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Abstract
Schraufnagel, William Ernest. PhD. The University of Memphis. May, 2017.
“Kenneth Burke’s Adolescence, 1915-1920: An Archival Study of Influence.” Antonio
de Velasco, PhD.
This dissertation applies the method of influence studies to the archive of communication
theorist Kenneth Burke (1897-1993) between the years 1915-1920. During this time,
Burke was influenced by British and French aesthetic writers along with some philosophy
and the writings of Cicero. As he was not conventionally trained in an academic
discipline, this study shows how Burke’s theory of communication began to emerge from
these disparate strands.
The strongest influence on Burke during this time was the novel Marius the
Epicurean by Walter Pater. As Harold Bloom’s theory of influence teaches, strong
writers such as Burke “misread,” or willfully distort, their precursors in order to create
space for themselves. Pater exalts “sensation” as the core of aesthetic experience, and
Burke henceforward develops a bias against “sensation” in favor of “intelligence.”
I track this bias through Burke’s encounter with American, Russian, and French
novelists, mostly revealed through Burke’s letters to his friend Malcolm Cowley. I
describe how Burke’s point of view was complicated by reading Arthur Schopenhauer,
Henri Bergson, and Cicero, and place in this context many early texts that have not been
studied: an unfinished novel, book reviews, short stories, essays, and notes. Although
there is no one central document, together they show repetitive themes of sensation and
intellect against backdrops of the city, country, history, and the differences between
France and America. The final influence considered, Remy de Gourmont, introduces a
definite historical bias that Burke maintained his whole life. Apologist for the Jesuits,
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Gourmont reinforced Burke’s image of a Catholic Middle Age in Europe, an era of stable
and unified meanings that, if it cannot be recreated, still points to a universal promise.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Kenneth Burke as a Communication Theorist
One of the oldest threads in the field of Communication extends back to early 20th
century teachers of speech and the academic study of oratory—a speaker addressing a
public in a deliberative, judicial, ceremonial, or sermonic context—itself a tradition
dating to ancient Greece and Rome. Thomas Benson writes that around the mid-1960s,
“Younger scholars interested in rhetoric and public address began to develop in earnest
the view that the domain of rhetorical activity extended beyond oratory, and that the
range of rhetorical theory extended far beyond the probable ‘impact’ of a single message”
(4-5).1 Within this milieu, scholars seized upon an idiosyncratic writer who “had been
available but hardly visible” (5), a man without a college degree named Kenneth Burke.
At that moment, Benson claims, Burke helped Communication scholars justify the
field’s “turn … from probability and referentiality and effectiveness to human knowledge
as essentially invented” (6). A collection published by the Speech Communication
Association in 1978 entitled Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action illustrates this
trend, and cites Burke’s definition of form to support the editors’ claim that “forms … are
stylistic and substantive responses to perceived situational demands” (19). The transition
from the study of oratory within its own terms, and the terms of Aristotelian logic, to the
study of rhetorical forms as human action within social, psychological, historical, and/or
material constraints, abstracts from the points of view of the rhetor (speaker) and
audience, widening the scope of analysis.
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One book frequently associated with this paradigm shift is Edwin Black’s Rhetorical Criticism: A
Study in Method, first published in 1965, and re-issued in 1978. Black’s introduction to the second
edition offers a paean to “personally expressive” criticism (x).
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Within this scope, Burke singled out identification as the central communicative
act. Following the Enlightenment-era alienation of European individuality, Burke
“corrects” the ancient emphasis on the deliberate persuasion of oratory to “include
partially ‘unconscious’ factors in its appeal” (Nichols 7-8). What may be “unconscious”
in the speaker and audience is, however, hyperconscious in the mind of the analyst.
Rhetorical criticism, in the Burkean sense, abstracts the form of human actions to
uncover shared identities constructed and dismantled at every turn. These identifications
become, then, the substance of rhetoric and communication. Burke may not have
introduced this element of “partially unconscious” identifications into the study of
communication, but he emphasized and became associated with this concept.
Gregory Clark is the most recent among many to realize that the form of Burkean
identification is essentially aesthetic, or a matter of artistic appeal. In his book Civic Jazz:
American Music and Kenneth Burke on the Art of Getting Along (2015), Clark draws an
analogy between music and narrative plot. Like music,
Plot moves us along with it by prompting expectations. If what comes after is what
was expected, we remain in a state of mind that is mostly unchanged. But if
something unexpected happens, we are surprised, even disturbed, and must choose
whether to adapt and change perspective or reject the story altogether. (6)
This procedure, Burke suggests, works in the most rational argumentation, and need not
be separated from the most whimsical trill of the piano. Much of this plot, these changes,
operates beneath the level of explicit consciousness and we only feel a pull or push from
a given symbol of identification. To commune is to identify with another person,
however, not merely to “express” oneself. Clark describes this process as recursive: “it is
only in the process of careful listening that saying something that matters enough to
others to prompt them to change becomes possible” (15). This dilemma plays out along
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two sets of parallel axes: the spectrum between sensation and intellect, and the spectrum
between expression and art.
In a late essay titled “Poetics and Communication” (1970), Burke recalled first
depicting sensation and “expression” as individual and intuitive, with the intellect and
“communication” deliberate and “even … scheming” (402). But he also sought a third
term to transcend this dichotomy, which, oddly or not, he found in theological
contemplation, combining intuitive “faith” with rational intelligence. Such a mode no
longer attaches purposive discourse to a specific audience, but works up to the logic of
the symbol-system as a whole.
Constructed dialectically through human discourse, symbol-systems still operate
on a “pure” logic of their own, at least to the eye of the discerning analyst. A particular
linguistic operation in response to some concrete situation is subordinated, or suspended
under “some one generating principle that is implicit in all its parts” (404). This is not an
Aristotelian dialectic of reasoned questioners in pursuit of knowledge, but a dialectic
(perhaps more Hegelian?) of terms interrelated by essentially aesthetic forms.
Thus, the philosophy of communication Burke named “dramatism” employs the
grammar of the stage—scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose—in a way more complex
than merely to say “all the world’s a stage.” What holds together the coherence of a
drama is the same diffusion of “ultimate” principle(s) that enables the most rudimentary
human communication. We speak differently when we say that a “scene” generates a
symbolic, rhetorical, or communicative action, than when we say an “agent” or a
“purpose” generates it. Theological terms such as guilt and redemption are also common
“master terms,” which for Burke mean simply dominant human motives or situations.
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From an origin in late 19th century aesthetic theories and the problem of postRomantic expression, Burke transforms the study of communication into a philosophical
investigation of the relationships between terms.2 To be coherent as a language
(functioning symbol-system), these terms must be subordinated under a concept of order.
This definition of communication theory may perhaps appear strange to those who
consider communication only empirically, as the observation of a speech-act or other
kind of “message.” Burke encourages communication scholars to search out the
“ultimate” principles by which language allows messages to be enunciated. Examples of
these messages can be found everywhere, but to Burke some of the most thorough, and
therefore the most instructive, can be found in literary, musical, philosophical, and
theological works.
All these modes of thorough-going symbolic cohesion, the exemplars and holding
places of form, in turn constitute human identities and therefore make up the real
substance of communication. They all embody the mutual-interdependence Burke came
to associate with architecture and ritual, additional terms for order. Communication is
“magical” in so far as it ritually names, un-names, and re-names identities and realities.
But it is “architectural” insofar as it depends on social, material, ideological, aesthetic,
technological, and economic constraints—even depends on concepts of the
“supernatural.”
The originality and difficulty of Burke’s communication theory lies in its
combination and blurring of conventional academic disciplines. Under the heading of

2

I thank Professor Hoke Robinson for pointing out that the relationship between terms is invented. An
example he used during the defense of this dissertation was the association between the words
“trivium,” standing for the three disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, and the adjective “trivial,”
which came to stand for subjects not worthy of serious attention.
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“rhetoric” it includes a little aesthetic literature and a little philosophy. Some critics have
objected to this mixture, but others have attempted to develop, or at least elucidate
Burke’s curious synthesis. Whether the communication scholar has an explicit social,
pragmatic goal, such as Gregory Clark’s object of “getting along,” or whether one simply
wants the intellectual and dialectical satisfaction of following these thoughts through “to
the end,” Burke remains a unique voice in communication theory.
Long before these views crystallized into the somewhat wild architecture of his
later formulations, Kenneth Burke was a pimply-faced kid from Pittsburgh. By the time
he reached his twenties, Burke was already looking back with mixed feelings upon his
“adolescence.” In high school he had felt himself to be “literary,” and wanted to be a
writer. His struggle to develop a literary identity became, in part, a revisionary struggle
against the memory, and written archive, of his own adolescence.
By turning to Burke’s archive, we can enrich our understanding of his theoretical
perspective at its origins. This allows us a closer and more detailed look at Burke’s key
insight: the rhetorical nature of aesthetics, and the aesthetic nature of rhetoric. Using the
same terms the young Burke used to describe these problems, we can transpose
“aesthetic” and “rhetoric” into “sensation” and “intelligence” or “expression” and “art.”
We can bear in mind, as well, Burke’s later concept of “identification” to see how
rhetoric and communication always straddle these two realms. Burke detected something
dualistic or “dialectical” in the metaphysics of words, and this duality emerged precisely
in Burke’s struggle with his aesthetic precursors. Fittingly enough, “aestheticism” and
“adolescence” became an enduring association of ideas in Burke’s legacy.

5

The following dissertation makes use of heretofore unstudied documents in
Burke’s archive between the years 1915-1920, in three distinct “movements” or
“moments.” The first emerges from Burke’s high school experience as a devotee of Oscar
Wilde and Russian literature, through his first encounters with the literary scene in
Greenwich Village (especially Theodore Dreiser) and his readings of influential novels
by Walter Pater and André Gide. This takes the narrative through the end of 1916. During
this period Burke writes mostly poems and letters to his best friend Malcolm Cowley, but
the letters, especially, reveal a profundity of literary reflection by the 18- and 19-year-old
young man, ambitious for a career in letters. The key influence on Burke at this time was
Marius the Epicurean, a novel of successive rituals by Pater.
The narrative picks up again in May 1917 when Burke attends Columbia
University and reads the philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Henri Bergson. After
Bergson, to whom Burke inclined more than Schopenhauer, Burke integrated a temporal
element into his literary reflections to Cowley. Burke begins to think in “ages” and
“stages,” both of individual human life—puberty, adolescence, maturity—and in history.
By Fall 1917, Burke formulated theories on the relationship between historical periods
(such as the “Renaissance”) and kinds of “expression” which may be suitable to different
“ages” of human life. Modernism, in Burke’s view, may be typically “adolescent,” the
broken years of transition, as the passage of time ironically wears down conventions
which make for social maturity. Already, when he is 20 years old, we can see Burke’s
notion that symbol-systems are complete and transcend the participation of any single
speaker, writer, or discursive act, even a writer as original as William Shakespeare.
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Along with his philosophical training at Columbia, Burke spends much of 1917
reading and considering the works of Cicero: especially the Letters to Atticus. The idea
that artistic conventions are bound by historical period suggests to Burke that the essence
of communication, which he has not yet separated from “expression,” lies in the
translatability of a medium among persons. In this respect, he reasons, letters or epistles
are superior to the multiform but inadequate media available to modern artists: letters
require an audience of an “other” for their very possibility, a “concession” as Burke terms
it. Burke looks to Cicero and ancient Rome as a time when there was no gap between
expression and the conventions of discourse.
In Cicero’s Rome, public oratory and its contemplation did in fact unify both
speaker and audience in something like a totality of meaning, or at least its possibility.
The concepts of duty and service to the state, with the emblem of the State itself,
provided ultimate terms toward which Cicero oriented himself. The fact that the
crumbling of the Republic coincided roughly with the death of Cicero only reinforces
Cicero’s representative status. In 1917, Burke felt something like this unified civic
impulse in the act of letter-writing (mostly to Cowley, but to others as well). The impulse
was so strong as to make Burke doubt the efficacy of his ongoing (“modern”) education
at Columbia, and I believe this to have prompted Burke to reject school.
The final movement of the arc described by this dissertation begins after Burke
drops out of Columbia in 1918. It had been necessary, when discussing Burke’s year at
Columbia, to introduce some basic metaphysics of Immanuel Kant, Schopenhauer, and
Bergson, in order to make sense of the historical element in Burke’s thinking starting at
that time. The concept of “form” is introduced in that section only obliquely, in a way
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prematurely, for Burke was not in the habit of using the term until later, in the 1920s.
However, the philosophical meaning of “form,” and its relationship to time in Bergson,
helps us to see where Burke was headed at this early age.
Archival materials for the final movement, from the years 1918-1920, present
some difficulties of arrangement which have perhaps not been satisfactorily solved. In the
effort to provide both scope and detail, I have included both fiction and non-fictional
essays and book reviews together in the same chapter. In a way, these are two separate if
parallel tracks of Burke’s effort. I find it useful to read them together. Both these sets of
documents share Burke’s concern at the time with passage from adolescence to maturity,
and form as a negotiation between sensation and the intellect.
The plot of a short story, in its content, can be a kind of miniature thesis on human
relations. In its form, or the sequence of development, it can establish different sorts of
relations between author and reader. This reflects Burke’s double awareness of empirical
communication—the temporal exchange of glances and words between individuals—and
the dialectical possibilities of communication, bound as they are to socialized or
conventional expectations of readers and listeners, contingent upon history and culture.
The theoretical essays considered in that chapter show some of Burke’s explicit claims on
these subjects, especially a comparison of French and American writers.
The dissertation concludes with Burke’s essay on the French aesthete Remy de
Gourmont, not only because the publication of this essay was an epochal moment in
Burke’s career, but because Gourmont was the most synthetic and complex influence
Burke experienced through that point. Gourmont combined a metaphysics of sensation
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worthy of Pater, with an historical consciousness worthy of Bergson, and, like Burke,
looked back to the European Middle Age as a time of unified conventional meanings.
I stop with Burke as an essayist and communication theorist at Gourmont in mid1920. Gourmont’s depiction of the Jesuits in Le Chemin de Velours [The Velvet Path]
points to the complexity with which Burke later considers language in general. Thus
Gourmont provides a suitable end point to a study concerned with Burke’s incipient
communication theory.
Biographical Prelude
This dissertation tells of a young man who, by the time of his high school
graduation in 1915, determined to make his mark upon the world. He made of the
universal problem of vocation a concrete problem of communication, and his solution,
developed over a lifetime, gradually secured him a place as one of the most original,
provocative, and challenging communication theorists of the twentieth century. The name
Kenneth Burke is familiar to many scholars in rhetorical studies, and perhaps some
beyond that domain.
Of Burke’s high school years, we have scattered information in the form of
reminiscences by himself and his closest friend Malcolm Cowley. The earliest dated
documents in his archive include poems, three from as early as 1914, and letters to
Cowley, beginning in September 1915, after Cowley matriculated at Harvard. After
Burke graduated high school, his family moved from Pittsburgh to Weehawken, New
Jersey, and Burke sought out literary contacts in New York City. In the spring of 1916 he
attended the Ohio State University but returned to New Jersey that fall. The following
year, 1917, he enrolled in Columbia University, began to read philosophy, and started to
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write a novel which he soon abandoned. Meanwhile, by age twenty, he had become
fluent in French, German, and Latin.
Burke wrote a few short stories and what appears to be his first book review,
never published, in the fall of 1917. He enrolled for a second semester at Columbia,
where he wrote four essays for an English literature class which are still extant. After this
semester, however, he dropped out of college for good and began life as a bohemian in
Greenwich Village. Burke wrote what became his first major short story, “The White
Oxen” (finished by March 1918) and studied literature in earnest, especially French. He
wrote another short story, “The Buried Titan,” which he considered a failure but would
eventually revise. By October 1918 he began another, “The Birth of a Philosophy.” He
spent most of 1919 writing short fiction and got married that year at age twenty-two.
At the beginning of 1920 he had a few minor publications and wrote more essays:
book reviews and what we might call cultural commentaries. These complex essays
reflected both his wide reading and a burgeoning interest in metaphysics. His first child
was born in 1920 and he now had to support a family with his writing. His first published
book review appeared in April 1920, while he read and took notes on some eighteen
works by the French writer Remy de Gourmont. He completed an essay on this author by
the summer of 1920, a breakthrough publication in The Dial, a magazine which would
soon employ Burke full time.
Burke’s Adolescence: From Expression to Art
This is only the beginning of Kenneth Burke’s story, but a close study of
documents from these five years, 1915-1920, contains enough material to make a
substantial contribution to rhetorical studies and communication theory. All too

10

frequently writers, including Burke himself, dismiss Burke’s earliest years as
“adolescent,” self-absorbed in a world of aesthetic decadence, an “art-for-art’s-sake”
mentality left over from England and France at the end of the nineteenth century. Burke
establishes this point of view in the title of the first chapter to his first critical book,
Counter-Statement, published in 1931, but begun in the early 1920s. That chapter is titled
“Three Adepts of ‘Pure’ Literature,” and Burke chooses, not arbitrarily, Gustave
Flaubert, Walter Pater, and Remy de Gourmont as his representatives.
By portraying the English and French aesthetes as individualistically and privately
absorbed with the problems of art, to exclusion of any social awareness, Burke and his
exegetes prepare the way for its alternative, a socially-minded critic whose object of
study, rhetoric, transcends the individual’s myopic quest for artistic expression. As early
as 1917, Burke attributed this obsession with “self-expression” to the modern era in
particular, linking modes of communication to historical periods and social
configurations.
Burke was, then, concerned with the transition from the individual to society, or
expression to art, but this concern is present from the very earliest documents we possess.
We do a service neither to Burke nor to rhetorical theory in general when we lump
Burke’s early career as an opaque “aestheticism” marked by a sudden transition to “social
concern” (many scholars pick the stock market crash of 1929 as a turning point). Rather,
this dissertation shows Burke’s “adolescence” marked by multiple, progressive struggles
from solipsism into socialization, a process of “maturity” punctuated by crises of
communication. It is the object of this study to chart these moments, and this progression,
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in as minute detail as the archive, along with personal and institutional constraints, can
sustain, from 1915 to 1920.
A series of agonistic struggles with aesthetic writers from England and France,
novelists from Russia and the United States, and a slight admixture of philosophy and
Latin rhetoric, prepared Burke’s arrival as a fiction writer, critic, and editor for The Dial
in the 1920s. Walter Pater’s Marius the Epicurean was Burke’s paradigm in fiction, and
Remy de Gourmont became something of a model for a critic who wished to combine
historical and biological metaphysics in the analysis of art. In addition to Pater and
Gourmont, these two towering aesthetes, this period of Burke’s life, from ages eighteen
to twenty-three (1915-20), includes a wider cast of characters: George Meredith, Oscar
Wilde, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Theodore Dreiser, André Gide, Arthur Schopenhauer, Henri
Bergson, and Cicero.
Pleasure, aesthetics, and sensation are the antecedents against which Burke
wrestles free in the name of intelligence, architecture, and the communicative fiction we
call “audience.” Reading Cicero in 1917 and struggling with the problems of writing
fiction, Burke experienced what I call a “rhetorical awakening” which impelled him to
drop out of Columbia University, probably the most drastic decision he had made up to
that point. I capture this rhetorical awakening in two sentences from a hand-written letter
to Malcolm Cowley dated December 10, 1917.
Having read the letters of Cicero and Pliny, and discovered an essay by Walter
Pater on the letters of Flaubert, Burke decides to write a book about letters:
The introductory essay, of course, will advance my usual thesis that art, fictional art,
is inimical to self-expression, and that the epistolary form is the best of all mediums.
Where it defeats the diary is in the fact that the writer of the letter is making some
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concession to an audience, a thing which is necessary in the creation of a medium.
(To Cowley 12/10/17)
Through the period under discussion in this study, Burke remained ambivalent toward the
antithetical terms “art” and “expression.” Here he favors expression over art, and yet he
ties expression to concession to an audience. It is probably best to consider that Burke
wanted to bring the two, art and expression, together. The synthetic term, “medium,”
allows for this possibility. The oscillation between art and expression in search of a
medium forms a dominant thematic for understanding Burke’s “adolescence.”
Influence Studies: Sensation and Intelligence
The methodology of this study derives from the work of literary scholar Harold
Bloom during the decade 1973-1983, during which time, incidentally, Burke proved an
important influence on Bloom.3 According to Bloom, “A text is a relational event, and
not a substance to be analyzed. … Poetry is poems speaking to a poem, and is also that
poem answering back with its own defensive discourse” (Kabbalah 106, 108). We can
substitute any text for Bloom’s “poetry” here and look at the text of Burke—poems,
notes, essays, stories, letters—vis-à-vis several of the texts created by his precursors, to
which Burke responded. The precursors treated below include Meredith, Wilde, Pater,
Dostoevsky, Dreiser, Gide, Schopenhauer, Bergson, and Gourmont, among a few others.
Responding to these writers, Burke chipped his way into an original aesthetic
theory. Per Bloom’s theory, Burke “misread” his precursors determined by the pressure
to open discursive space for himself. A clear example of this can be seen in Burke’s
ambivalent relationship to Pater. Burke adored Marius the Epicurean when he read it in

3

The present author completed a master’s thesis entitled “The Influence of Kenneth Burke on Harold
Bloom,” under the direction of Ellen Quandahl, in 2008. I had the privilege to present a copy of this
thesis to Bloom on July 12, 2012, one day after his 82 nd birthday.
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October 1915, but swerved from Pater’s emphasis on sensation to an emphasis on
intelligence. Burke’s first major short story, “The White Oxen,” misreads Marius the
Epicurean. Both narratives describe the coming-of-age of a young man through a
sequence of meaningful relationships. Marius, Pater’s hero, preserves his taste for
sensations and “impressions” to the end, and Pater persistently affirms their dignity.
Burke, on the other hand, places the metaphysical concept of “sensation” into the more
ambivalent vehicle of the “white oxen.”4 The white oxen, with Burke’s hero Matthew
Carr vicariously through them, feel sensation dumbly, without intelligence. Something
about this appeals to Burke, and something frightens him. We can say that the white oxen
represent Burke’s mis-representation of Walter Pater.
Practicing influence study, it must be acknowledged, implicates the “third party”
or critic in the system of misreadings. Pater’s text stares back defensively at Burke’s text,
but only through the medium of the third-party critic. One might say that the critic,
having encountered the younger writer (“ephebe” in Bloom’s terminology), searches the
older critic (“precursor”) to defend against the ephebe’s influence on the critic. I have
previously5 employed the following diagram to illustrate this process:
“Unknown God”6

Precursor
↑
Ephebe

Precursor
→
↑
Ephebe
Critic
Figure 1. The critic’s clinamen.
4

Flaubert’s Sentimental Education contains a kind of folk song, “I’ve two great oxen in my byre, / Two
great white oxen …” (288), from which Burke may have picked up the image.

5

See Schraufnagel (MA Thesis, p. 11).

6

See Harold Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism: “[E]very new poet tries to see his precursor as the
demiurge, and seeks to look beyond him to the unknown God, while knowing secretly that to be a
strong poet is to be a demiurge” (64).
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I encountered Kenneth Burke some ten years ago, and found myself in the position of
ephebe with Burke as a necessary precursor. To circumvent this influence, one reverses
the terms and makes the precursor into an ephebe to some writers two steps prior, who at
first may appear to be “unknown gods.” Through the labor of reading those earlier
writers—in this case Pater, Bergson, et al.—the ephebe becomes in turn an antithetical
critic, “correcting” the precursor, now an ephebe, through the critic’s reading of the
“unknown gods,” now become precursors. Harold Bloom describes the process in a more
subjective, impressionistic, and indeed poetic way:
Criticism then necessarily becomes antithetical also, a series of swerves after
unique acts of creative misunderstanding.
The first swerve is to learn to read a great precursor poet as his greater
descendants compelled themselves to read him.
The second is to read the descendants as if we were their disciples, and so compel
ourselves to learn where we must revise them if we are to be found by our own work,
and claimed by the living of our own lives.
… [Antithetical Criticism] begins when we measure the first clinamen [swerve]
against the second. Finding just what the accent of deviation is, we proceed to apply it
as a corrective to the reading of the first but not the second poet or group of poets. To
practice Antithetical Criticism on the more recent poet or poets becomes possible
only when they have found disciples not ourselves. But these can be critics, and not
poets. (Anxiety 93-94)
We first read the precursors (Meredith, Wilde, Dostoevsky, Dreiser, Gide, Bergson,
Schopenhauer, above all Pater and Gourmont) as we believe Kenneth Burke compelled
himself to read them. Then we employ our difference from Burke (our own lives and
work) to determine where we must revise his reading.
Essentially, we measure the difference between Burke’s and our reading of his
precursors. We gain a fresh access to those precursors precisely and solely through our
difference from Burke. We read the precursors twice: once from Burke’s point of view,
and once from our own. The difference between the two readings measures our subjective
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misreading of each ratio, e.g. Pater/Burke, or Bergson/Burke. Peculiarly, at first, this
teaches us more about the precursors than about Kenneth Burke.
To What End?
The results of this study can be boiled down to two claims: First, if Kenneth
Burke is accepted as a legitimate figure in the history of rhetoric, then his precursors also,
including Walter Pater, Henri Bergson, and Remy de Gourmont, must be considered
germane to rhetorical theory by virtue of their influence on Burke. This study proves this
contention, by establishing the fact of their influence, and demonstrates their insights into
rhetoric. By nature of the case, these insights into communication are drawn upon the
metaphysical axes of “sensation” and “intelligence.” It therefore equally argues the
necessity of these terms for rhetorical criticism pursued along these lines.
Second, antithetical criticism of Kenneth Burke should remove current prejudice
against Burke’s early period, and demonstrate how, far from an exclusive and solipsistic
aestheticism, the young Burke’s explorations of poetry and fiction led him directly into
the arms of rhetoric via the “epistolary form,” in other words, the problematics of letterwriting. This discovery, prompted in no small part by Cicero and what I call a “rhetorical
awakening,” was soon accompanied by a “Catholic awakening,” prompted largely by
Remy de Gourmont. From this moment, experienced in the first half of 1920, Burke
imagined the European and Catholic Middle Ages to be a period wherein ritual
successfully joined the private need for expression with the social and conventional
demands of art. The transition from Roman rhetoric to Catholic casuistry is also
anticipated in Marius the Epicurean by Walter Pater.
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Such a reading emerges, through antithetical criticism, from a subtler and more
detailed picture of the discursive events in Burke’s “adolescence” (ages 18-23) than has
so far been perceived by contemporary critics. Such a re-imagined Burke is possible only
after the double gesture of wiping away a received accrual of commonplaces, and
restoration of the archive to its fullest possible texture.
I consider myself to have opened Kenneth Burke as an object of antithetical
criticism in my master’s thesis, in which I placed myself alongside Harold Bloom as a
disciple of Burke. In that study, I determined that action in Burke is more important than
agent, while the reverse seemed to be true in Bloom’s criticism (his drama of poetic
influence). This equips me with an insight to bring to the reading of Walter Pater, Henri
Bergson, and Remy de Gourmont, among others. (It also helps that Bloom employs Pater
as an “unknown God” to implicitly challenge his precursor Burke).
In other words, I can read Marius the Epicurean and ask: what symbolic action
does this novel perform? I discover what Harold Bloom has found before me, that
Marius the Epicurean is constructed as a series of rituals, each of which is absorbed
into its successor without being destroyed or even transcended. As art was ritual for
Pater, so life is ritual for Marius, the ordering principle always being that no form or
possibility of life (or of art) is to be renounced in favor of any other. (xvi)
Now I can read Burke’s fiction in no other way. Bloom preserves, knowingly or not, the
dialectic between “art” and “life” that so distressed and preoccupied not only Pater, Oscar
Wilde, and André Gide, but also the adolescent Kenneth Burke.
With Marius in mind, I turn to Burke’s writings about Pater, but more importantly
to Burke’s fiction. One considers the “ritual” of Burke’s fiction, and becomes shocked to
recognize oneself practicing antithetical criticism on Pater; we ask ourselves in what way
can Pater inform us as to the means of Kenneth Burke, the great rhetorical writer? Lois
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Peters Agnew has attempted to recover Pater for the rhetorical tradition by linking “ethics
and aesthetic expression” in Pater (43), and she argues that Pater “preserves the basic
sense that aesthetic experience has a social and historical significance” (39). Armed with
the antithetical method of influence studies, we can go further than Agnew.
Pater’s sequence of rituals in Marius the Epicurean includes the dramatization of
a public address by the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius beginning with the highly
stylized, “Art thou in love with men’s praises, get thee into the very soul of them, and
see!” (134), itself a methodology of rhetorical criticism in miniature. The seed planted by
Marius the Epicurean in the young Kenneth Burke grew over time into Burke’s
metaphysics of ritualistic rhetoric, or the rhetoric of ritual. All our deductions from
antithetical criticism of Burke’s aesthetic precursors may not be so precise as this, but
then few works influenced Burke so deeply or sharply as Marius the Epicurean during
this period.
Of all the works discussed below, I believe only Creative Evolution by Henri
Bergson and the combination of The Culture of Ideas [La Culture des Idées] and The
Velvet Path by Remy de Gourmont to have operated on Burke with something like
analogous power. As the influences of Pater, Bergson, and Gourmont on Burke can all be
measured with respect to each writer’s stance on the question of sensation and
intelligence, these terms, along with “expression” and “art,” become necessary terms of
rhetorical criticism in this context. The primary outcome, then, of this study, is to open up
the “precursors”—Pater, Bergson, and Gourmont especially—as objects of antithetical
criticism. Another objective is fulfilled along the way, which is secondary but may at first
seem more immediately plangent.
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That is the correction of a prevalent “canonical” criticism of Kenneth Burke. Over
the twentieth century Burke has gained many disciples indeed. Harold Bloom has already
been mentioned,7 but an earlier and more widely influential disciple was William H.
Rueckert, referred to often as the “Dean of Burke Studies.” Closer to our own time,
Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, Timothy Crusius, and Bryan Crable, among
others, have devised various periodizing schemes to cut up Burke’s career and render
judgments about different phases. They all accept without question, as did the later Burke
himself, that Burke’s youth or “adolescence” is ideologically cut off from the rest of his
career, and so, by extension, are the aesthetic writers Burke admired. The two objectives
of this dissertation, to restore the aesthetic writers to prominence in rhetorical theory, and
to “rhetoricize” the aesthetic struggles of Burke’s youth, are complementary and achieved
simultaneously.
Three Stylistic Features of this Dissertation
Readers may be struck by three potentially anomalous features in the style of the
following dissertation. The first is the preponderance of literary and philosophical texts in
what presumes to be a dissertation in rhetorical studies. With the major exception of
Cicero, the authors discussed here tend to be novelists and philosophers. Corresponding
to the two overall objectives listed in the previous section, on the one hand, I desire that
the reader should begin to consider Pater and other “precursors” in terms of rhetoric,
specifically regarding the “sensational” or “sensual” versus the “intelligible” aspects of

7

James Arnt Aune was the first, both to call attention to Burke’s influence on Bloom, and to call for a
Bloomian-style influence study of Kenneth Burke. To my knowledge the present dissertation is the first
attempt to answer Aune’s call, issued over three decades ago in 1983.
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rhetoric, perhaps held together in the rituals of fiction and philosophy. On the other, our
association with Burke as a rhetorical theorist retrofits a canonical back-formation.
Before the “rhetorical” stances he achieved in the essays of the early 1920s, which
form the bulk of Counter-Statement, Burke encountered novels and philosophers,
attempting to develop from within them a vocabulary suitable to criticism. For a while
Pater overwhelmed him. It was the intellect versus sensation, art versus life, art versus
expression. By the time he reaches Gourmont (the end point of this study) Burke’s theory
of “form” is not yet complete, but his historiography may be nearly settled. In part this
reveals the extent to which all the “precursors,” again saving Cicero, represent a modern
diffusion, the insufficiency of art to expression, and expression to art. As Burke’s
canonical exegetes intuit, modern aestheticism may not have had a vocabulary suitable to
rhetoric.
The second anomaly, perhaps, consists in the few sections of this dissertation
which seem to depart altogether from a discussion of Burke, in favor of one or more
“precursors.” The two largest examples of this in what follows are, first, the philosophical
excursion on Kant, Schopenhauer, and Bergson, and second, the paragraphs on Cicero.
What justifies these in a dissertation on Burke? Indeed, Burke’s references to
Schopenhauer, Bergson, and Cicero are scant compared to those on Pater and Gourmont.
It is not obvious that Schopenhauer had a very deep impact on Burke, despite evidence of
a precise impact in a hand-written note. Except for a consciousness of time in Burke’s
essays, it is difficult to say much about Bergson’s direct influence on Burke. And Burke’s
discourse certainly was never “Ciceronian” in the way that his fiction is Paterian.
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We do not have to witness the presence of a precursor in an ephebe’s text in order
to measure the ratio of difference, or influence, between the two texts. Because Burke
read Schopenhauer and Bergson at the same time, mentioned their books in the same
letter, and Bergson clearly had an agonistic stance toward the German tradition of Kant
and Schopenhauer, it seems appropriate to discuss all three of them together. By the
procedure of antithetical criticism, outlined above, it is appropriate to read the two
philosophers, Schopenhauer and Bergson, as Burke tried to read them—to assist writing
his novel. Bergson in particular helped Burke calibrate an attitude toward moving time in
a way that emerges perhaps only in his essays. The fact that Pater remained a stronger
influence on Burke’s fiction suggests that Burke subordinated his misprision of Bergson
to that of Pater. He could read Bergson, in other words, only under the greater influence
of his swerve from Pater. (The same could be said in turn for Gourmont, under the double
influence of Pater and Bergson).
Whatever the case, antithetical criticism attempts to hold apart the readings of
precursor and ephebe as much as its strength will permit. For instance, Cicero is so much
the stronger influence on Burke than Theodore Dreiser, that it is possible to dispatch
Burke’s reading of some one and a half thousand pages of Dreiser with a few short
quotations, mostly subordinated to Burke’s own trajectory; and one can write and write of
Cicero’s complexities without even beginning to show their practical manifestations in
Burke. Something similar holds for Bergson—Burke does not write much of Bergson at
all, but at a terrifying moment, after he has quit Columbia for good, something about
Bergson’s temporality floods in to comfort Burke, and affirm him in his course.
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The third and most omnipresent stylistic feature is what may at times appear to be
excruciating and even unnecessary detail. Why narrow the microscope so finely as to spin
scores of written pages on a few years of the archive, containing almost nothing
published in Burke’s lifetime? Cannot the main points be accomplished in fewer strokes,
and with greater elegance? Why tire the reader with every small reference to this and that
turn of thought or book that Burke read? Is it not trivial, tiresome, and gossipy? To this I
answer that these details are precisely what have been lost through canonical criticism,
the bland acceptance of commonplaces as received wisdom. Now that we possess this
wealth of documents in the archive, it is best for us to deepen and enrich the scholarly
record with the greatest possible mass of documentary evidence, without sacrificing the
architecture of concepts, the sequence of arguments, and the weight of judgment.
Empirically, the method of influence study as here essayed does sort the
precursors by degree of power. I would think it impossible to explain Burke’s earliest
fiction without reference to Marius the Epicurean, but such, alas, is a measure of my own
subjective experience. I can only submit it to my readers to measure it, if they will,
against my precursors and their own reading of me.
Sequence of Arguments
So far in this introduction I have made liberal use of the technical terms
“canonical” and “antithetical” criticism, but I have neither defined nor illustrated them.
The first order of business is to accomplish that, and place them in the context of Harold
Bloom’s influence criticism. Then I will elaborate the history of one thread of canonical
criticism: periodization of Kenneth Burke’s career, starting with Burke’s own assessment
in the 1950s. I show how the various attempts to arrange Burke’s career into periods can
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be complicated by personal narratives, and how both periods and narratives are further
disrupted by the archive. After presenting the phenomena of periodization, narrative, and
the archive in Kenneth Burke studies, I offer the approach of influence study. This rounds
out the dissertation’s methodology from large to minute scale, and this labor constitutes
Chapter 2.
I begin the chronological sequence with a discussion of Burke’s poetry, which I
argue was influenced more directly by George Meredith and Oscar Wilde than Jules
Laforgue, whom posterity has attached to Burke’s adolescence. With this entry into
practical criticism, I discuss Burke’s first encounter with Marius the Epicurean in Fall
1915, a crisis he experiences in late January 1916, and his discovery of André Gide in
Fall 1916. This period of one and a half years, from about September 1915 through
December 1916, establishes Burke’s relationship with Meredith, Wilde, Pater,
Dostoevsky, Dreiser, and Gide, and introduces the major themes of sensation vs.
intelligence, art vs. life (the problem of autobiography), and art vs. expression. This is
Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 begins in May 1917 as Burke reads Schopenhauer and Bergson at
Columbia. Therefore, for the first time I depart from an orderly chronology to discuss
Bergson’s theory of time against Bergson’s precursors Kant and Schopenhauer.
Indirectly, through one of Burke’s notes on Schopenhauer, I suggest how Burke’s
intuition led him to the Frenchman over the German. In preview of my own
“periodization” (I am not exempt from this necessity) I offer some documentary
references made by Burke during this time to the concept of “adolescence.” Then I
discuss his works of Summer-Fall 1917: the novel “Fallow Ground” against the backdrop

23

of art vs. expression, his first book review “Two Sordid Books,” his short stories of Fall
1917, his Columbia essays on the English Renaissance, and finally, the “rhetorical
awakening” he experiences as a result of Cicero and the reading of letters. The pivot to
conclude this chapter is his dropping out of Columbia in January 1918.
The final chapter, Chapter 5, moves to consider the fiction Burke wrote from 1918
to 1920, a few undated essays likely written during early 1920, and his agon with Remy
de Gourmont. Beginning with his fiction, we see the influence of Marius the Epicurean
as Burke matches narrative techniques and symbols to metaphysical inclinations. The city
and the country and sexual negotiation are the most obvious instances of varying balance
between sensation and intellect, still Burke’s dominant concern at this time, but I also
consider the transcendent landscape, ritual, and architecture in the stories.
Concluding with a few undated essays and Remy de Gourmont brings us again to
a precursor figure as close to stature and complexity as Walter Pater. Burke’s study of
Gourmont wages agon, or discursive battle, with Pater as well. Both aesthetes wrote
fiction and criticism, as Burke did in 1920. We can see Burke emerging into something
like a synthesis as a critic in that year, aided by Bergson’s metaphysics of time. In five
years, this material is enough to work us through some version of Kenneth Burke’s
“adolescence.”
Summary of Arguments
Chapter 1 – Introduction


Kenneth Burke’s central contribution to rhetorical and communication theory, the
concept of identification, works on the level of aesthetic form.
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◦ That which allows for the coherence of a building, a drama, or a ritual, is also
that which allows humans to identify with one another.


Kenneth Burke’s archive allows scholars to observe the emergence of his
perspective in minute detail: a struggle for individuation against aesthetic
precursors.



The dissertation covers three archival moments or “movements” of Burke’s
development between 1915 and 1920.
◦ From high school graduation in 1915 to the end of 1916, Burke was most
influenced by George Meredith, Oscar Wilde, Walter Pater (Marius the
Epicurean), Theodore Dreiser, Russian novelists (especially Dostoevsky’s
The Idiot), and André Gide (La Porte Étroite). [Chapter 3]
◦ In 1917, Burke read Arthur Schopenhauer, Henri Bergson, and Cicero, and
wrote an abandoned novel, his first book review, short stories, and critical
essays marked by historical metaphysics, before dropping out of Columbia
University in January 1918. [Chapter 4]
◦ Coverage of the period immediately after 1918 follows two parallel tracks:
fiction Burke wrote from 1918-20, with its experimental negotiations between
sensation and form, and a few of Burke’s critical essays, culminating in his
reading of Remy de Gourmont in mid-1920. [Chapter 5]



“Aesthetics” and “Adolescence” became associated in the standard interpretation
of Burke’s earliest years.



A partial rejection of aesthetics by Burke and his followers allowed a space for
“rhetorical” or social criticism, at the expense of sensation.
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Harold Bloom’s theory of influence helps us understand Burke’s ambivalent
relationship toward his aesthetic precursors.
◦ To follow this method entails measuring the difference between the
precursor’s text, and Burke’s interpretation or misreading of that text.



The dissertation aims to clear away canonical interpretations and to restore in as
much detail as possible the scholarly record of Burke’s life and work from 19151920.



The dissertation also aims, through antithetical criticism, to change the way we
think of rhetorical history in this period: to think of aesthetic writers as more
“rhetorical” (Burkean), and to think of Burke as more “aesthetic.”

Chapter 2 – Theory and Methodology


Harold Bloom has distinguished “canonical” from “antithetical” criticism. The
former establishes a tradition and the latter subverts it.



Canonical criticism made possible Kenneth Burke’s incorporation into the
substance of the academy.
◦ Such a process involves, in the words of William H. Rueckert, “purification”
of Burke, or the elimination of certain details in favor of those that solidify an
institutional identity.



Canonical criticism represents stability; antithetical criticism represents change.
◦ In the 1930s, Burke acted as an antithetical critic in the name of history
against the ideology of aesthetic permanence.
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◦ By the 1970s, however, critics portrayed a canonical Burke as static, and
positioned themselves as the antithetical defenders of history, change, and
temporality.


Bloom’s diachronic rhetoric is based on kairos, the opportunistic imposition of
deceptive and/or persuasive logos with the competitive aim to see earliest.



Three main ways of considering Burke’s temporality include periodization,
narrative, and the archive.
◦ Periodization schemes tend to value Burke’s later work over his earlier.
◦ One dominant canonical prejudice is that Burke abandoned his aesthetic
adolescence in favor of a “mature” social and rhetorical criticism (by the
1930s), repeating a judgment made by Burke himself in the 1950s.
◦ Scholars use the archive to trouble the fixed period schemes brought on by
canonical purification.



The following dissertation exploits many heretofore unstudied documents, many
transcribed from handwriting, including poems, letters, notes, short stories, and
essays.



The following dissertation reads the archive through the critical/antithetical lens
of “influence” developed by literary scholar Harold Bloom.



This method singles out “precursors” of Kenneth Burke: George Meredith, Oscar
Wilde, Walter Pater, Fyodor Dostoevsky, André Gide, Arthur Schopenhauer,
Henri Bergson, Remy de Gourmont, and others.
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Chapter 3 – Life and Art (September 1914 to May 1917)


Canonical scholarship, starting with Burke himself and Malcolm Cowley, has
created a picture of Burke’s “adolescence” confined in the trope of “art for art’s
sake” and French Symbolism.
◦ Cowley’s memories are of dubious accuracy and archival evidence
complicates this picture.



Burke’s early poems reflect the comic attitude of George Meredith.



A conflict with his mentor Louis Wilkinson over the nature and quality of Oscar
Wilde may have steered Burke away from poetry, but Wilde’s influence on Burke
remained.



Marius the Epicurean by Walter Pater made the strongest impact on Burke of any
fiction when he read it in Fall 1915.
◦ Burke’s swerve (clinamen) from Pater can be expressed in the diagram
[sensation→ intellect].



Burke’s clinamen from Pater also influenced his reading of Theodore Dreiser and
Fyodor Dostoevsky, especially the character Ippolit Terentyev in the latter’s The
Idiot.



Burke experienced a crisis of wordlessness in a letter to Cowley of January 28,
1916.



André Gide and Arthur Schopenhauer soon gave Burke new ways to think about
the battle against Paterian “sensation.”
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Chapter 4 – Columbia University (May 1917 to January 6, 1918)


Kant’s transcendental aesthetic places time as part of humans’ internal intuition,
but does not grant it to be part of “things themselves.”



Schopenhauer maintains this concept of time, and places the Will likewise outside
of time.
◦ According to a hand-written note, Burke was uncomfortable with
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and disinclined to remove the Will from
temporality.



Bergson places time as a part of absolute existence.



Bergson claims that humans can access absolute time through a “suprasensible
intuition.”



While more inclined toward Bergson than Schopenhauer, Burke does not follow
Bergson all the way in his affirmation of intuition.



Bergson did get Burke to start thinking temporally, however, which means
constructing “periods” or “ages” both in history and in the individual human life.
◦ For example, Burke made several statements about the “age” of adolescence
between 1917 and 1920, to indicate this as a period of transition, perfect to
illustrate Bergson’s philosophy.



Burke continued to work through his problems of fiction with a short story
“Beyond Catullus” and the abandoned novel “Fallow Ground” in the summer of
1917.
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By the time of his first book review, “Two Sordid Books,” Burke had mapped the
problem of expression versus art into an historiographic model in which the
modern need for expression is matched by a lack of conventional modes to do so.



The book review also compares French and American responses to this modern
dilemma as based in generality and empiricism, respectively.



Burke’s short stories written in Fall 1917 illustrate the difference between
American and French types, and inordinately feature the theme of suicide,
perhaps as a carry-over from Dostoevsky.



In Burke’s essay for an English literature class at Columbia, he maps the
historical conflict between art and expression onto the difference between the
Renaissance and Modern eras.



The canonical question of Burke’s relationship to “rhetoric” can be supervened by
an antithetical criticism of Cicero’s influence on Burke.
◦ In this view, Burke found a rhetorically active Cicero primarily through the
Letters to Atticus, but also found Cicero to be a metaphysician of time in De
senectute.



Frustration with modern expressionism, coupled with Burke’s growing
appreciation of Cicero, culminated in a “rhetorical awakening,” where “rhetoric”
means “epistolary” rather than “oratorical.”
◦ In both cases, it means concession to an audience.



This “rhetorical awakening” in large part impelled Burke to leave Columbia.

30

Chapter 5 – City, Country, and Catholicism (January 1918 – Summer 1920)


Burke’s fiction from 1918-1920 plays with the American and French type of short
story.



It also constructs city and country as ecosystems wherein sensation and intellect
are variously mixed in encounters between the sexes.



The transcendent or aesthetic landscape allows a German-style release from the
contradictions of sensation and the intellect, or country and city.



Essays likely written in early 1920 show an increasing double focus on American
and French authors, with the [sensation/intellect] dichotomy mapped onto both
historical and biological periods or “ages.”



Remy de Gourmont was the most formidable influence Burke encountered since
Walter Pater and Henri Bergson, combining elements of both.



Burke attempted to dismiss the late Gourmont as insufficient in sensual
experience, reversing a bias against sensation Burke most often evinces
elsewhere.



Gourmont’s metaphysics of sensation, and his historiography, are really superior
to anything Burke had formulated by then, and to a certain extent contain the
arguments Burke made against Gourmont in The Dial.



Gourmont’s lasting effect on Burke can be seen in Gourmont’s praise of the
Jesuits, employing the highest intellect in service of popular religion and
sensuality.
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With Pater, Bergson, and Gourmont, we can witness something like an “arc” of
influences leading Burke from 1915 to 1920, a period that might be referred to as
his “adolescence.”



By the end of this time Burke was a confirmed aesthete (Pater), but also an
incipient historiographer (Bergson), rhetorician (Cicero), and theologian
(Gourmont).
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Chapter 2 – Theory and Methodology
Canonical and Antithetical Criticism
Comparing William Blake to the Hebrew Bible in Poetry and Repression (1976),
Harold Bloom articulates a distinction between what he calls “canonical” and (following
W. B. Yeats) “antithetical” interpretation. Canonical reading presumes canonical status
for its object. Antithetical criticism challenges the tradition by deliberately taking up a
stance different from the canonized author's, and measures that author against some other
standard. “Strong misreading” in Bloom's sense is always antithetical. Canonical
criticism establishes and denotes a received transmission. Burke’s acceptance in the
mainstream academy depended on his own efforts, and the efforts of his disciples, to craft
a standardized, canonical version of him: to make Burke “usable” for communication
scholars.
Kenneth Burke's canonical critic is William H. Rueckert, whose edited Critical
Responses to Kenneth Burke 1924-1966 initiates the study of secondary literature on
Burke. Rueckert fittingly derives his central trope for canonical criticism—purification—
from Burke, the canonical author himself. Isolating Burke's “literary theory and critical
practice” (Drama 3), Rueckert acknowledges “it was necessary to over-purify the whole
in order to present a coherent exposition of the part” (5). This necessity points to the
difficult but pioneering work of strong canonical criticism, and the “part” which Rueckert
chooses to purify indicates his own limitations as a follower of Burke.
In the first edition of his book, published in 1963 but “finished in all its essential
details by 1961” (ix), Rueckert devotes a chapter to the aesthetic theory of Burke's first
critical book, Counter-Statement, and two chapters each to Burke's literary critical tropes
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of “symbolic action” (culminating in Burke's reading of Coleridge) and “dramatism”
(culminating in Burke's theory of tragedy). For the second edition of Kenneth Burke and
the Drama of Human Relations, not published until 1982, nearly 20 years after the first
edition, Rueckert adds a final chapter on the mode of analysis Burke calls “logology,”
which had been formulated as early as 1961, contemporaneous with the first edition of
Rueckert's book. Throughout he aims as closely as possible to give unity and coherence
to Burke's literary theory and make it “usable,” as canonized text, to subsequent workers
in literary interpretation.
A frustration symptomatic of the anxieties of canonical criticism shadows
Rueckert's second edition, however. In A Grammar of Motives Burke had projected a
trilogy to cover his original vision of a grammar, rhetoric, and symbolic of motives. The
“symbolic” and final third was to be a comprehensive statement of poetics. Needless to
say, given Rueckert's “purifying” interest, the projected Symbolic of Motives would have
been the most important document, created by the master, to Rueckert's ambition of
canonizing Burke as a literary critic.
Indeed, Rueckert first contacted Burke in 1959 in search of this “final” document.
The problem was that Burke never produced such a volume. Rueckert's second edition
laments this absence:
Burke has … systematically refused to bring his poetics (“A Symbolic of
Motives”) together in book form, and has made no attempt to assemble the varied and
interesting work of the last ten years so that it can be studied, synthesized, and
used. …
[A] book that would certainly have been in a class with, and might well have
had the same impact and influence as, Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism has been
held back all these years for reasons that are clear to no one, not even Burke, I
think. …
Contemporary European critics, especially the French, hardly know who
Burke is, though he has been doing many of the same things they have for more years
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than most of them and often with equal brilliance. Burke has no one to blame for this
but himself, because at the very point in literary history where he might have
achieved the kind of intellectual and theoretical prominence which he certainly
deserves … he withheld the text that might have accomplished this … (229, 231, 234)
This repetitive cento reflects not only Rueckert's bewilderment, but more significantly,
Burke's resistance to his own canonization. Burke withdraws and scatters in defiance of
Rueckert's evident desire to secure Burke's reputation. Comparisons of Burke with
Northrop Frye and “contemporary European critics” show Rueckert's anxiety at the
thought of a missed opportunity, the fear that posterity would eclipse Burke.
Yet Rueckert does not abandon the unifying work to be done. He projects the
eventual collection of Burke's poetic material from the fifties and after 1966, when
Burke's last “official” book, Language as Symbolic Action, was published (270). He
admits, humbly, “Burke's mind is greater than my capacity to encompass it” (287), the
proper stance of canonical criticism. He includes as an appendix three lists from Burke on
essays to include in the Symbolic of Motives, the last dated from 1978, though Rueckert
remains unsatisfied, claiming the final list “would continue to suppress the 'Symbolic' as
a coherent poetics” (291). Adjectives such as coherent, finished, final, complete, single,
systematic, and masterful, capture the drive of canonical criticism.
Rueckert continued his labor until his death in late 2006. In 2007, Parlor Press
brought out Rueckert's edited version of Essays Toward a Symbolic of Motives, 19501955. In the introduction, Rueckert reviewed three different “versions” of the “Symbolic”
and reiterated Burke's refusal to “agree to any arrangement of it while he was alive” (xxi).
Rueckert restates his canonizing desire in a somewhat belated tone, “to reclaim some of
[Burke] for literary criticism,” and concludes with a moving, even breathtaking irony of
canonical criticism: “[I]t is only after Burke died and finally let go of all this material …
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that it became possible to … begin to make sense of it and see it for what it is” in the
hope that scholars after Rueckert will “establish or re-establish Burke's proper place in
the history of modern American literary criticism” (xxi). This should give any student of
Burke severe pause to meditate on the nature of canonical interpretation.
Canonical criticism pronounces death to the canonized author. This must have
been, on some level, what Burke sensed and resisted from the late 1950s on. As sensitive,
scrupulous, and humble as Rueckert could hope to be (and he was all those things), he
always wanted a “usable” Kenneth Burke, which was only possible on Rueckert's terms
after Burke's death. Burke has now been successfully canonized, especially in the United
States, and a recent Burke conference in Belgium indicates something of his influence in
Europe. As “complete” a picture of the Master as we can hope to get, as tempting as it
might be to regard copious extant Burkean texts as the “living Burke,” such a temptation,
such an illusion, constitutes the exact the price of canonization. Against this ongoing
temptation, antithetical criticism wages battle.
The Theoretical Question of Burke’s Temporality
The canonized version of an author, in trying to fix it, may tend to freeze the
author’s work in time, render it static. A stable point of view wants to remain stable,
while a rebellious point of view, the antithetical, wants to initiate change. When
examining various writers’ commentary on Burke, one can perceive this ratio between
canonical and antithetical from both sides.
Earlier in his career, Burke was attacked by Allen Tate for being too “historical”
in his outlook, a surrogate for Marxism. Tate worries that Burke interprets the “historical
environment” too narrowly, in terms of opposed “class interest,” thus forcing Burke into
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the mistaken “belief that the human is wide and abstract, the historical narrow and
concrete” (65). Any “transcendence” from a Marxist perspective could thus be only wide
and abstract. Tate defends poetry as “intensive” or qualitative, logically prior to both
history and the environment.
During that exchange with Tate in the 1930s, Burke played the antithetical party
of social change, Tate the canonical party of aesthetic permanence. The tide against
Burke shifted, however, and by the 1970s he was not “historical” enough. Once Burke
assumed a canonical role in the academy himself, scholars began to attack him as
canonical, antithetically, in the name of change, history, and time.
Frederic Jameson maintains a distinction between a text and its “social ground”
on the basis of an historical “process” or “breach” through which “texts [are] released
from the social functionality which once controlled their meanings and uses in precapitalist social formations” (75). Jameson interrogates Burke's depiction of this
“ideological relationship” in the key terms “strategy” and “act” (77) and finds them to
“rule out … that vaster social or historical or political horizon” Burke had promised (789). Tate had faulted Burke's Marxist historicism for making possible only a “wide and
abstract” vision of the poet who transcended it. Reversing this judgment, Jameson blames
Burke's “strategy” and “act” for withdrawing from the (Marxist) real, where the real
appears as “subtext” (74) to be interpreted and even constructed by the critic.
The exact meaning of “history” continued to trouble and provoke attempts to
integrate Burke into, or distance him from, a diachronic criticism. Frank Lentricchia
pointed to “a wholly arbitrary (magical) dimension … creativity in the literal sense” (72),
in Burke's term “act,” forcing criticism into the historical texture. Following Lentricchia,
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Samuel B. Southwell assimilates Burke to Martin Heidegger, whose “temporal
definition … may be applied as an enrichment of Burke's concept of the act” (82).
According to Southwell, Burke's “pentad,” or structure of the act, “is a synchrony to
which the diachrony of 'act' is antecedent and a synchrony in which diachrony is
implicit. … the pentad is open to history” (35, 36). This projection of “implicit”
temporality strongly misreads Burke, antithetically, via Heidegger.
Carole Blair's opposition of Foucault to Burke raises a question similar to that of
Jameson two decades earlier: Burke remains enclosed within an “ideological content,” a
commitment in which he would seem to be surpassed, in different modes, by Jürgen
Habermas and Ernesto Grassi (see Farrell and McPhail). Foucault's theoretical world of
history, power, institutions, and related discursive forces, epistemes, and the like,
sufficiently describes a cosmos external to, and alienated from, Burke's more explicitly
theological notions of order.
Barbara Biesecker's explicitly Derridean reading isolates temporality as the selfshadowing element in Burke's logology (72). Temporality provides an impersonal
“structure” against which the subject carves a tenuous negotiation or what Biesecker calls
“finesse” (28). The temporal sequence of linguistic acts, or history, contaminates
language's claim to total and “circular” self-sufficiency. Biesecker associates “the origin
of social or collective being [with] (what I have called human history)” (55). History,
driven by the radical possibility of language to disrupt and overturn the human subject,
lingered as the possibility for failure at every stage of Kenneth Burke's reckoning.
Debra Hawhee attributes Burke's ethical orientation to aesthetics, his
epistemology of metaphor, to the influence of Nietzsche's “perspectivalism” (“Nietzsche”
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132-3, 136-7). The clash of metaphors or perspectives, including the effect of art and
poetry, for Hawhee, does the work of what Biesecker called “history”; it opens up the
space for potentially disruptive change. In Kevin A. Johnson's analysis Freud's “latent”
material is precisely what Burke so treasures, the “essence” of temporality, the entire
meaning of the sentence or plot. Lentricchia and Hawhee emphasize Burke’s antithetical
side, ironically canonizing Burke as a champion of change. Jameson, Southwell, Blair,
Biesecker, and Johnson do something like the reverse: in placing Burke as canonical,
they themselves play the antithetical disruptors of Burke’s stable and stabilizing legacy.
Burke makes the “essentializing” of temporality the key fixture of his “logology,”
or theological study of language, and Biesecker here locates its vulnerability. Accounting
for the sinfulness of Adam's transgression in Eden, Burke shifts “from the logical to
temporal mode of priority. … Burke's defense of the logological interpretation of the
creation myth exceeds its own protocols by seeking validation in narrative diachrony
itself” (72). Likewise, G. L. Ercolini argues that Burke's desire to “resolve the paradoxes
or contradictions” in the Binding of Isaac story neglects Kierkegaard's investigation of
“faith and choice as modes where one does not have the convenience of foresight” (214).
The problem of “foresight” assimilates with Biesecker's “'felicity' … a sense of the
timely, the appropriate, that which arises not out of logical necessity but, rather, out of
temporal urgency” (72). One challenge illuminated by these differences is to ask in what
sense is Kenneth Burke's rhetoric diachronic, does it trope itself as new and fresh in
relation to past iterations? It cannot be merely the roll of events.
Harold Bloom credits his theory of diachronic rhetoric to Ralph Waldo Emerson,
whose object, according to Bloom, was “to see earliest … the aim of drive is always
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revisionary” (Agon 19, 30, [Bloom’s italics]). Bloom then turns to the Sophists
Protagoras and Gorgias, as well as Kenneth Burke, to associate the ancient Greek term
kairos as “ambivalence-in-motion, or a figuration for poetry … a metaphor for criticism”
(38). If man is the master of all things and the essence of logos is competition, diachronic
rhetoric depends upon seizing the right figuration at the right moment.
The central concept of Bloom’s diachronic rhetoric is kairos, whose definition
Bloom draws from Mario Untersteiner’s The Sophists: “that epistemological process
defined as ‘deception,’ ‘persuasion,’ the power of which lies in the imposition of one of
the two alternatives” (qtd. in Agon 37). Combine this with Emersonian vision and you
have the opportunistic drive or will to see earliest, through deception, persuasion, or both.
Periodization, Narrative, and the Archive
Those who employ a chronological method in the study of Kenneth Burke (or
anyone else) encounter logical choices about the selection and arrangement of material.
Scholars have responded through periodization, historical narrative, and archival
research. These strategies overlap, for instance, in that epochal assumptions, principles of
logical division or “change,” always underlie historical narratives. These equivocal
transitions may generate arguments about cause, necessity, and acceptance or rejection.
Retrospective interpretation remains subject to the fallacies of conjecture, and historical
details required to form judgments on periods, data and access to the archive, remain
time-bound and belated. Even though all three of these processes interweave in all
diachronic accounts, different scholarly traditions emphasize different aspects.
The following examines three basic intellectual schema which, over the past
century, have layered atop each other to condition scholarly reception of Kenneth Burke.
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They are, in the sequence of intellectual development: Periodization, Biographical and
Historical Narrative, and the Archive. Kenneth Burke and his best friend Malcolm
Cowley engaged in “periodizing” their own lives, from our earliest records to their final
testaments. Scholars have followed Burke himself in dividing his career into “stages” or
“phases,” of which I shall present the major representatives. Further, critics since the
early 1930s have drawn upon published and unpublished biographical and historical
material to condition their interpretations of the major events in Burke's life. Finally,
since Pennsylvania State University obtained portions of the Kenneth Burke archive in
the 1970s, scholars have drawn upon documents to intensify, corroborate, or subtilize
existing theoretical conceptions.
After presenting these three complementary methodologies, I propose a fourth
which, to my knowledge, has never been attempted outside of a somewhat lengthy book
review in the early 1980s. Confronting the literary critic Harold Bloom's theory of poetic
influence, developed in the decade between 1973-83, James Arnt Aune claimed that
Kenneth Burke could be considered a “strong poet” of sorts, and may be subjected to the
same scrutiny, of relationship with his forebears, to which Bloom had put the Romantic
poets. A description of Bloom's theory of influence concludes this chapter, and the
proceeding chapters attempt a synthesis of all four methods, oriented antithetically
toward the received tradition.
Periodization
As every publication of a book or essay marks an event, the simplest periodization
begins as a list of works. Burke inaugurated the narrative of his own career in a
retrospective essay, “Curriculum Criticum,” published as an appendix in the 1953 (2nd)
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edition of his first critical work Counter-Statement. Here for the first time his work
attained the shape of a “‘curve’ of development” (213), an attempt to establish continuity
from Counter-Statement to A Rhetoric of Motives. At the end of his summary, offhandedly, he mentions fiction published in the earliest part of his career. By Burke’s own
arrangement the fiction appears as an afterthought.
William H. Rueckert first divides Burke's career into phases, with early “poetic
realism” balanced against the later, more complete and mature “dramatism.” Just as
Stanley Edgar Hyman reads all of Burke in terms of the concept “symbolic action,”
Rueckert reads the early phase as a lead up to and component part of dramatism. Hyman
and Rueckert read the whole arc deliberately in terms of one concept for the sake of
intellectual coherence and clarity, a process Rueckert follows Burke in calling
“purification.” At the same time, Rueckert relies on a “development” in Burke from
literary, to sociological, to linguistic emphases (33). The first transition, from poetry to
social criticism, thus constitutes a qualitative and problematic moment in the definition of
Burke's chronology.
The next great periodization of Burke's career came two decades after Rueckert's
study, again assisted by Burke himself. Prompted by the context of a polemic, in the
1980s, between competing definitions of rhetoric as epistemological and ontological,
Burke retroactively associated his own “dramatism” with ontology and “logology” with
epistemology (which could then be unified as a dialectical system). In so doing he
identified a 1968 encyclopedia article as his first argument for an explicitly ontological,
literal meaning of “dramatism.” Bernard L. Brock and James W. Chesebro seized upon
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this self-proclaimed “shift” to distinguish an epochal moment in Burke's career from
“early” to “late,” or epistemological to ontological dramatism.
This particular shift into “late Burke” thus originated as an historiographical
judgment first uttered by Burke in the early 1980s about a discursive moment in 1968,
upon the recollection of which Burke revised his interpretation of his earlier work. In this
revised view the earlier “epistemological” dramatism transformed via the religious
metaphor into “logology,” after which Burke revised his earlier “dramatism” into a new
ontological system; but did not label it as such until asked about it in those terms at a
conference in 1982. In a similar way, Burke's “transition” from literary to social criticism
had been a self-conscious retrospection, in the 1950s, of events occurring in the late '20s
and early '30s. Emerging from this debate, Brock constructed a three-stage “evolution” of
Burke's career divided into the stages of “Critical Realism” (1931-41), “Conceptualism”
(1945-66), and “Symbolic Coherence” (1968-). This “arc” hinges on the gradual
movement or change from dualism to a “unified system” as Burke's definition of the
symbol changes, according to Brock, from epistemological response to ontological
ground.
Cary Nelson (1989) and Timothy Crusius (1999) use alternate definitions of “late
Burke” to correspond with different metaphysical assumptions, interests, and contexts.
Nelson includes The Rhetoric of Religion (1961) while Crusius points with special
interest to the essay “Definition of Man” published in 1963. In 2003 William H. Rueckert
admitted that everything written after 1966 belongs to “his 'late' period” (2). More
recently Bryan Crable has employed the technique of periodization to bring out different
meanings of Burke's term “transcendence.” In Crable's first phase (1931-1937),
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transcendence is a curative method; in the second (1941-50), a dialectical process; and in
the third phase, beginning with “Poetics, Dramatistically Considered,” written in 1951
but not published until fifty years later, in 2001 (see Williams 8), Crable finds
transcendence in Burke an “existential condition” (18). This final condition of
“transcendence” may presumably co-align with the late stages of Brock, Nelson, Crusius,
and Rueckert, but of the exact limit and quality of this late phase scholars share no
consensus.
Of the major periodizations undertaken by William Rueckert, Bernard Brock, and
Bryan Crable, each necessarily imposes a logical division or “shift” upon continuous
events, thereby delimiting finite intervals of subject-matter suitable for analysis and the
extraction of stable concepts. Without those borders between periods, a contradiction
between one of Burke's utterances and another might destabilize the theorizing project
and hamper the clarity of knowledge. The historiographer requires more than the
monotonous tick of the everyday. Through a systematizing “purification” scholars distill
a simplicity or “form,” and so parallel Burke's own cognitive activity.
However, periodization remains open to two criticisms. First, as we have seen,
periods organize belatedly in relation to events. It is only from the 1950s that Burke
confidently saw the curve of his departure from aesthetic to rhetorical theory, and only
under pressure from academic debates in the '80s that Burke clarified his revision of
dramatism into ontology. Even so, polemical debates of the '80s and '90s colored how
scholars designated the most recent phase up to that point. With all these considerations,
no periodization can be regarded as epistemologically secure. They are all subordinate to
the intellectual demands of criticism.
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The second charge, after inaccuracy, is that a judgment of historical and/or
theoretical “period” immediately subordinates all historical fact and judgment to the
prejudice and inaccuracy reinforced by the cognitive stability of this very category. So if
a later theory is deemed more “mature” or “complete,” as is usually the case, it gives the
critic warrant to discount the earlier work. An instance of this is Chesebro's declaration
that in 1968, Burke's “comedic posture was replaced by a far more serious mood and
tone” (“Epistemology” 180). Finally, upon reaching his seventy-first year, Burke became
quite serious about his work while writing an encyclopedia article! This particular article
may have indeed contained the seed of an intellectual revolution when considered after
the fact, but Chesebro's hyperbole has the effect of strongly diminishing the uninitiated
reader's respect for anything Burke wrote prior to 1968—in other words, the vast bulk of
his output. In general, the teleological or “linear” temptations of the “evolutionary”
chronology give an undue bias in favor of both what comes last, and what can provide for
a unified and simple picture.
If the periodization of a writer's long career, for whatever good it does, tends also
to over-simplify and distort through blunt naming and abstraction, a return to the full
rambunctious texture of historical and biographical narrative offers another approach to
chronological treatment. A notable tradition in Burke scholarship shies away from strict
or rigid periodization toward a more fluid, permeable narrative of life. The key to this
approach is the ready and unprejudiced acceptance of facts as they present themselves,
often narrated from the historical point of view. In the standard biography, every phase of
life is just as valuable as every other. We would never say the adult is more significant
than the child, nor read the child as merely an incomplete and ill-formed adult.
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Historical and Biographical Narrative
Points of transition within any periodizing scheme retain a locus of interest as the
qualitative limit between discrete phases. Rueckert attributes Burke's “shift” from
aesthetic and literary to social and rhetorical criticism to conditions of the Great
Depression. Historical argument intrudes into the explanation and understanding of the
philosophical division of systems and theories. Yet, as shown, the scheme may too
quickly force an interpretation in keeping with the abstract period division, and rule out
other questions or possibilities. Scholarly treatment of Burke's so-called “transition” of
the early 1930s can be taken as a representative anecdote for the dangers and allure of
historical narrative.
Therefore, Rueckert says of Burke's 1932 novel that it “symbolically re-enacted”
Burke's abandonment of a poetic career (Drama 34). The decade spent on aesthetic
theory has been preserved in its old form of the fiction and Counter-Statement, but a new
phase approaching brackets off those “old” things and in a way proves their futility. To
link such a change to a putative historical event such as the “Great Depression” must at
the very least invite intrigued inquiry, if not critique. Multiple and varying accounts
provide initial stimulus to probe the question further. Rueckert states, “Now, something
like this is what happened to Burke and a great many other thinkers as a result of the
Great Depression. The whole society in which they lived and most of the things for which
it stood—in short the national-social orientation—had become unreasonable” (36). As a
result of the Great Depression: into this we must inquire.
Not long after Rueckert's canonical criticism, Armin Paul Frank described the
same scenario in different terms:
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To be sure, the earlier anti-societal estheticism—whether of the “Aesthete: Model
1924” or 1925 (or, for that matter, 1917) variety—had already been a kind of group
attitude. Yet now it was even more vital to “belong,” to find one's self by identifying
with a common cause. The economic plight with all its concomitant illnesses of the
social body naturally and justly gave direction to the element of opposition contained
in the earlier estheticism… (23-4)
In Frank, if anywhere, the weight of meaning falls on the side of the earlier period rather
than the later. The “social body” which suffers “economic plight” (Great Depression)
stands apart from the group of artists, who, more continuous than converted, take up their
point of view with different materials and purposes in mind. Perhaps they changed in
essence not one bit from the Great Depression but the external world simply gave them a
new pressure and direction. It is hard to know where to locate the motivating force or
determinant factors.
Rueckert's view makes it seem as if Burke and his associates reject their earlier
selves and set up a new project different in kind, while in Frank's view Burke and his
group remain essentially the same, but act differently in different circumstances. Merle E.
Brown, more hostile to Burke, hardly mentions the Depression at all. Brown's view is
primarily sociological, and only secondarily a function of time or history. Early twentieth
century America in Brown's theory was divided between mass culture and “specialized
talent” (8). As in Rueckert's account, Burke as a specialist desires to humanize or
“accept” this painful situation, but where Rueckert celebrates Burke's “social turn” of the
1930s and derives it from economic circumstances, Brown depicts the writing of Burke's
novel as the pivotal moment. Towards a Better Life, published in 1932, does not merely
“re-enact” a limit of aesthetic solipsism and dissolve Burke's fictional art, as Rueckert
believes, but sets the mode and stance for the rest of Burke's writing: an empty
proclamation of oneness combined with “associational revery” (45). Brown ironically
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praises the suitability of this attitude to a leveled mass culture, and suggests that Burke's
character would have taken on this stance regardless of any Depression. Presumably
Brown’s “specialized talent” operated otherwise than through “associational revery.”
Historiographical judgments, then, are not only dogmas of intellectual
classification into periods or “epochs,” with the aim for theoretical stability (and ease of
“application”). History also demands sociological and ethical judgment. Rueckert's and
Frank's claims about Burke in the early '30s tie to his membership in a group, and Brown
accuses Burke of the curiously social-anti-social ability to “evoke a sense of oneness
without listening to others or himself” (14). The selection and interpretation of facts all
too easily reflects the personality and attitude of the scholar or critic. Given that many
facts derive from reminiscences, with data culled from memoirs as well as professional
histories, the scholar might give up, bewildered, the hope of gaining any privileged
insight.
Burke's 1953 recollection of his professional transition from Counter-Statement to
Permanence and Change in the early 1930s acknowledges “the problems of early
manhood … intensified by the market crash of '29” but focuses on a then-unpublished
manuscript he wrote “to resist the mounting sociological emphasis in criticism.” Then he
pinpoints a representative of this “mounting emphasis,” his antagonist, in Edmund
Wilson's Axel's Castle (1931). Against Wilson Burke would “reassert a kind of aesthetic
mysticism” (213). This reminiscence does not account for change in terms of intellectual
rupture, vocational calling, or psychological adjustment. Burke describes it in terms of
conservatism enacted as textual polemic. The quarrel centers on an historiographical
judgment and call for change.
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Wilson, like Frank and Brown, depicts the poet as a misfit in scientific bourgeois
society. He then, upon historiographical grounds, ventures the aesthetic judgment, in
1931, that the “world of private imagination in isolation from the life of society seems to
have been exploited and explored as far as for the present is possible.” Russia, on the
other hand, displayed
a central social-political idealism … able to use and to inspire the artist as well as the
engineer. The question begins to press us again as to whether it is possible to make a
practical success of human society, and whether, if we continue to fail, a few
masterpieces, however profound or noble, will be able to make life worth living even
for the few people in a position to enjoy them. (292-3)
If we disregard the name of the author, this would seem as plausible a reason as any to
“convert” from aesthetic to social criticism. The dead-end road of artistic solipsism,
paired with worldwide economic misery, would plenty enough support Robert L. Heath's
contention, following Rueckert, that “the Depression of the 1930s forced [Kenneth
Burke] to reconsider what artists could contribute to society, beyond entertainment” (1).
But beyond the questionable term “entertainment” to describe the aesthetic aims of the
1920s, Kenneth Burke did not write the above passage, Edmund Wilson did. And the first
thing Burke remembered about the early '30s in 1953 was arguing against Wilson in
defense of the isolated artist, resisting Wilson's sociological emphasis in criticism.
Peculiarly, then, the commonplace historicization of Burke by scholars places him
in the exact opposite position from which he argued, and from which he remembered
arguing. Both the original arguments and the recollections, moreover, are written in print.
Historical narratives may disrupt abstract classification into epochs, but scholars select
and interpret the data in varying ways, and it is possible for an historical figure to become
associated with a position toward which he was originally opposed. By the 1980s,
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however, scholars had found a way to revise the historical narratives at their disposal,
through increasing public access to the archive.
Archival Research
The first major study to make extensive use of the archives is that by Robert L.
Heath (1986), already alluded to. The book is about half narrative and half theoretical
exposition, but Heath everywhere wields a deft hand over a vast array of historical
materials. Heath organizes every chapter by ideas rather than strict linear chronology, but
freely quotes from the standard memoirs of Malcolm Cowley, Matthew Josephson, and
Gorham Munson, in addition to all kinds of correspondence stretching out over decades
of Burke's career. As with the narrative tone of Armin Paul Frank, these voices rise from
the past as an intermingling vapor—yes, there are technically “many voices” in this
historical account, but most of the time they blend into the voice of the critic, Frank and
Heath and other authors of “historical narratives.”
The voices in these narratives rarely disagree with each other in any great detail.
They complement to create a unified narrative point of view. One major exception in
Heath's presentation is an extended description and exegesis of an aesthetic debate
between Burke and Waldo Frank in 1922 (48-59). This kind of analysis, exposure to such
detailed precision of Burke's socially engaged thought, was impossible before the private
correspondence of these writers became available to scholars. Heath's study of the BurkeWaldo Frank debate, to establish a theoretical point, opened up a new possibility for how
scholars might study and “acquire knowledge” about Kenneth Burke, of fundamental
importance for the validity of any theoretical claims made in Burke's name.
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Archival research has called the day in Burke scholarship ever since the mid1980s. Paul Jay's collection of letters written between Malcolm Cowley and Kenneth
Burke gives the general reader an intimate view of Burke's mind and passion beginning at
age 18. (I cannot speak to the value of the Cowley letters, not being familiar with
Cowley's writings). Notably, Jay as well as Jack Selzer, slips easily into Cowley's
narrative gaze when discussing the earliest period of Burke's life and career. Since
Cowley has been there since Burke's near-infancy, Cowley is the default narrator of
Burke's early years, his Horatio to Burke's Hamlet.
The Cowley-Burke letters, on the other hand, put the two voices and visions in
“dialogue” with each other, and even sometimes into direct agon or conflict. In fact, from
Burke's perspective, it is clear that Cowley was his first definitive “audience” in the
rhetorical sense. Even while at high school, we get the feeling Burke must have written
for Cowley, to Cowley, with more enthusiasm than he wrote for or to a teacher or any
other friend. In a way, the Burke-Cowley letters remain the most authentic, intimate
biography of Burke that we possess in print.
Many other archival projects have ensued. In 1993 the University of Alabama
Press published, after 60 years, Burke's “transition” piece between Counter-Statement
and Permanence and Change, longer than an essay but shorter than a book, an extended
treatise called “Auscultation, Creation, and Revision.” Greig Henderson calls this
document “a transitional work par excellence” (173) and with its belated publication in
relation to its original composition, it cannot help but be immediately subject to the prior
historiographical judgments of this “transition” in Burke's career. Not a single critic has
“denied” that anything important happened between 1931 and 1935, but it is almost as if
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the need to discuss this moment of transition brings out the particular character in the
critic. Timothy Crusius, Henderson, and Jack Selzer and Ann George have written about
“Auscultation,” and its existence will continue to invite further complication of Burke's
“shift” from aesthetic to social criticism.
The work of Selzer, Selzer and George, Weiser, the contributors to Burke in the
Archives (2013), and many others have deepened historical understanding of Burke
through the archive. Selzer's method, followed by George, Weiser, and others, is to put
Burke into conversation with his contemporaries, assisted by the archive. Something like
an archival-historical arc has been founded on the principles of rhetorical criticism—
evaluating Burke's statements by their context or rhetorical situation—in the sequence of
books, Kenneth Burke in Greenwich Village (1996), Kenneth Burke in the 1930s (2007),
and Burke, War, Words (2008). If writers such as Robert Wess, Timothy Crusius, and
Ross Wolin have not done extensive archival research themselves, they draw freely upon
the work of Jay and Selzer. Debra Hawhee (2009) uniquely blends an independent
theoretical interest—Burke's understanding of “motion” or the body—and an
archival/chronological form. Burke's letters with William Carlos Williams (2003) and
William H. Rueckert (2003), his literary reviews (2010), and unpublished essays by
Burke (2001, 2007) have all added to the primary material available to scholars. Further,
the entire Penn State “Burke-3” archive of over 40 microfilm reels is available for library
use.
Supplemented by the archive, made up of “historical” documents, historical
treatment does not escape the bias of periodization and the problem of narrative point of
view. Contrasting Burke with other voices in his contemporary moment opens up,
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document by document, new possibilities. A narrative drawn from the archive is by no
means linear in any sense, but the temptations toward linearity and unified voice remain
formally inviting to any scholar. Delight in variety of critical response lies in the thematic
(period), material (archival), and narrative choices made by each critic.
Influence Study: Antithetical Criticism
Reviewing Harold Bloom in 1983, James Arnt Aune remarks that “Kenneth
Burke … may be classed as [a] 'strong' poet[…] who seek[s] to develop [his] own sense
of meaning over against the contributions of [his] precursors” (“Late Blooming” 329).
Antithetical criticism reads against a common tradition of interpretation, called by
contrast “canonical criticism.” It assumes that a “strong” writer, in this case Kenneth
Burke, misinterprets prior writers as well as himself in order to individuate as a writer.
Bloom calls this process “misreading” or “influence.”
The choice of influences, a focus on proper names, diverges from the “contextual”
form of diachronic reading, while attempting to take it into account. Influence study
practiced by Harold Bloom replaces social context with the scene of a belated, isolated
reader. The relationship is with the text, or the voice of the prior text, in the writer's
struggle to voice again: “Change is the key term, and every cosmic origin of change is
seen by Freud as having been catastrophic” (Agon 138). Bloom's reading of Freud locates
this “change” or “catastrophe” also called “influence,” in the quantitative pressure
(“magnitude”) between precursor and ephebe. Reading passes through a transition into
writing through a process Freud names “repression.”
The scholar-critic as ephebe practicing influence study attempts to interpret
temporality, or “narrative diachrony,” as a sequence of fierce, agonistic engagements
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with prior writers. Each accomplished text serves as evidence for these encounters. Since,
in Bloom's view, they were written primarily against prior texts, the scholar can compare
the achieved text with the prior text and argue about their quantitative difference.
Such quantitative differences, the results of the agon, must be mediated through
the third party, or scholar-critic. In this respect one will differ from another, and the
following study must be taken as the effort only of its author. In this case the scholarcritic is exactly an ephebe and must revise or misread in this exegetic effort. There is no
way around this and it must be left open to other third parties in turn. In any respect, the
importance of temporality to recent piquant critiques of Kenneth Burke should encourage
all new approaches to Burke “over time,” and the present study may be accepted as one
such attempt. After addressing the Freudian question of magnitude, it finally poses the
diachronic or metaleptic question of influence which cannot escape temporality but must
reside forward in the critical study itself, always subject to further review by another.
Bloom's young poet, or ephebe, operates less under the eye of contemporaries
than the burden of past accomplishment: “The human writes, the human thinks, and
always following after and defending against another human, however fantasized that
human becomes in the strong imaginings of those who arrive later upon the scene” (Map
60). The “context” here is precisely not contemporaneous. Like the archive itself it draws
loosely from different eras and figures of the past and combines them in ways sufficient
to itself, often forgetting temporal distance entirely.
The best entry into understanding Bloom's influence theory of 1973-83 (I do not
speak of his more recent writings) is through the language of Sigmund Freud: “Every
Primal Scene is necessarily a fantasy structure” (Map 55). Yet that fantasy does receive
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pressure from actual texts and poems, encountered first when the poet reads, and then
represses sufficiently to write new poetry. A critic, the third party, may observe
differences between prior and later poetry to measure the repression. At a certain point
the subject of poetry becomes origin itself, in English, at least, following John Milton
whose Paradise Lost set the paradigm. Bloom shows how all poets past a certain point
(we cannot fathom Homer's precursors) wrestle the past, and further claims that their
poetry contains the full meaning of that struggle. In this respect Bloom differs from his
contemporary Jacques Derrida, evader of logo- or word-centric meaning.
The process of influence has a triple ground of psychology, rhetoric, and
cosmology. Structures of the universe, language, and the mind are analogous, if not
identical. Experientially, ontologically, the poet suffers influence. This shows up in
poetry or conversation as a progression of tropes. It can be described as a six-act drama in
terms of Freudian defense: 1) reaction-formation; 2) turning-against-the-self; 3) undoing,
isolation, and regression; 4) repression; 5) sublimation; 6) projection and introjection.
The “end,” to call it that, resembles in grand Freudian style, a spitting out or swallowing
up of the past, poetry or writing a final statement. From the reader or critic's perspective,
the final stage Bloom calls apophrades, a Greek term for the return of the dead. One gets
the uncanny impression that earlier poetry, say Milton, has been written by the later poet,
say William Wordsworth.
In the chapters the follow Burke’s primary clinamen, or reaction-formation, is
against Walter Pater’s Marius the Epicurean and can be represented by the figure:
[sensation] → [intellect]. Burke experienced this clinamen against a backdrop of
influences inherited from high school, including George Meredith, Oscar Wilde, Fyodor
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Dostoevsky, and soon after high school, the novelist Theodore Dreiser. To our archival
narrative we now turn.
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Chapter 3 – Life and Art (September 1914 to May 1917)
The Canonical View of Burke’s Early Poetry
Before we look too closely into the archive, it is best to establish the current view
of scholarship on Kenneth Burke’s earliest years. The most detailed treatment is Jack
Selzer’s chapter “Burke among Others: The Early Poetry,” in Kenneth Burke in
Greenwich Village (1996). Selzer follows a tradition, set by Malcolm Cowley, of
associating Burke’s “adolescence” with the French poet Jules Laforgue.
Of the shreds of evidence concerning Kenneth Burke's high school years, we
have, first of all, reading lists. Austin Warren, writing in 1932 (according to Selzer 206 n.
1, approved by Burke), listed “Meredith's Diana … Ibsen, Strindberg, Pinero, Shaw,
Schnitzler, Sudermann, Hauptmann. Then came the Russians,” Chekhov and Dostoevsky
(227). Malcolm Cowley, from personal reminiscence, added Kipling, Stevenson, Hardy,
Gissing, Conrad, Wilde, Mencken and Nathan, Congreve, “Huneker, Somerset
Maugham, Laforgue (after we learned French),” and Flaubert (Exile's 20-22). Cowley
especially came to identify his friend Burke, as an adolescent, with Jules Laforgue.
Writing in 1934, Cowley imagines Burke's “moonlit walks along Boulevard
East … the crown of his days and moment when his adolescence flowered,” (25) citing a
letter from Burke written September 11, 1916 (almost twenty years earlier). At the end of
these walks, around midnight, Cowley imagines, Burke would “question his face for new
pimples, repeat a phrase from Laforgue and go to bed” (27). Thus, began the legend
linking Burke's poetic origins to Laforgue, an adolescent “phase” to be surmounted.
Armin Paul Frank, drawing on Cowley, claims that in Burke's earliest poems “the
young poet puts on the 'Armour of Jules Laforgue': romantic irony, sometimes
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anticlimactically tagged on to the end of a poem in the traditional way of Heinrich Heine,
but also, more Laforguean, incorporated into the immediate context of the high
sentiment” (121). According to Cowley, Burke himself termed this effect a “tangent
ending” (And I Worked 79). Cowley illustrates its operation at the conclusion of T. S.
Eliot's “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and compares it to “a door that opened on
a new landscape” (80) after the complete tour of a house.
Jack Selzer combines this “tangent ending” with the “double mood” theorized by
Yvor Winters (Selzer 78-9). Winters quotes Laforgue's poem “Complainte du Printemps”
as an example of “two distinct and more or less opposed types of feeling” which cancel
each other (Winters 65-7). Also called “moods,” these “types of feeling” alternate
between “romantic nostalgia … with no discernible object,” and “immature irony” (67).
Winters attributes the origin of this trend to Byron, but takes Laforgue as the prototypical
instance.
Three decades before Frank, Winters clarifies the particular “double mood” he
names “romantic irony”: “the poet ridicules himself for a kind or degree of feeling which
he can neither approve nor control … the act of confessing a state of moral insecurity”
(70). Writing in the mid-1930s, Winters also links Joyce's Ulysses and Kenneth Burke's
novel Towards a Better Life to this romantic irony. Ulysses is “adolescent as Laforgue is
adolescent; it is ironic about feelings which are not worth the irony.” Burke's novel, to
Winters, offers “not even progression; we have merely a repetitious series of Laforguian
[sic] antitheses” (72). The word “adolescent” dismisses both the “feeling” (of
unmotivated nostalgia) and the petty irony concerned with so worthless a matter.
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“Adolescence” in Winters becomes a magical term for rejecting both a certain
kind of feeling, and ambivalence toward that feeling. Winters was born in 1900 and wrote
in the mid-'30s, making him contemporaneous with Burke and Cowley, and his account
of Laforgue contemporaneous with Exile's Return. Although Winters is more critical and
Cowley more narrative, both seem eager to eliminate something—an action and a
counter-action, a “double mood”—prevailing in their near-youth, in the shape of Kenneth
Burke.
Burke himself perpetuated this trope in his first critical essay of 1921, “The
Armour of Jules Laforgue.” He implies that Laforgue, as a human being or personality
(“life”), was a kind of belated innocent. As a writer, however, Laforgue felt some
responsibility to “apologize” for his platitudinous emotions (9). What Winters calls a
“cynical” rejection of an emotion “not worth having” (74), Burke portrays as a
“metaphysical interest,” common among “the sexually immature” (9). Burke represents
Laforgue's sexual immaturity as a failure of aggressive instincts “paralyzed by the
passive attitude of receiving outward impressions” (9). Burke asserts his own aggression
by naming a fear of sexual passivity and casts this fear, in the poetic persona of Jules
Laforgue, into the oblivion of not only an historical past, but a kind of biological past,
which becomes a password for maturity. As Cowley, Frank, and Selzer have suggested
Burke's early lyrics resemble Laforgue's, Burke could possibly address a tendency in his
own earlier poetry, covertly projecting it onto Laforgue. The emotion Winters called “not
worth having,” the wistfulness Cowley recalled in the youthful Kenneth Burke, if
Laforguean, was a hesitant—and Paterian—passivity or acceptance of external
impression.
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Burke implies in his essay that earlier French poets, Baudelaire and Corbière, had
prepared Laforgue for both the acceptance and rejection of this “poetic” or “romantic”
susceptibility. But Burke’s true summary of Laforgue bears the social tonalities of his
later criticism: “In [Laforgue's] verse, this tendency manifests itself in a tendency to
incorporate various voices into a poem. Sometimes these voices are frankly labeled, like
Echo, or Choir. At other times they simply exist as a tangent, a change in metre [sic] or
stanza” (10). Laforgue's alternation of voices puts him “always one remove from his
emotion” (9), but it is not clear that such “remove” cancels the emotion, nor that the
emotion itself is fruitless.
The incorporation of various voices, in a poem or any other text, makes it
“rhetorical” on two levels. First, it represents a dialogue between two voices, which
allows the reader, observer, or otherwise “third party” to inhabit the roles of both speaker
and listener vicariously. Second, it increases the sense of the poet's social pose, what
Burke later (in late 1917) calls a “concession to an audience.” The very apology or
“tangent” arises from a socially conscious bashfulness for a kind of being which,
however satisfying to the individual, remains socially out of place. What Burke describes
as Laforgue's “dilettantism” (9) concedes the sincere poet's vulnerability to social irony;
it co-opts that irony against itself as a defense. If Burke was and remains a belated
romantic, he did and does contain his own critique of such romanticism, in a way
consistent with his later “rhetorical” career.
Selzer reads Burke's poetry primarily in terms of French Symbolism with
Baudelaire as its godfather and Mallarmé its prime expositor. Quoting from Arthur
Symons's The Symbolist Movement of 1899 (expanded in 1908), Ludwig Lewisohn's The
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Poets of Modern France (1918), and Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle (1931), Selzer
constructs the image of an inward-focused, hyper-subjective, private, “arhetorical” poet,
“personal and individual at the expense of the civic and political” (77). Selzer adopts the
tone and stance of Wilson, generally hostile toward the movement:
Aloof and radically alienated from contemporary life … the followers of Baudelaire,
Mallarmé, and Rimbaud after 1885 attempted to withdraw into an elitist realm of
art … —like Swinburne, Pater, and Wilde in England—tended toward a radical
aestheticism that expressed itself in an obsession with form and the determined
pursuit of art above all. … that art could be an event in itself rather than a rhetorical
statement about a worldly event … that ideal of arhetorical art. (71-2)
This problematic description seems to criticize the “ideal” and not the “art,” however, for
Selzer soon admits that “[t]he Symbolist poets inhabited an ineffable terrain between the
mind and reality, and sought to invoke and evoke that space by subtle, indirect means”
(72). Is this not a tangible goal approached with deliberate, rhetorical means?
Still, Selzer labels these poems as “personal and apolitical—far more aesthetic
and Symbolist than the usual poetry of the Masses group” (77). Whereas artists
associated with The Masses believed “art could be a lever for social change” (24), in
Selzer's view—strongly indebted to the critical rhetoric of Lewisohn (see Selzer 72)—the
Symbolists sought only “to recreate … the speaker's inner condition. … the inner
consciousness of isolates” (74, 78). This “inner consciousness,” as a critical trope,
neglects the self-awareness and social awareness in the “tangent ending” of the actual
poem.
Removing a caricature of the isolated, adolescent Laforgue from his fixed position
in scholarly opinion as the major influence on Burke's poetry may illuminate new shades
of the two poets' resemblance. Compared to Rimbaud, Arthur Symons calls Laforgue
“eternally grown up, mature to the point of self-negation” (111). A sensitive reader
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detects immense suffering beneath the cool, ironic façade, but Laforgue “will not permit
himself, at any moment, the luxury of dropping the mask: not at any moment” (109-10).
Tropes of self-ridicule, therefore, designate a complex social awareness, quite the
opposite of the romantic solipsism they display to the unironic. Winters suggests that
Byron initiated this pose, and that “Laforgue is not in every case [of this modern attitude]
an influence” (65). It expresses insecurity, perhaps, but expresses it in a self-conscious
rhetorical gesture. Winters's critique of this feature in Marianne Moore's poetry even
accuses her of “a tendency to a rhetoric more complex than her matter” (71) as a
symptom. Claims linking Burke or his poetry to Laforgue should not be used to support
the notion that either one, in person or poetry, was ever “arhetorical” or univocal.
Furthermore—we have reason, from Cowley's own hand, to doubt his account in
Exile's Return, published in 1934, that he and Burke had known Laforgue in high school:
At the end of a letter written the day after Thanksgiving, 1966, I asked [S.] Foster
[Damon] a question. “Did you introduce me to Laforgue,” I said, “or was I already
Laforguing when I used to come out to Newton and drink tea in your room, in the
spring of 1918? I remember your copy of Tender Buttons, but there is so much I
forget.” Foster waited a month, then answered frugally on a New Year's card.
“Mal—” he said, using a nickname that everyone else has forgotten. “Yes, I
remember showing you the poems of Jules Laforgue. We went over them together.
Happy New Year to you both!” (And I Worked 35-6)
Cowley and Burke graduated high school in 1915. Cowley entered Harvard in the fall of
1915, but only gradually befriended Damon (And I Worked 37-43). Burke records having
met Damon in a letter to Cowley of May 11, 1918. I am not sure how much French Burke
knew at all in high school and throughout 1915, when a large number of now extant
poems were written. I do know Burke was soaking in many authors—English,
German/Austrian, Russian, Irish, and American—and this leads me to conclude that an
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over-emphasis on French Symbolists, primarily Baudelaire and Laforgue, has allowed
scholars to obstruct a greater possible richness in Burke's poetry.
Archival letters to Cowley suggest that Burke did not seriously take up the study
of French until late 1915. The first French writers Burke mentions in the letters are
Anatole France, with whom Burke “made a bad beginning,” and Victor Cherbuliez,
whose novel Burke had not yet read, on November 9, 1915. On November 29, 1915, he
wrote, “Which is better- to talk Berlitz French fluently, to read French poetry naturally,
or to be able to know what I mean by, say, the Eleatic school?” He felt himself on the
verge of entering college for the first time, and anticipated what he would study and do.
Classics (Latin and Greek), mathematics, the theater, opera, philosophy, French,
and English vied in Burke’s imagination with “hold[ing] on to my German and
Esperanto, and writ[ing] for the school papers, and find[ing] a poker club.” He thought
about giving up Greek, French, or German, but never Latin, for he had “fallen madly in
love with Cicero,” quoting in Latin from the second invective against Catiline. Almost as
early as any records we possess, we find Burke’s cathexis to Roman oratory via Cicero.
The French language beckons him with “Verlaine, and Villon, and Banville, and de
Musset, and France, and Flaubert.” But these authors remain a prospect, yet to be tackled,
in November 1915.
Set to move to Ohio on January 24, 1916, Burke began a letter to Cowley in
German. He was in the middle of reading Arthur Symons’s Studies in Prose and Verse
and, while praising indelicacy, exclaimed, “And Verlaine! Thank God! there is always
Verlaine.” From this isolated reference, it is difficult to gauge Burke’s stance toward
Verlaine, but he may have read the essay in Symons’s Studies in Prose and Verse on the
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Spanish poet Campoamor, who, according to Symons, “followed, long before Verlaine,
Verlaine’s advice to ‘take rhetoric and wring its neck’” (196). From the essay I can infer
that by “rhetoric” Symons means the prose of abstractions against the poetry of images
(196-7). As Symons enlists Verlaine in support of this view, and Burke “thanks God” for
Verlaine in a letter written while reading this book of Symons, one might venture the
guess that Burke, too, rejects abstraction in favor of the image. It could not be possible to
prove this inference on so small a hint, but it does not damage plausibility for me to
imagine a contrarian Burke aligning at this moment with Verlaine to “wring the neck” of
abstraction. Yet more often than not, Burke takes the side of abstraction against the
image, in conformity with his major clinamen or swerve from sensation to intelligence.
When he encountered the major French poets at Ohio State, on March 11, 1916,
Burke reacted equivocally: “The nearer I get to an understanding of the French language,
the more I am astounded at the limitations of the medium. French is a social language.
Sonnet or no sonnet, French is castrated.” Soon after, on March 27, 1916,wil he wrote,
Are you reading French yet? Perhaps I told you—I am struggling more or less
successfully through the “Petits Poëms en Prose.” They are very pretty little things.
Baudelaire is very funny, and very normal. Did I tell you the figure?—he is a daring
little fellow who is determined to be naughty, and his efforts are awfully cute. …
Perfectly childish. Damn it, that is not degeneracy. That is mere youthfulness.
In these earliest letters there is no mention of Laforgue anywhere. Other than Cowley's
reminiscence (to me, dubious) in Exile's Return, no archival reference to Laforgue exists
in the Burke archive before a short, hand-written poem collected in a group of papers
from around 1918-1919.1 Many of the poems Selzer cites, including “The Oftener

1

Because of its proximity to notes for stories finished in 1919, I guess this undated poem to have been
written sometime in 1918-20: “I envy you your prophylactic Muse / Your melancholy’s documented
nature / With its experimental nomenclature // I envy you your grasp on prophylactics // X // I envy you
your highly cautious tactics / Your melancholy’s documented nature / With its experimental
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Trinity,” “Rhapsody Under the Autumn Moon,” and “Revolt,” were written in 1915. It
seems misleading to think they were historically written in the context of Burke's deep
reading of French poetry.
Whether he encountered Laforgue directly in high school or absorbed a similar
influence along other channels, Burke's poems from the earliest period do evince a
“double mood” as described by Winters. Burke can have implicitly criticized his own
earlier poetry through the substitute of Laforgue, without ever having read Laforgue
during that earlier period. Burke may have been only able to diagnose Laforgue's
“adolescence” because he had already worked it out in his own poetry. More likely,
Burke’s critique of Laforgue was always Burke’s self-analysis, and was naïvely (weakly)
picked up by others as a truth about Laforgue.
Onto both Baudelaire and Laforgue, then, Burke seems to project a pseudo-sexual
anxiety tied to his own “adolescence.” I bring this up to caution against any temptation to
over-simplify Burke the poet to a fiction created by the early 20th century English and
American critics upon whom Selzer relies for their characterization of the “Symbolists.”
Edmund Wilson, in particular, was explicitly hostile and reductive towards 19th century
aestheticism, the English representatives of which Selzer names as Swinburne, Pater, and
Wilde. Much can be added to Selzer's account by examining Burke's English influences
as well as the French. Let us glance at a few poems.
George Meredith: Comedy and Social Irony
Chronologically, Burke wrote poetry first, but he also wrote fictional sketches,
with no way to establish priority among all but a few scattered early texts in the archive.

nomenclature / Your savoir faire in poet’s prophylactics / Oh moon of Jules Laforgue, oh grinning
skull-bone // Yours is a highly prophylactic art”
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The earliest dated works are thirteen poems mostly written during May and June 1915,
although the earliest goes back to September 1914:
What will her eyes and lips effect in me?
Perhaps I'll live the hell of jealousy;
Or shall suck in that cloyed felicity
Of loving violently and being violently loved.
Either alone or sickly-excessive in companionship, no option looks promising for the
young Burke, seventeen at the writing of this poem. Timothy Crusius establishes bathos
as the primary rhetorical figure of Burke's poetry, and satire as the genre, under the
heading of Burke's own critical term “comedy” (‘Morbid Selph’).2 What Winters
condemns as Burke's looseness in the romantic “double mood,” Crusius praises as
Burke's “comic genius for inclusiveness and mediation between opposing viewpoints.”
Crusius finds these viewpoints to converge in the dramatistic system, but live directly in
Burke's poetry: “[A] comic meeting-place of equal, opposing ways of looking at the
world, each 'tragically' perfected in its partial knowledge of the truth, but undergoing the
comic process of gaining self-awareness … and hence tolerance” (‘Morbid’ 18-9). Burke
reflected on comedy both early and late, in ways instructive for understanding his poetry
and its “rhetorical” aspect.
As a young man Burke revered George Meredith's “Essay on Comedy.” In a
damaged letter written possibly on September 14, 1917,3 he wrote to Cowley, “as
Meredith pointed out in that essay of his on comedy which was once my Bible for a week

2

See Burke’s Attitudes Toward History, pp. 166-75, for the locus classicus of his “comic frame of
motives."

3

There was once a typed date in the top margin, but the only visible part of it at high magnification and
brightness appears to be the number 14, perhaps with a “t” at the end of month. It is impossible to tell
for sure, but this letter could have been written “Sept. 14” of 1917.
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or two, a cultured nation must invariably find its expression in comedy.” Two years
earlier, on October 9, 1915, he wondered if some epigrams he planned to submit to the
magazine Smart Set reflected more “the influence of Meredith or Mr. Hall's vaudeville
shows.” Meredith argues for the social basis of comedy, and personifies comedy as a
battle of wits between the sexes (93); “an interpretation of the general mind” (138); above
all a “vigilant sense of a collective supervision, spiritual and present” (147). One can
judge one's “capacity for comic perception by being able to detect the ridicule of them
you love without loving them less; and more by being able to see yourself somewhat
ridiculous in dear eyes, and accepting the correction their image of you proposes” (133).
Meredith's theory of comedy was well known by, and significant to, Burke, going back
far enough that he could consider it an influence in early October 1915.
The abstractions of Burke’s (perhaps prosaic) early poetry often turn on the comic
perspective espoused by Meredith. Consider the following sonnet, sent to Cowley on
October 5, 1915:
If I could view myself without a laugh,
If I could flee the roaringly pathetic
Self-introspectiveness my evil half
Imposes on me, showing how bathetic
It is for me to soar,— were not the staff
Of self-acquaintanceship so energetic.—
Did I not feel at times a strutting calf,
Or a forty-year old virgin's tired cosmetic:
Then stupidly I'd purr to my caress,—
At my own stupid blandishments I'd bow,—
I'd take the poor dear world beneath my wing,—
And be the wearied cynic of success.
What proud Byronic sniveling songs I'd sing!
But I would be less proud than I am now.
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Burke’s “evil half” imposes bathetic, ironical images of himself as a “strutting calf, / Or a
forty-year old virgin’s tired cosmetic.” Mocking both the youth trying to appear old, and
the aged trying to appear young, Burke admits his pride. Without the “selfacquaintanceship” which is really a self-chastisement, he would obey his own appeals,
purr to his own caresses, in other words, retreat cynically like his image of Byron.
Meredith had written, “[Byron] had no strong comic sense, or he would not have taken an
anti-social position, which is directly opposed to the comic” (136). The “laugh” here is
Burke's irony aimed at himself. Laughing is pride, self-acquaintanceship, and Burke’s
complex rebellion against what he considers “Byronic,” self-satisfying and anti-social
poetry.
A version of this poem, likely written earlier, appears in the archive typed dated
June 1, 1915, some four months before Burke sent it to Cowley in the form printed
above. The earlier version contains “that” for “the” in Line 2; and the last word of Line
10 was “blush” instead of “bow.” As Burke transcribed the poem in the letter to Cowley
of October 5, 1915, he first wrote the word “blush” but crossed it out, and wrote the four
lines printed above to conclude. The final five lines in the original corresponded with the
earlier “blush” in Line 10: “At my own stupid blandishments I’d blush,– / And be the
gentle cynic of success. / Then I could waste my talents, not just booze, / And never
would I call my genius mush gush. / But yet by that what Russian pride I’d lose.”
Without his self-imposed ridicule, Burke would waste his talents in praising his own
genius; furthermore, the earlier version suggests a Russian influence behind this “selfacquaintanceship.”
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Another poem, sent to Cowley on October 9, 1915, makes the Meredithian
metaphysics more blatant. But where Meredith’s comedy can be described as a “calm,
curious eye” (91), and “an oblique light … followed by volleys of silvery laughter” (142),
Burke’s comedy has a more malicious edge in quest to thwart not only Folly (Meredith
120), but all tragedy. Burke in the letter calls this a “novelistic poem”:
To A Sense of Humor.
Aroint thee, wicked plague to sighing swains.
A pox on thee, thou blotter to our tears.
Thou idle anti-climax to our pains,
Leave us, and take with thee thy heartless jeers.
Thou tellest us the music of our lute,
Which we were pouring forth so soaringly,
Is but the wheezy pibroch, and to boot,
Thou addest that we played it roaringly.
We settle, to enthuse in the divine,
And hear a voice ring out from high Parnassus.
Thou tellest us, “Your ether is cheap wine.
The voice you hear’s the chanting of some asses.
Thou snickerer, if we got rid of thee,
Then every one could have a tragedy.
The use of “roaringly,” as in the “Sonnet on Myself” quoted above, again shows Burke’s
contempt for loud profusions. His antagonism toward Byron in the previous poem
expands to other “romantic” tropes: sighing, tears, pains, the divine Parnassus, and above
all, the dignity of tragedy. Burke plays the cynic well before achieving success, as if
defensively anticipating and warding off the possibility of failure. The idle, heartless
snickerer of Burke’s comedy (implied by antithesis to “tragedy” in the final line) is a
clinamen or defensive misprision of Meredith’s “calm, curious eye.”
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The following page of the same letter, October 9, 1915, Burke includes a poem
aimed at the idea of “love,” with the comic spirit lying in wait:
Lamentations of a Latent Genius
I want to love.
I want to build me a goddess once.
I want to dress my love up in pretty similes,
Be enraptured like drunken Bacchantes swirling
on hillsides- and all that.
I want to weep poetic rivers, too.
I want to be sick unto death with love,
So sick that I must moan in agonized sonnets.
Just let me love,
And I’ll see to the moons and the roses.
Ah, Fatal Sisters, grant me one really ethereal love.
I want to have a Beatrice.
I want to have a noble, ecstatic love.
Perhaps I could sell it to some magazine.
One of the most revealing lines of this poem, to name Burke’s implicit antagonist, is “I
want to weep poetic rivers, too.” That “too” points a finger at all the anti-social poets,
who purr at their own caresses, bow to their own blandishments, violently cloyed to the
sighs and tears of divine Parnassus, a noble, tragic, ecstatic love entirely built of images
from within, and sold to the nearest magazine. The impulse to sell sets the young Burke
apart; a mark of his self-acquaintanceship, not self-praise, but a kind of jealous anti-self
which attempts to negate the British romantic tradition. Burke uses Meredith’s concept of
“comedy” as a lever to fight this battle (against, say, “Byronism”), but it is not clear that
Burke does not fall into what Meredith calls “Satire”: “If you detect the ridicule, and your
kindliness is chilled by it, you are slipping into the grasp of Satire” (Meredith 133-4).
One may have to seek encouragement in the precursor, Meredith, to render one better
able to detect the young Burke’s kindliness.
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That October, the British novelist Louis Wilkinson agreed to show two of the
eighteen-year-old Kenneth Burke's poems to a recently formed poetry magazine called
The Others. Wilkinson called the following poem “the one about music” (qtd. in Letter to
Cowley 10/12/15), sent to Cowley by Burke in a hand-written letter of September 30,
1915:
Some would call music a prestidigitator,
Insinuating into them a change of mood,
And twisting their souls about a keyboard
As the labyrinth of a guilloche.
They are prestidigitators to themselves.
I am not tickled by a trill,
I do not choke at a dance of death,
Nor do I fling myself to syncopations.
Music, be it loud or soft,
Be it dainty wisps,
Or awful crashes,
Or motion,
Lends me no sentiment.
It bids me seek my own.
It is dark.
I am alone in my room,
Casting for a thought.
From somewhere cords are rising.
They come like recollection.
Raggy things, they become tender.
I am weeping at a fox trot.
As in the “Sonnet on Myself,” Burke accuses those who allow themselves susceptibility
to music of being self-deceivers. Refusing to passively accept the sentimental “trick” of
music, Burke undermines his own “Russian pride” at the end of the poem. Music takes its
revenge on Burke in a grotesque return. The verbs “tickled,” “choke,” and “fling,” in the
first stanza, manifest bodily the musical forms of the trill, dance of death, and
syncopation—or so the music would intend. “My own” initiates what Harold Bloom
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calls the Crossing of Solipsism involving emptiness and fullness, height and depth, and
the Freudian tropes of isolation and repression. The pathetic weeping at the end is a
surcharge of the sublime, the return of the repressed.
The bathetic concluding line, “I am weeping at a fox trot,” is fully aware of the
earlier mood or attitude in the poetic persona's rejection of susceptibility to music. The
bathetic weeper becomes a proto-Laforguean clown (even if Burke had not yet read
Laforgue), Burke's “satirical presentation of himself, as he creates his most natural mask,
his role of comic hero” (Crusius 23). The confrontation of moods or perspectives within
the poem is the comic effect; Burke is the comic hero.
The other of the two poems Louis Wilkinson showed to The Others editor Alfred
Kreymbourg (Selzer 63) was certainly written before October 5, 1915. Burke announces
in that letter to Cowley that Wilkinson found the following poem “pretty good”:
The Metropolitan Light As Seen From
The Jersey Shore
I might liken you unto a jewel in the coronet of a sumptuous
Ethiop virgin,
In the coronet of a black-haired virgin as she lies upon a
bespangled couch;
Or unto the shapened soul of man, high, yet supported from
the earth;
Or unto a motionless balloon of sickly diamonds, with one
hidden, striving ruby;
Or unto the Star of Bethlehem, alluring the Seven Sages on
to Anti-Christ;
Or an emblem of purity- even an emblem of purity weeping over
an evil city;
Or unto the spirit of evil which glitters over an evil
city;
Or an anxious lantern my love has hung upon the sky to warn
me constantly against inconstancy.
So might I tempt my fancy.
But I will not deceive myself so happily.
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To me you are nothing but a light- measured, calculated,
payed-for.
You are there to proclaim not man's genius, but man's
business.
The cluster which includes Comedy includes business. Byronic suffering, moons and
roses, as well as religious yearning, the divine, and Parnassus, fall on the side of Tragedy.
So, in a painfully complex way, does music. Selling to magazines, the fox trot, and
perhaps, “Russian pride” are the only tropes in the poems quoted above which approach
anything near to synthesizing or reconciling comedy and tragedy. Take the fox trot:
Burke regards it as somehow banal, or bathetic, yet it makes him weep. Likewise, in
“Sonnet on Myself,” Burke’s self-acquaintanceship, or ironical self-glance, is both
pathetic and bathetic. There must be a kind of “wholesome” (is it?), non-tragic weeping.
This desire comes through in these early poems, perhaps in spite of Burke’s snickerer.
Oscar Wilde and Louis Wilkinson
Burke wrote to Cowley on December 10, 1916, planning a holiday trip back to
Pittsburgh: “[O]f course, we shall take the walk to the library, just as we did as Slavian
Juniors and Oscarian Seniors.” Whether or not their slightly divergent memories
correspond to some factual timeline of book-reading, Cowley divides reading into
encounters with individual authors, while Burke cuts a direct line from one abstraction to
another, two “metaphysical” boundaries: Slavian and Oscarian. That Burke generalized
his entire senior year of high school as “Oscarian,” only one and a half years removed
from the experience, testifies to Wilde's predominance for Burke at the moment just prior
to our earliest documentary evidence.
Cowley’s Exile's Return interprets his and Burke’s emergence as socially
determined: “the football crowd, the social crowd, the second-best social crowd,” and a
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group of “boys who made good marks in English Composition, read books that weren't
assigned for reading, were shy, noisy, ill dressed and helped to edit the school magazine”
(15-6). Cowley details the social strategy he refers to as a symptom of “adolescence” (16)
and names “a sense of paradox” (21). This was to oppose someone's expectation of you,
even if it meant anticipating the other person might expect your opposition.
Their response to Oscar Wilde illustrates the limit of this strategy: “If it leads at
one moment to reading Oscar Wilde because other high-school pupils have never heard
of him, it leads at the next to disparaging Wilde because you admired him once and
because [other] people still admire him” (21-2). Burke's own impression of this period, or
social pose, is probably best characterized (or caricatured) in the brief snapshot of Lowell
Waldemar Jones in Burke's first major short story, “The White Oxen,” written about three
years after high school:
Universally disliked, he had already learned to carry his unpopularity masterfully by
universally disliking; he wafted about him an aura of contempt in general … [he] had
set out at this early date to be the sunflower of erudition. An omnivorous reader, he
applied his reading inexorably; he wore his learning as his archididascalus, his Lord
and Savior, Oscar Wilde, had worn his green carnation. (Here & Elsewhere 163)
Austin Warren believes this is a self-portrait of Burke (227). Of Swinburne, Pater, and
Wilde, Burke's ambivalence toward Oscar Wilde was especially vehement and
problematic. On October 9, 1915, Burke tosses off this Wildean sentence: “The only way
I could keep a secret would be to forget it, and nothing in the world could induce me to
forget a secret.” On October 22, 1915, Burke joked to Cowley, “I was always ready to die
for a pose, and yet you always posed much more successfully.” He bragged about his
epigrammatic “Oscariana” on October 5, 1915. And yet a few days before, on September
30, 1915, he worried that “Wilde has too much ease in expressing his feelings in prison to
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suit me.” This sentiment becomes associated with a potential conflict with his sponsor
Louis Wilkinson.
On October 12, Wilkinson criticized Burke's poetry for being “too projectingly
conscious,” at the expense of “real feeling.” Given the discussion of Burke’s poetry
above, imagine how he might have felt receiving such criticism. It seems as though
Burke’s “projecting” consciousness is precisely his polemical point in the poems. He
inveighs everywhere against “real feeling.” But Burke seems to have taken Wilkinson’s
criticism to heart. Hereafter, Burke largely accepts Wilkinson’s judgment that Burke
writes better in “free verse” as opposed to rhymed, and while Burke does not ever
abandon verse entirely, Wilkinson’s discouragement seems to have led him to pursue his
ambition in letters elsewhere. Another dimension to Burke’s unease regarding Wilkinson
arises from the former’s defensive criticisms of Oscar Wilde.
On October 22, Burke frets to Cowley about an instance when he referred to
Wilde in Wilkinson's presence as “the idol of the old maids” and sneers more privately to
Cowley that Wilkinson “retain[ed] the worship of Wilde we all have at one stage. … he
thought 'De Profundis' the profound anguish of a latent soul, instead of the record of an
arch-dandy who knew how to be dandified in everything, even sack-cloth.” Whatever
Burke's possible social regret about his bravado, he quoted to Cowley on October 25
Wilkinson's statement that “I still think your free verse better than your rhymed- but you
put in too much. Prose is the better vehicle for you- now, at any rate.” Wilkinson's
opinion must have meant a great deal to Burke, for at first he questions but eventually
accepts the former's opinion on his writing. Furthermore, Burke projects onto Wilkinson
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his simultaneous (but partially repressed) admiration of, and (defensive) dislike for Oscar
Wilde.
Burke inverts Wilkinson's preference for “real feeling” against the “projecting
consciousness” the latter sees in Burke's poetry. Where does Wilde fit in this dichotomy?
I believe Wilde bothers Burke so much because he does not fit; even worse for the young
ephebe of English letters, Wilde seems to precede or contain Burke’s dichotomy. The
latter’s claim that Wilde’s “De Profundis” was not “the profound anguish of a latent soul,
[but] instead … the record of an arch-dandy who knew how to be dandified in everything,
even sack-cloth,” attempts to perform the same operation on Wilde as Burke’s poems
would perform on Burke’s own latent “Byronism,” precisely real feeling.
But the terms are reversed. A voice within Burke’s poem mocks Burke the wouldbe tragedian, putatively in the name of comedy, borrowed from George Meredith. Here
Burke apprehends Oscar Wilde and distrusts him for simulating “real feeling,” for
counterfeiting “profound anguish” while remaining a mere dandy. Something about this
offends Burke. Is not the “dandy” Burke’s own inner mocking voice? Wilde surpasses
Burke at his own purported literary game, and Burke scoffs at Wilkinson for taking the
bait Burke is trying to ward off. The “latent soul” in Wilkinson’s supposed naïve
“worship” of Wilde is Wilde’s own ruse, in Burke’s view, and Burke himself proved it in
that he knew, in his poetry, how to mock his own “latent genius.”
Burke’s poems’ projecting consciousness puts itself forward as redeeming,
perhaps “selling,” through comedy, the false pose (“real feeling”) it creates with some
convincing reality. Poem after poem repeats this comedy as Burke's ironic selfacquaintance. Wilkinson would have just the convincing reality without interruption from
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consciousness. Burke would like to lump Wilde into “proud Byronic sniveling songs” but
cannot, because Wilde possesses a super-mimetic grace which unsettles Burke. It
surpasses Burke’s mere “snickerer.” The truth, by implicit contrast, of Burke's comedy
relies in some ironic way on its negative self-acquaintance defined in the poems. Only
when confronted directly by mockery from without, in the person of Wilkinson and the
image of Wilde, did Burke have to confront the inadequacy even of his own negation.
Self-interested, yes; arhetorical, for the ambitious man of letters, hardly.
Wilde implicitly reads Burke as Burke wishes to read Byron—susceptible to
“sincere” emotional anguish, even if expressed through negation. It may be that Wilde
puts an unsettling mirror to Burke the satirist. Further, Burke's ambivalence toward Wilde
may transfer to Wilkinson, and expose Burke to undue, perhaps, but decisively influential
judgments from Wilkinson on his own work, Burke’s nascent vocational program. On
October 12, Burke writes to Cowley, “Wilkinson's preferring my free verse to my
conventional verse has assumed the nature of a challenge in my mind.” Burke never
concedes that his free verse is better, but he does concede in the same letter that
“Wilkinson is right … I overemphasise [sic], and thereby lay myself open to the censure
of those who don't feel my emphasis,” a rhetorical consideration, after all grounded in
“real feeling.” After the second letter from Wilkinson, on October 25, Burke grants “as
Wilkinson says, I am not at my best in poetry.” To go away from “real feeling” toward
“projecting consciousness” departs from poetry in Wilkinson's sense, and may also
escape the trapped position between Wilde's false grace of easy conversation (dandyism)
and the Byronic torment of false emotion. Note, however, that Wilde and Byron here
become essentially fantasy structures for Burke. Finally, Wilkinson's warning may have
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contributed to Burke's wish to avoid “projecting” himself as autobiographical in his
fiction.
Burke would then be a classicist—and Walter Pater's Marius the Epicurean gave
him his way out. The initial impulse, received from the Wildean Louis Wilkinson, for
Burke to move toward fiction, away from poetry, coincided with his reading of Marius
the Epicurean. Just before he read it, as it lay by his bedside or perhaps on his table,
Burke argued to Cowley on October 5 that he would soon go to Columbia and “eat up the
classics, for I find that I am yearning for them.” Essential to Burke's classicism was and
always remained an ironic mockery which he eventually named “comedy”: visible in his
earliest poetry and uneasily variant with the social pose or stance of Oscar Wilde.
Marius the Epicurean: Sensation and Intelligence
Grouped with Burke's earliest dated manuscripts from 1914-1915, mostly typed or
written poems, are two pages of what seem to be fictional prose, beginning with a
quotation, “You remember Beatrice?” These could have been written any time before
1920 or so, but I suspect this fragment was written in mid-1915. I guess this partly
because of its proximity to dated poems in the archival folder, but partly also because of
the fictional sketch's preoccupation with Oscar Wilde: “How to be thought clever … Give
epigrams from Oscar Wilde as your own,” is scratched at the bottom.
The two characters, two voices, summarize what might be different aspects of
Burke. One character in the story, Waldemar, who may be a precursor to Lowell
Waldemar Jones in “The White Oxen,” is a stormy, blustery, self-dramatizing lover with
a hint of George Meredith in his description: “He was a little fellow, and seemed to
realize that a little fellow in love is always more or less ridiculous. Only big men are
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suited to tragic passion.” The narrator, by contrast, quietly goes on studying his Latin.
Burke remarked in letters to Cowley on the relationship between a writer's
autobiographical tendencies and the fictional portrayal of character. To a great extent this
problem extends the “double mood” problem in poetry, discussed above, to the domain of
prose fiction, however one wishes to characterize that transition.
Early hints of this “doubleness” appear in Burke's references to George Moore.
Moore's novel Esther Waters, Burke writes, fails in the artistic trick which makes “the
most uninteresting people in real life quite absorbing in fiction” (To Cowley 9/19/15).
Moore's autobiographical writings, on the other hand, reveal something of Meredith's
comic spirit, especially in his portrayal of Yeats. “[M]ost interesting when [Moore] writes
about himself,” Burke goes on, the author “ridicules and admires Yeats, doing both at the
same time” (To MC 10/22/15). Moore portrays human weakness in a sympathetic way,
much as Meredith would have it.
As an apprentice fiction-writer Burke encountered certain limits very soon, and
began to theorize on the relationship between art and life. One of these limits was the
extreme representation of “life” in fiction, associated with Theodore Dreiser and Russian
writers: journalistic detail, passion, and personality. Another limit was French
asceticism—art above life—first exemplified to Burke by André Gide, ambivalent friend
of Oscar Wilde. But Marius the Epicurean by Walter Pater over-rides American,
Russian, and French influence in its importance to the development of Burke's fiction. In
a way, it contains these differences within itself. Its elements of “sensation” (life) balance
equally with the abstract (art): intelligence, the idea, the ritual.
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“Ritual” serves as a master trope for Marius the Epicurean. The story follows the
career of a boy from the Italian countryside educated at Pisa, who moves to Rome,
eventually to serve the philosophic emperor Marcus Aurelius, and dies in the early
flowering of Christianity. At school Marius befriends Flavian, a pagan poet who dies
young, and Cornelius, a Roman knight who embraces the new hope of Christianity.
Harold Bloom describes Marius the Epicurean as “a series of rituals each of which is
absorbed into its successor without being destroyed or even transcended” (xvi). The
reader and Marius witness together processionals in the country and city, secret Christian
group worship services, the gladiatorial games, and literary readings at a dinner party. All
of these today could be called “rhetorical situations” precisely because of, and in, their
ritual content.
Burke referred to Marius the Epicurean in a 1968 preface to the second edition of
his short fiction, alongside Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain and Hermann Hesse's
Glass Bead Game as types of “the moody treatment of ideas,” something Burke had
wished to emulate (xvi). The Burke-3 archive includes some forty-odd stories, only
fifteen of which were published in The White Oxen of 1924. These tales work through
relation between the sexes, the difference between country and city, descriptive
landscapes as transcendent devices, and the relationship between ritual and architecture.
Burke often discusses fiction in terms of architecture, and one story, “The Book of Yul,”
consists almost entirely of architectural description as a progressive initiation into ritual.
The relationship between Pater and Burke is important for two reasons. First
Burke experiences what Harold Bloom calls clinamen, a revisionary swerve, away from
Pater's focus on “sensation” as the primary value. Burke swerves into his own special
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kind of “intellect” as a reaction-formation against Paterian sensation. From this vantage
point Burke tends to denigrate “sensation” in the form of dumb animals, and sometimes
in the stories applies this unflattering role to women. On the other hand, Burke prizes
Pater's construction of a narrative around rituals which progressively blend into each
other, as easily as one stage of human life passes into the next. It is safe to say that when
Burke first read Marius the Epicurean in October 1915, it set his ideal of fiction.
The first recorded evidence of Burke's encounter with Pater is an unpublished
letter dated October 5, 1915 to Malcolm Cowley. After listing off his recent reading,
Burke turns to his to-do list: “Now I have at home 'Marius the Epicurean', some
Strindberg, and some of [Arthur] Symon's [sic] purple patches. I am going to go back
over Swinburne and Rossetti, with perhaps some Shelley, Keats, and Byron.” Seventeen
days later, on October 22, Burke writes,
“Marius the Epicurean” proved the most arresting book of the year. It was a
luxury to fall into that archaic leisurely study of a philosophical temperament striving
(to quote Pater quoting some German, Goethe, I guess) sich im Denken zu orientiren
[sic—“to orient oneself in thinking” – Kant]. …
I was struck by that austere use that theory of mine about the dual terminology
had been put to. Indeed, as I read a little philosophy, I find that I was saying nothing
new, and a very poorly disguised variation of the old. The Stoic and the Cyrenian (I
prefer that word to Epicurean because it is not so abused) both start with the same
premise, “Oh, hell, what's the use.” From this the Stoic deduces “Let's be diffident”.
But Cyrenaicism is more modern. It deduces, “Let's be acute”. Then, leaving the
territory of ethical philosophy, we step back among the hylozoists, and find a similar
condition. Heracleitus, following Thales and the rest of the Milesians finds that the
basis of everything is change. But Parmenides comes out with the conclusion that it is
permanence. The only other classic example I know of is that one of Emerson and
me, but doubtless, when I have read twenty pages from a history of philosophy
instead of ten, I shall have more.
Eighteen years old at the time, Burke forecasts his intellectual project for the next two
decades. This passage does not directly indicate the exact nature of Burke's anterior
theory of “dual terminology,” but significantly, Pater calls it forth in an uncanny
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anticipation, Marius the Epicurean having been written and published just over ten years
before Burke's birth. To adapt an Emersonian phrase, Burke perceives his own thoughts
returning to him from Pater in alienated form, giving the young Burke a “poorly
disguised” feeling of belatedness.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (whom Burke misjudges to be the
literary artist Goethe) and pre-Socratic “hylozoist” philosophers Heraclitus and
Parmenides shadow Burke's apprehension of Pater's modern acuity. Kant admonishes to
“orient oneself in thinking,” while the ancients understand matter in terms of either
change or permanence. Burke's 1935 book Permanence and Change begins with a
chapter titled “Orientation.” Harold Bloom would call the letter quoted above a Scene of
Instruction.
The letter to Cowley quoted above, in addition to an undated typed speculation
“Hints for a Post-Joycean Euphues,” and the poem “The Erstaz-element in a NeoCyrenaic philosophy,” suggest that Burke was specially drawn to Chapter VI,
“Euphuism,” and Chapters VIII-IX, “Animula Vagula” and “New Cyrenaicism,” of
Marius the Epicurean. In “Euphuism” Marius eagerly follows the elder boy Flavian's
study of “words, of the means or instruments of the literary art” (73). Burke wrote an
unpublished essay titled “Degeneracy of the Gloss,” containing a reference to the
Columbia University library and so likely written while Burke was a student there in
1917. In that essay Burke favorably quotes from Pater's “Euphuism” chapter on the
arbitrary, one could add belated, scene of “art or literature” in all ages (77). Without
question Burke wanted to innovate with words, found new schools, restore the sharper
edges of words. Whether Burke felt closer to Flavian or Marius remains ambiguous.
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“Animula Vagula” and “New Cyrenaicism” begin after Flavian's death when
Marius takes upon himself a program of self-education, beginning with Heraclitus. In a
diary entry of January 16, 1921, the autodidact Burke reflects on an essay he has written
on Pater:
I suggested that Pater's Marius the Epicurean had been the only English novel which
approached my idea of what a novel should be. My main point, however, that his
ideas on Stoicism and Epicureanism were meant to be beautiful rather than
convincing may be somewhat beyond the mark. Still, that is what I get out of Pater:
the aesthetic value of an idea, rather than the fact of its truth or falsity. The other
appealing phase of Pater is his liberation from the trivial narration of incident which
goes into the representative novel.
From this evidence we can piece together a reasonable picture of Burke's misreading of
Pater. On the one hand, Pater liberates the novel from trivial incident and plot business in
a way that Burke praises in an unpublished manuscript, “The Qualitative in Fiction,”4
(possibly the article referred to in the diary entry above) as “qualitative purpose” over the
mere conveyance of information: “Thus, Marius does not go on a journey because it is
the author's purpose to get his hero from one place to another, but because Pater obeyed
the need in a given chapter to establish the feel of travel, the quality of a sensitive and
questioning adolescent under the consciousness of deracination.” Open to this positive
influence in Marius the Epicurean, Burke yet wards off some of Pater's intellectual
power by degrading the latter's (and Marius's) ideas to the status of “beauty” rather
conviction. There is a division in Burke between the “beautiful” and “convincing.”

4

This is a subheading. The Overall title on this manuscript is “The Basis of a New Prose Fiction,” for
which Burke wrote several short components: “The Fallacy of Narrative,” “The Qualitative in Fiction”
(quoted here), “The Autobiographical Novel,” “Analysis and Synthesis,” “The Ultimate Others,”
“EGOMET,” “Fluctuation,” and “Progression.” On some of these he crossed out “The Basis of a New
Prose Fiction” and re-named it “Adversus Paganos,” which he applies to several of the manuscripts
without the former title.
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Conscious yet resigned that he has undervalued Pater for his own purposes, it
remains for Burke's fiction to realize its own trajectory of development along lines
dictated by his misreading of Marius the Epicurean: How shall Burke create a fiction of
“ideas” based on qualitative forms, while evading the brooding note of sensation and
impression that comprises Paterian beauty? We can turn in Pater's fiction to a passage
exemplifying the object of Burke's ambivalence:
But our own impressions!—The light and heat of that blue veil over our heads, the
heavens spread out, perhaps not like a curtain over anything!—How reassuring, after
so long a debate about the rival criteria of truth, to fall back upon direct sensation, to
limit one's aspirations after knowledge to that! (114)
Burke confuses an argument for aesthetic knowledge with the idea that somehow
aesthetics evades knowledge or shirks responsibility. Discounting (self-consciously)
Pater's intellect, Burke reduces Pater's novel to an intellectual debate between Stoicism
and Epicureanism (or Cyrenaicism). That Pater chooses the latter undermines, in Burke's
view, the intellectual rigor of the debate. This contradicts Burke's initial impression in
1915, in the letter quoted earlier, that Pater's “message,” in fact, deduces the admonition,
“Let's be acute.” The debt has been covered over in retrospect.
Dreiser and the Russians: Autobiography, Expression, and Art
Burke's agon with Marius the Epicurean informed his encounter with other kinds
of fiction: American, Russian, French, and German, for the most part. As we proceed
through the development of Burke's fiction, let us keep our attention fixed on two things:
Burke's fictional self-portrayal (“autobiography”), and his theoretical comments about the
ratio between life and art. These two fault-lines provide architectural basis for the ritual
of Burke's fiction. Burke swerved from Theodore Dreiser and Fyodor Dostoevsky in the
same direction, and at the same angle, as he swerved from Walter Pater’s Marius the
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Epicurean, but Dreiser and the Russians provided an easier target for Burke’s rapidly
developing mind. The strongest example of influence in this respect was the character of
Ippolit Terenyev in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot. When Burke misread this book defensively
sometime around November 1915, Burke formulated a division between the
“architectural novel” and the “psychological sketch.”
Burke claims, “I love to write around a grain of philosophy, rather than around a
sensation,” one month after his praise of Marius the Epicurean in late 1915 (To Cowley
11/24/15). A stigma toward the word-concept “sensation” fit with Burke’s developing
polemic against Pater, but these maneuvers were not just directed against Pater. To
Burke's taste Theodore Dreiser, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and journalistic novelists immersed
themselves too deeply in the subject-matter of “life,” allied with “sensation.” Dreiser's
The “Genius” made Burke feel “as sensual as the animals in my play,” but “these
moments of passion have been absolutely commonplace things” (To Cowley 10/27/15).
One can fail, like George Moore, to infuse “life” into a fictional character, and yet still
depict comic otherness with liveliness in frank autobiography. Contrasted to Moore,
Dreiser's infusion of life into fiction appeared to Burke too frankly Dreiser's own.
Against Dreiser's simple “red passion,” Burke wants “complexity, convolution,
reaction, development-the very things that make me rave over the Russians” (To Cowley
10/27/15). Soon enough, Burke meets Dreiser in person and finds his impression
confirmed:
[Dreiser] says he can not [sic] explain the psychology of a weak temperament, a
temperament which is not aggressive. There is my chance, eh? … I shall try to exploit
the ways of weakness, and at the same time shall depict one of those creatures of my
megalomania. I am very wise. To witness, I intend putting myself in a minor part. (To
Cowley 11/6/15)
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Meredith's philosophy of comedy had taught Burke perspectival multiplicity, “vigilant
sense of a collective supervision,” which has already been noted in his early poetry.
Burke observes the success gained by Moore's autobiography, with Moore himself
playing a minor role. To place oneself “in a minor part” adopts the fool's mask of a
potentially comic view, which can posit both “weakness” and “megalomania” as
opposing motives. Dreiser's aggressive simplicity cedes to Russian complexity, an
inherited love from Burke's and Cowley's high school years.
This complexity, however, still rests on sensation. Another way to conceive of
“sensation” is through the companion terms “impression” and “expression.” An
“impression” receives a sensation from the outside, while the same mechanism
“expresses” its sensation to the outside. The pair impression-expression describes
sensation as a transmission between inner and outer. This manifests in fiction as a kind of
transmission between the author and reader via the “sensation” of the “character.” The
author may say (or we may say of the author), “this character expresses me.” The reader
may say the same thing, and we have established a link of “sensation” between the author
and reader. Of course, for strong readers, we here open the door to influence and
misreading.
Burke had written an early story, “Analysis of a Cerebralist” (see Selzer 183),5
and found a simplified version of his “cerebralist” in Dreiser's Eugene Witla (To Cowley
10/27/15). Introducing a beautiful young woman in The “Genius,” Dreiser writes of
“Dreams! dreams!—of clouds, sunsets, colors, sounds which a too articulate world would
do its best later to corrupt” (501). Dreiser seems to find something hostile to beauty in

5

I am not sure whether the “You remember Beatrice?” fragment is a part of this, but it seems to be the
likeliest candidate I have found, if any of this early story does survive in the archive.
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language. Jennie Gerhardt, an earlier Dreiser novel which Burke also read in late 1915,
drives the wedge between feeling and speech more drastically.
In a letter to Cowley of November 6, 1915, when he reports meeting Dreiser,
Burke “rhapsodize[s]” about the beauty of nature and the skies, and refers to a moment
when “Jennie Gerhardt cries because she can not [sic] express such things” (To Cowley
11/6/15). The key sentence in this passage from Dreiser reads, “No artist in the
formulating of conceptions, her soul still responded to these things [trees, fields, water],
and every sound and every sigh were welcome to her because of their beauty” (16).
Neither Jennie nor her lover Lester Kane express themselves very well, Dreiser takes care
to show us, and during one of the most terrible climactic scenes Jennie becomes “hurt
beyond the power to express herself, unable mentally and physically to listen to another
word” (356). Her mean treatment by a lawyer in the plush environs of a well-appointed
home on the South Side of Chicago represents the antithesis of Dreiser's ideal of
simplicity and goodness. Surely Dreiser has allied himself with “life,” with sensation,
feeling, and beauty, even if it is tragic.
Uneasiness over the commonplace passion of Dreiser’s Eugene Witla may have
suppressed Burke's desire to make himself into a fictional hero. George Moore had
shown him it was possible to write both autobiographically and “comically,” if one takes
care to shine the primary light on others. Doestoevsky’s The Idiot, and Ippolit Terentyev's
“Essential Explanation,” comically raise the negotiation between the writer's need
(“expression”) and the audience's interest (“art”) in written discourse.
In Terentyev, the consumptive nihilist from Dostoevsky's The Idiot, Burke
discovers “exactly the fictionalization of myself in my letters to you this summer” (To
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Cowley 11/24/15). In Ippolit's long diatribe, “Essential Explanation,” the dying man
expresses vividly to his audience the intricacies of his mental and physical agitation with
only a few weeks to live. This turns from a desperate clinging to life, to contempt for the
healthy who squander it, to a desire to do good deeds, to an “ultimate conviction” to
commit suicide in the front of the very witnesses who have just heard his “explanation,”
at the moment of sunrise (387-420). The suicide attempt fails, and Dostoevsky treats
readers to a poignant combination of pathos and bathos; in other words, comedy.
The “psychological sketch” delighted Burke, even though he deplored it as “bad
architecture” (To Cowley 11/24/15). Here seems to originate a split in Burke's critical
mind, that would widen and sharpen, between “expression” and “art.” Ippolit's digression
both represents and burlesques the principle of “self-expression” in fiction. At one
moment the eighteen-year-old pauses, while reading his would-be suicide note, with
some embarrassment. He had promised not to re-read or edit his note in the interest of
“the whole truth, ultimate and solemn” (387). But his audience complains, “There's too
much of the personal … you're much too interested in yourself” (391). The problem of
expression and art indirectly raises the issue of difference between persons.
Burke carries the distinction between art and expression, in the same letter, to
Shakespeare’s Othello. The dramatic critic William Archer, who “deals with Shakespeare
as a playwright rather than a psychologist,” interprets the end of that play, in Burke's
words, as “an example of legitimate dramatic surprise rather than a speech to portray soul
states” (To Cowley 11/24/15). Thus Shakespeare “the artist” provides Burke a foil to
Dostoevsky “the psychologist.” Legitimate dramatic surprise has a valid claim to artistic
convention, therefore social appeal, whereas as “soul states” may be so glutted with
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sensation as to be not transmissible to others. The dark comedy of Ippolit exposes this
dilemma. The eighteen-year-old Burke, too, felt an impulse to “express” his “soul state.”
He associated Walter Pater with the haunting thought that “we can not get beyond the
walls of our own personality” (To Cowley 11/29/15), and claimed for himself a “burning
lust to express sensations by words” (To Cowley 1/18/16). But the budding comic artist
in him checked the impulse through a socially grounded irony he began to call “art.”
The term “expression,” from the writer's perspective, finds its correspondent in
the critic's “impression.” Before entering Ohio State, Burke wrote, “My only abnormality
is that of every artist- the mania for understanding and impressing.” This “impressing”
requires an audience, so even the rawest expression must contain some art if it is to
“express” at all. The proper audience for art, the “connoisseur,” should be able to
welcome all impressions and measure them by their “strength or weakness” (To Cowley
1/13/16). It is hard not to think of Pater while reading this letter.
The two novels which seem to have influenced Burke the most through January
1916 were Marius the Epicurean and The Idiot. He decried the former for its priority of
sensation as opposed to the intellect, while praising its handling of ideas. He blamed the
latter for its power of expression, while finding himself reflected therein. Such
contemplation, and its implications for Burke's career, brought him to a crisis of
wordlessness which led him to sharpen the distinction between expression and art.
January 28, 1916: A Mountainous Crisis
Burke was defending a story he had written involving incest,6 and evidently
became sick of defending it. On January 28, 1916, Burke feels himself a “mass of

6

See Selzer (183). This story had revolted an acquaintance of Burke's named Harden (To Cowley
1/13/16).
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squirming sensations” and longs for the mountains, sparked by a childhood memory
when he spent “the most delightful hour of pure bestiality” with Cowley. Associating this
memory with a pastoral scene of peasant labor from Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, Burke sets
up “art” by antithesis, and links it to the city: “I have always doubted art; now I
understand why. It is because art to me meant the city, and I unconsciously hated the
city” (To Cowley 1/28/16). Here is another reversal, not like their high school Wildean
cult of paradox (wit), but rather a reversal of Burke's current situation (in early 1916) by a
reversal of a previous, remembered, polemic against Cowley, against the country, and in
favor of the city.
Then, whenever it was, Burke defended the city. Now he rejects it, as memory
plays double with revision. But still, the country has a very complex relationship to
“expression.” With the city now firmly attached to the idea of art, turns toward “nature”
beg the problem of how to convert sensation into words. Burke admits that in turning
against art, he turns against himself, “that thing I was striving for. … All revolutionists
revolt against only themselves” (To Cowley 1/28/16). Sometime after 1918 Burke
schematized his letters to Cowley, from 1915 up till that point, through a series of notes.
Burke’s note for this letter of January 28, 1916, reads, “Scene of my errors, which I
would have erased. Discussion of 'nature.' Mystic silence, etc. Pivotal.” In that pivotal
letter, in a rush of passionate despair, Burke asks Cowley to burn all his letters:
They are the writings of a coward, with a mania for explaining himself, and a fear of
being seen as he is. … They are everything but mountainous. They are not the
expression of a personality, but the concealment of one. … We are all isolated
entities, and must learn to sink into ourselves. We must learn to bear up under the
most terrible torture of life, silence. Those who think they can speak are fatuous. …
To go to the depths of one's own soul is to find that nothing has been expressed. (To
Cowley 1/28/16)
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“Mountains” are Burke's trope for Cowley and Pennsylvania, wordlessness and
companionship.7 Burke might also have had in mind the loneliness of the Swiss
mountains described in The Idiot (59). He attempts to destroy the voice of his letters up to
that point, with the new, and old, form of mountains.
A newfound desire for the pastoral drives Burke to the limit of speech, with the
paradox, “silence is the only great truth, the only mode of expression.” Then he adds in
the margin, in pen, “No, there is no mode of expression.” He comes full stop, having
reached the limit. This must have been Burke's “mystic silence.” For once, he catches
glimpse of his “ideal,” and “[w]hat a mighty strength of asceticism it would take” to
follow it up (To Cowley 1/28/16). The ideal itself has a limit and rebounds back in the
direction of speech.
What someone admires as mystic asceticism or “voluntary barbarity” (to use
another of Burke's phrases), can also be negated as a “continual burden of egoism” (To
Cowley 1/28/16). At first disgusted by urbanity and the ideal of art, Burke flies to the
mountains and becomes disgusted with expression, yet cannot bear the “restless
isolation” of ascetic egoism. He looks about him for a curative, and his selfacquaintanceship teaches him to evade his self-introspectiveness (see previous chapter)
through the “trivialities of speech” (To Cowley 1/28/16). The old, weary, urbanity
transfigures into a new, “positive” term for social life: sympathy.
To sympathy and Malcolm Cowley he turns, and as if by a spell, his concern
vanishes. Burke returns to the prattle of literary criticism, making comments on a few of
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“I recently used, in a letter to Sue [Jenkins], the simile of a mountain to describe you- not a virulent
shaggy mountain, but a lazily rolling slope, massively indolent, the last thing in the world that would
become hysteric” (To Cowley 1/28/16).
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Cowley's compositions as if he had not just asked his friend to burn the very letter he is
writing: “The most elemental tendency in me is my desire for the sympathy of
intelligence- and the great truth of this burden of silence is its denial of the possibility of
sympathy” (To Cowley 1/28/16). The lesson of mysticism, the “mountainous” crisis,
turns around the simultaneous failure of both love and “expression.” So, Burke finds,
sympathy is not the same as self-expression, but nor is it the same as art.
As we shall see in the next chapter, expression and art did not fade altogether
from Burke's critical vocabulary; they were submerged. I think the “pivotal” letter of
January 28, 1916, can at least show Burke's ambivalence towards both expression and art
at a very early point in his life. As a young man, he praised and aspired toward an ideal of
art, associated with complexity and the city. Yet he formulated these dreams from the
countryside with Malcolm Cowley. Later, after moving to the city and developing literary
contacts, embroilment in the city (“art”) causes him great repugnance. Art pursues
expression to the country to the point of a mystic silence, a terrible burden of egoism
which undoubtedly wounds Burke. He shrinks from this abyss, and only upon his return
can he restore some grace to both expression and art, a grace and gratitude Burke names
“sympathy.”
Cowley reacted to Burke's “mountainous” despair with a gesture of empathy and
identification: “Finally you realize the inexpressibility of everything. I have been
realizing that poignantly for the last month” (Jay 19). In the next letter after receiving this
reply, Burke initially scoffs at the idea that anyone, much less his close friend, could
share his profound solitude. He longs to create a “character who acts as fanatically as I
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think,” not as fanatically as he acts. This is a swerve from Dostoevsky, away from
sensation, in the same pattern as Burke’s swerve from Pater.
Burke declares that he wants his character free from crippling thought-patterns of
“skeptical hedonism with a philosophy of negation” and admits to Cowley, “In the end
we both are kept sterile by the thought of an indifferent Milky Way” (To Cowley
1/31/16). Burke swerves to Tolstoy's Anna Karenina and Nastasya from The Idiot in
search of some vitality. In an uncouth expression, he calls this “Weak-heart-good-healthcreation-Slavism,” and plans his third novel without having yet written one:
Let's see—this will be my third novel. And lo! there will be no woman and pig! Not a
single sensation … The theme will be quite Russian- the resolutions and counterresolutions of a man of great artistic abilities, his doubting of himself and art, his
Byronicism (occasionally cynical) and the utter unexpectedness of his actions. To
keep myself from falling into autobiography in a minute way, I shall allow myself as I
am to fill the secondary roll [sic]. (To Cowley 1/31/16)
Burke crystallizes Russian psychology (life, expression) into a few points: doubt,
withdrawn and brooding cynicism, and perhaps most important, the unexpected. Burke's
swerve from autobiography prevents this from becoming direct expression on Burke's
part, however. The angle of separation requires art. May 1, 1916, as if catapulting toward
an identity, Burke rejects the “Slavic view” in favor of the “Anglo-Saxon temperament”:
“I cast my lot with urbanity, and I have become as healthy as I once was sick” (Jay 23).
Half a year after his revelation to Cowley concerning Marius the Epicurean, Burke
returns to Meredith, Wilde, and Pater in colors more his own.
André Gide and the Ascetic Spirit
French and German letters problematically mediate this supposed gap between
Slavic (by implication also journalistic-American) and Anglo-Saxon worldviews—a
dichotomy that does not match up so nicely to the matter-form and sensation-intellect
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distinctions as Burke would like. In the unpublished essay “Basis of the American
Attitude,” likely written sometime in 1920, Burke commends American intellectuals'
swerve from British to French literature as a sign of growing national independence. By
June 9, 1917, Burke proudly claims to Cowley, “I now read both French and German
with the fluency of English,” one month after his twentieth birthday. References in the
Cowley letters alone indicate, by that time—in addition to Latin and English language
texts—that Burke had read or knew of Arthur Schnitzler, Anatole France, Thomas Mann,
Charles Baudelaire, Guy de Maupassant, André Gide, Ranier Maria Rilke, Arthur
Schopenhauer, and Henri Bergson, along with many others less famous.
On October 4, 1916, Burke admonished Cowley to “Read André Gide's
monograph on Oscar Wilde. And also, read some novel by André Gide.” About two
months later, on November 30, Burke enthused about Gide's La Porte Étroite: “Why are
the French so good at analyzing the ascetic temperament? … they love to make their
heroes live up to codes in which they, the authors, have no faith. At least, that is why I
should love to write a book like 'La Maison du Péché'8 or 'La Porte Etroite.'” Even so,
some of Gide's lessons for Burke on the art of fiction may have come indirectly from
Oscar Wilde.
Gide's “reminiscences” of Wilde bring up the ratio of Life and Work, captured in
Wilde's enigma spoken to Gide: “I have put all my genius into my life; I have put only
my talents into my works” (qtd. x). The admiring Gide summarizes his view of Oscar,
both the life and work, with the following lesson: “[I]f Balzac had wanted to live his
Comédie humaine, that might have prevented him from writing it.—Wilde was in the
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By Marcelle Tinayre (see Jay 33n).
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habit of saying that 'everything that is gained for life is lost for art,' and that is the very
reason why Wilde's life is tragic” (43-4). Burke began translating Gide's La Porte Étroite
under the title “The Straight Gate,” but only made it a few pages in.
Its opening, in Burke's translation, repeats a similar dichotomy between “work”
and “life” with a decidedly somber result: “Others might have made a book of this; but
the story which I tell here has been all used up in the living, and my valor is exhausted.”
Gide's ambivalent reception of Wilde alerted Burke to the compensation of rhetorical
gain to experiential loss, and vice versa. I believe that Burke flew to French literature to
evade the more direct struggles he had with the English, Americans, and Russians. Gide,
and later Henri Bergson and Remy de Gourmont, matched Burke’s love for intelligence
with a retreat from sensation. Perhaps it was this love of the French that gave rise to the
“Symbolist Solipsist” stereotype of Burke’s early career and the aesthete in general.
La Porte Étroite by André Gide, translated by Dorothy Bussy as Straight is the
Gate, seems to be the first book to make as great an impact on Burke as Marius the
Epicurean, the works of Dreiser, and The Idiot, after Burke read those fictions. I do not
hesitate to say it became Burke’s representative French book at the time: “[T]he French
are not Russians. Indeed, they are not even English” (To Cowley 11/30/16). We may
reasonably attribute Gide as a recommendation from Burke’s Ohio State teacher Ludwig
Lewisohn. Burke’s clinamen from Gide may reveal as much or more about Burke’s
fiction as that from Marius the Epicurean. Pater’s novel largely omits any relation
between the male and female sexes; Marius’s important relationships are male. Straight is
the Gate provokes Burke into a clinamen instructive as to the development of this
problem—relation of the sexes—in Burke’s fiction.
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First, Burke’s reaction: “This book … is about a fanatic. But … the fanatic is a
woman, a very lovely young girl. Really, Malcolm, it is magnificent to contemplate the
wasting and sickening of this fresh young body under her determinations to enter
[heaven] by the straight gate” (To Cowley 11/30/16). Doubtless, this interpretation of
Gide’s novel is possible, the possibility of which Gide must have been aware. But it also
reveals a greater identification between Burke-the-reader and Gide’s protagonist, Jerome,
than between Jerome and Gide-the-author. Burke does not separate himself from
Jerome’s sexual anguish at never being able to consummate his love. Gide allows for
greater irony, through the perspective of Jerome’s cousin and beloved, Alissa.
Jerome falls in love with Alissa one night when Alissa’s mother, Jerome’s aunt, is
entertaining a lover. Jerome witnesses them lounging and laughing through an open door,
and discovers Alissa by herself in her room, crying: “My whole life was decided in that
moment; … I could express nothing of the unfamiliar transport of my breast, but I
pressed her head against my heart, and I pressed my lips to her forehead, while my whole
soul came flooding through them” (26). Burke would use this image of kissing the
forehead as symbol of chaste love in the slightly different contexts of his attempted
novel, “Fallow Ground,” and an early story, “A Man of Forethought.” True, Straight is
the Gate transpires without the two cousins ever enjoying the earthly happiness of
marriage, but Gide’s drama unfolds in a more far more delicate and ironic way than to
simply call Alissa a “fanatic.”
Jerome, the narrator, spends the entire book mostly bewildered by Alissa’s words
and actions, although Gide seems to plant a deeper intuition of the fatal outcome through
its being narrated as a memory. The speaker can know the outcome while the character
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thrashes about in ignorance. But Gide gives an even more significant clue to the action in
the behavior of Alissa herself, who, from Jerome’s point of view (even in memory)
always seems a bit superior to him. Alissa’s motives, more shrewd and caring than
fanatic, become clarified in the first significant exchange between Jerome and Alissa, an
exchange which includes the whole novel’s development as both premonition and point
of departure.
After the episode mentioned above, Alissa is walking innocently in the garden
with her father, Jerome’s uncle, and their conversation turns to Jerome. Jerome stops to
overhear: Alissa asks her father what kind of support Jerome would need to be a
“remarkable man” in the eyes of God (37-8). Jerome confesses to Alissa the next day that
he overheard, and makes no mistake that he wants to be joined to Alissa, that she “must
show [him] the way” to God (38-40). To begin with, Jerome has set a pattern of deceit by
hiding behind the bushes and listening, which Alissa will do later on with disastrous
consequences to Jerome. More deeply, Alissa in this moment faces her total dilemma.
She loves Jerome, but the object of her love is that he should be great: “Aren’t you strong
enough to walk alone?” (40). Every attempt he makes to divert attention to her, the object
of his love, she deflects: “Don’t you understand what communion in God means?” (40).
He must walk alone, she understands. Curious negotiation, when each refuses to be the
object and yet demands objectivity of the other all the more!
Jerome never allows himself to understand what Alissa tells him at this moment,
and he suffers for it throughout the novel as one blind to one’s tormentor. Alissa’s sister
Juliette, also Jerome’s cousin, soon draws out from Jerome more specifics (56). Alissa, of
course, is listening behind the bushes. Alissa understood even before then that marriage
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to her would not make Jerome “remarkable,” but now learns two things which make her
duty concrete, although painful, to her. First, Jerome lets Juliette (and Alissa in hiding)
know he is rather happy as things stand: “life with her seems to me so lovely that I dare
not” broach the subject of marriage; and second, Jerome “foresee[s]” an “immense
happiness” with Alissa involving travel, when Alissa has already said travel does not
interest her (56). Alissa takes her cue from Jerome himself, and when she repeats back to
him his own arguments, he barely recognizes them; much less accepts them.
Alissa is simply more intelligent, more perceptive, and finally has a larger heart
than Jerome. Far from tormenting him, she never abandons him, and perhaps even gives
him the best possible happiness she can. The reader can never quite know where Alissa
stands, so calculated does she seem for Jerome’s spiritual education. Whether or not he
becomes “remarkable” in the eyes of God, Jerome evidently fulfills the purpose Gide set
out for him.
The key passage for Burke, when he read La Porte Étroite at age 19, seems to
have been the initial kiss on the forehead. At this moment Jerome “could express nothing
of the unfamiliar transport of [his] breast,” a return of the repressed as we saw when
Burke wept “at a foxtrot” in his poem about music. Gide embraces this transport more
readily than does Burke. Gide does not mind being “tragic,” he does not hold at arm’s
length “poetry” the way Burke’s poetry did. And yet La Porte Étroite was undoubtedly
architectural. Burke exaggerated the ascetic aspect of Gide’s novel, underestimated the
novelist’s irony and the heroine’s generosity (not to mention intelligence), and even tried
to insult Alissa by calling her a “fanatic.” Burke was not in the mood to see a fresh young
body go to waste.
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So far in this chapter, we have looked at some of Burke’s poems and his
responses to fiction in letters to Cowley, but not yet any fiction Burke wrote. When we
turn to his fiction in the next chapter, we must consider on what terms to discuss it. The
terms “art” and “expression” continue in Burke’s letters to Cowley through 1917, but
Burke also makes a distinction between “American” and “French” types of short story in
Fall 1917. At the time he formulates that distinction (see next chapter), Burke makes
reference to Guy de Maupassant, but I place the real origin of Burke’s cathexis onto
French fiction in November 1916 when he reads La Porte Étroite.
Chapter 5 will show how many of Burke’s stories hinge around situational
relations between the sexes. Burke often associates women with sensation and men with
intelligence, but this is just part of his swerve against Walter Pater. For range of
emotional subtlety in his depictions of these scenes he is more indebted to André Gide.
Burke lacks the subtlety of his master, but that simply measures Burke’s misreading of
Gide, perhaps more effective in Burke’s agon with Pater, Dreiser, and Dostoesvsky than
it was initially with Gide.
Kant, Schopenhauer, and Form
In early 1922, bursting with a new aesthetic, Burke would use Dostoevsky
antithetically as the psychologist of “subject-matter” as opposed to Burke himself, the
psychologist of “form” (To Cowley 2/22/22). “Form” is probably the most often
discussed term regarding Burke’s early career. Its emergence must be tracked minutely
and carefully, and requires a fair amount of philosophical preparation. This will
necessarily interrupt the continuous flow of the narrative in the next chapter.
On May 27, 1917, Burke admitted to reading Arthur Schopenhauer's The Will in
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Nature, which defines the difference between “organic” and “inorganic” as “between that
where form is the essential and permanent, matter the accidental and changing, and that
where this relation is precisely reversed” (88). In the organic, or life, form is permanent
and matter changes. In death, or the inorganic, matter is permanent and changes form.
Such reduces “dumb sensation” to pure death or inorganic matter: from the point of view
of the organic, or life, accidental and changing. Schopenhauer’s “life” is quite different
from Dreiser’s, Dostoevsky’s, or Oscar Wilde’s, and not to be identified with sensation.
In his discussion of plants, Schopenhauer tells of an experiment in which plants
were induced “to grow upside down” through boring holes in the bottom of a dark box
and the use of mirrors below reflecting sunlight (70). Direction of growth is form,
tendency, or purposiveness abstracted from any particular plant. But this knowledge only
becomes objectified in human or animal perception. If perception is purely intellectual, as
Schopenhauer insists, the quality of “sense” reduces in value as perception and
intelligence increase. Burke takes up French asceticism in a spirit of rebellion against
novelistic “sensation,” whether in Pater, Dostoevsky, or Dreiser, but the German
philosophical influence from another angle performs this labor no less, by lifting
abstraction over anything material.
The narrative here pauses, while Burke reads philosophy at Columbia. He reports
reading Schopenhauer and Henri Bergson in May 1917, but in order to understand their
influence on Burke, we must begin with their precursor, Immanual Kant. Burke would
not “manifest” an anxiety of influence in regards to Kant until a few years after he
studied philosophy at Columbia, but the effects carry into his ongoing worries about art
and expression. Therefore, after the philosophical interlude, we resume again in the
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summer of 1917, when Burke writes the beginning of what was to be his first novel, and
branches out into the short story, book review, and didactic essay.

101

Chapter 4 – Columbia University (May 1917 to January 6, 1918)
Time in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic
Columbia left its mark on Burke, notably through his philosophy class. After one
semester, Burke wrote to Cowley the packed enigma, “I am becoming a philosopher. At
present I am reading 'Uber den Willen in der Natur' by Schopenhauer, and Bergson's
'L'évolution créatrice.'… I find that reading philosophy is a much better preparation for
writing novels than reading novels is” (To Cowley 5/27/17). Before one applies Henri
Bergson's Creative Evolution to literature, it can be read against Arthur Schopenhauer's
On the Will in Nature. The difference is simple and concerns the nature of time.
One finds the best introduction to Kenneth Burke's concept of “form” in
Immanuel Kant's “transcendental aesthetic” in the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in
view of Burke's swerve from Walter Pater's Marius the Epicurean and sensation.
Beginning with intuition, empirical contact with phenomena or the “content” of the
world, Kant separates the “form,” relations under which the content is organized. Matter
or content is given to us empirically, through the senses; form, therefore, as mere
relations of contents, “cannot be itself sensation” (41). Kant discovers the forms of space
for external intuition, and time for internal intuition. Time is more fundamental: “a
necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. … In it alone is all
reality possible” (47-8). That “in” becomes problematic, however, because Kant
separates time from both the “thing itself” and all outwardness. Although time provides
the necessary representation, Kant argues time is still “merely the subjective condition”
for intuition and “the form of the internal state” (49), at once both the most rudimentary
and blindest of our faculties: not a principle of reality itself.
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Time, as a form and not a content, places phenomena in “relations of the
successive, the co-existent, and … permanence” (59). Kant also qualifies “the conception
of change … [as] possible only through and in the representation of time” (48-9). Time
belongs to us, first and foremost. Each intuition “fills up” (121) time in a different way.
“[A]lways sensuous” (50), intuition and sensibility “restrict” the understanding (122) to a
non-spontaneous (nonintellectual) “manner in which … representations are given in the
mind” (59). The non-spontaneity of these representations lie in their relation to an object,
whether external or internal.
Time itself—“the universal condition” of the possibility of phenomena (48)—is
different from objective phenomena which occur “in time,” which enter consciousness
only through sensibility. What happens, then, when sensibility, conditioned by its own
inner sense of the “filling” or quality of time (121), pretends to apprehend, through the
data of phenomena, the working of time, an “inner quality,” in an object? Kant develops
what kind of statements can be made about time: “the schema of modality and its
categories, time itself, [is] the correlative of the determination of an object—whether it
does belong to time, and how” (121). Whether it does belong—such a judgment cannot
be made from within “time itself.” Kant's intuition cannot “in itself” intuit the inner
quality of an object. It must build up postulates of thought from the matter of sensation.
Arthur Schopenhauer and Henri Bergson propose two different answers to the question
posed above: What can one sensibility hope to say about the “inner quality” of an object?
Schopenhauer: The Will Outside Time
Schopenhauer maintains Kant's designation of time as an a priori form of
sensuous intuition. Thus for Schopenhauer as for Kant, one cannot make an argument
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about time from within time. If you try to explain a temporal event from the perspective
of (your own) temporality, you are bound within what Kant might call an “analogy of
experience.” Knowing the cause and effect of actions in your own experience, you infer a
cause, the “fourth term” (142), from what you perceive as an “effect” in “nature” or the
world of phenomena. Now Schopenhauer takes this inference from effect to cause as the
entire operation of the understanding. He reduces all Kant's categories to “time and space
as well as causality and inference,” through which we cognize the world as representation
(WWR I, 420). Internally, Schopenhauer subordinates all cognition to what he holds as
the source of action: the will. What Kant finds transcendental and unknowable,
Schopenhauer names as his own will, with “his own” a disposable attribute. He makes the
inference, by analogy, of a universal Will, the thing-in-itself.
The Schopenhauerian Will necessarily antecedes the subjective intuition of time.
One of Burke's handwritten notes, which could date from Spring-Summer 1917,
exemplifies his resistance to this notion. Burke complained about the following passage
in Schopenhauer's On Will in Nature, which his note copies in German, but I give in E. F.
J. Payne's translation:
Here the will did not first cherish the intention, recognize the purpose, then adapt the
means to them, and finally subdue the material, but its willing is also directly the
purpose and directly the attainment. Consequently, there was no need for any foreign
means that first had to be subdued; here willing, doing, and attaining were one and
the same. (64)
Schopenhauer can only make this argument by inferring from his own will to Will in
general: they are one and the same, and logically precede both the sensuous order of time,
and the intellectual or pragmatic problem of “means-selecting.” Burke struggled with this
concept in his reaction:
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But wouldn't this argue that the will is not the ultimate ding an sich [thing-in-itself]?
To be aim, attainment, and means to attainment all at once, the ding an sich must be
something which is neither aim, attainment, nor means to attainment. The ding an
sich, therefore, can not be the will.
But later on in the same chapter
(Vergleichende Anatomie) [Comparative Anatomy] Schopenhauer says that the aim
(the Zweck) is not contained in the will; it is simply a deception of the intellect. This
might be called a solution, although will without aim seems as much of a seiendes
Unding [existent non-existent] as Kant would claim for time and space.
Kant had analyzed the difference between the thing-in-itself (ding an sich) and the
phenomenon. Schopenhauer then tried to replace the ding an sich with the Will. Yet
Schopenhauer says, with finality, “willing is also directly the purpose and directly the
attainment.” How, Burke asks, can the will be purpose and attainment and still the ding
an sich, excluded from aim, attainment, and means?
In the first half of his note, Burke tries to play a sleight of hand on Schopenhauer,
or to catch the German philosopher in one. You cannot say that the Will and its object are
separate, but then turn around and call them the same, Burke accused. Burke's original
note exhibits a space of about ½ inch (I measured the facsimile) between the first
underlined “will” and the following “But later on in the same chapter …” This may
indicate Burke finished writing the first part of the note, put the pen down, and kept
reading.
In the paragraph of On the Will in Nature following the passage Burke copied,
Schopenhauer explains the difference between the Will and the intellect. The intellect is a
specific human function bent on its “own works. … the will to do the work and the work
itself are two different things” (65). In contrast to the indirect method of the intellect,
works of nature express the Will directly:
The true inner essence of every animal form is an act of will lying outside the
representation and consequently outside its forms of space and time. For this reason,
that act knows neither succession nor juxtaposition, but has the most indivisible unity.

105

Now if our cerebral intuitive perception grasps that form … [it] appears drawn
asunder into a juxtaposition of parts and a succession of functions. (66)
Burke apparently interprets this passage to mean “the aim (the Zweck) is not contained in
the will; it is simply a deception of the intellect.” There is no contradiction here. A will
without aim is simply a will without intelligence: blind will. Schopenhauer splits off an
intermediary realm between the will and its object, “the intellect.” The animal form is
apart from the intellect and only inferred, a universal act of will.
To equate Schopenhauer's aimless (and timeless) Will with Kant's space and time,
as Burke does at the conclusion of his note, reverses Schopenhauer's intention, indicating
a defensive swerve on Burke's part. The Will in Schopenhauer precedes and excludes
space and time. Burke's observation in his note beginning with the second “But,” after the
space in his note, perhaps after he had read a little further, does not expose a
contradiction in Schopenhauer's thinking. To say the “aim is the deception of the
intellect” marks Schopenhauer’s distinction between the direct Will in animal form, and
the indirect representation of that form by the intellect. We can read further in
Schopenhauer to detect more of the philosopher’s meaning than Burke was able to:
No explanation or assumption enables us even remotely to understand the exact
appropriateness illustrated by the skeleton, of the structure to the animal’s aims and
external conditions of life, or to appreciate the admirable fitness and harmony in the
mechanism of its interior, other than the truth, firmly established elsewhere [i.e.
through philosophical argument] that the animal’s body is simply its will itself seen as
a representation in the brain and therefore under the forms of space, time, and
causality, and hence the mere visibility, objectivity, of the will. (64)
The great accomplishment of Kant’s division between phenomenon and thing-in-itself
was to limit the pretenses of human cognition. Schopenhauer believes he has found a
secret way behind the curtain of phenomena, through the Will. This philosophical
thinking enables Schopenhauer to doubt his empirical reason (the utilitarian and
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subjective “intellect”) in favor of what might be called “direct inference.” The Will is
present in the animal (or natural) form directly, subversive of the human intellect.
Burke’s misreading of Schopenhauer accuses Burke of intelligence, without
harming the consistency of Schopenhauer's argument. Burke holds short of the ascetic
limit achieved by Schopenhauer and the latter’s idol, the Buddha, as Burke had held short
of the mountain’s silence in late January 1916. The Schopenhauerian intellect errs when
it ascribes a temporal difference between willing, doing, and attaining, and this temporal
ascription Burke would not relinquish to the German: “although will without aim seems
as much of a seiendes Unding [existent non-existent] as Kant would claim for time and
space.” Burke tries, through Kant, to deprive Schopenhauer’s will of content. Burke
insisted upon placing the essence of willing, doing, and attaining in the empirical,
historical movement. Burke dives, as it were, into the Schopenhauerian intellect where
the philosopher holds back. With religious quietude, Schopenhauer disdains the intellect.
Schopenhauer’s influence on Burke did prove effective, however. In nature,
Schopenhauer writes, “we find matter wholly permeated by form; or rather they [form
and matter] are of quite the same origin, existing mutually for each other and to that
extent identical. That we separate them here in the work of art is a mere abstraction” (65).
On the same page as his note on Schopenhauer quoted above, Burke wrote the following
paragraph, lightly scratched out:
If not as absolute proof the following considerations may be taken as strong grounds
for believing that objectivity is a form, not of the mind, but of the intellect merely: (1)
We possess certain vague moods which are real and immediate but which have
nothing of the definite quality of objects, or even of emotions; (2) in dreams
objectivity forms incomplete, but very convincing, representations of emotions as, for
instance, in a dream of flight and pursuit there is often the agonizing vividness of
threatening destruction, of lightning speed, while motion is either slight or absent.
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Here where the intellect is alive but metamorphosed (and doesn't the effect of sleep
imply great activity rather than a cessation of activity?) it insists upon objectification.
Burke resists Schopenhauer's separation of the will and intellect, but follows him in
sectioning off the intellect to a more limited realm than the “mind,” which experiences
“moods” without objectifying, around the fringes of the objectifying intellect. Whether
we would discuss this “moodiness of mind” in terms of sensation remains undecided, but
it is certainly sub-intellectual and closer to the root of motivation. It should be a
considered a major modification, however, of Burke’s prior conception of “intelligence,”
which heretofore had been mostly grounded in an antithetical reading of Walter Pater (via
Pater’s philosophical precursor Kant?).
Kant wanted to make reason a window into the unconditioned. He relegated all
empirical activity to the “understanding.” Reason conditions the understanding, to Kant,
through categories and forms discovered and arranged by philosophy, but implicitly
“given” without any further statement of origins. Schopenhauer maintains a place for the
unconditioned in the Will, which enters into knowledge (intelligence) and motives—all
phenomena—only indirectly, through sensuous, perceptive intelligence. Reason,
understanding, and the categories are mechanisms of willful intellect striving within
temporal bounds. The temporal eye places what it imagines to be a “distance,” or spatial
separation, between cause and effect, origin and end, urge and attainment. Burke adopts
this reflex defensively against Schopenhauer. Burke does not accept the literal unity
between hunter and prey because he cannot escape the temporal unfolding of the hunt.
Henri Bergson: Philosopher of Change
Schopenhauer maintains a vertical hierarchy among beings from inanimate nature,
to the plant kingdom, to animals, culminating in man and reason. Aesthetic values extend
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this abstraction further into the realm of Platonic “Ideas” which are not so much private
as universal. But Schopenhauer does not grant any “evolutionary” ingredient in this
development, and so falls down as a philosopher of permanence. For Schopenhauer, the
orders of mineral, vegetable, and animal successively correspond to the orders of
causality (stone), stimulus (plant), and motive (animal), with “knowledge [as] the medium
of motives” (37). Time is a condition of our brains. One may conceive the absolute unity
of aim (purpose), attainment (act), and means (agency), if one subordinates the category
of time to the “thing itself,” the Will.
Henri Bergson falls as a philosopher of change. Like Schopenhauer, Bergson
acknowledges “a line which ascends through the vertebrate series up to man,” but unlike
Schopenhauer, he ascribes its existence to “uninterrupted progress,” a “history” which
“reveals to us how the intellect has been formed” (ix). In Permanence and Change,
written in 1933, Burke referred to “philosophies of becoming which seem to have reached
their flowering in Nineteenth Century thought (Goethe, Hegel, Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche,
and the vast horde of lesser evolutionary or revolutionary thinkers)” (163). We can
presume that Bergson offered Burke an early version of the school of “becoming,” and
Schopenhauer an antagonist to this school. Recall also that Burke's reaction to Marius the
Epicurean, a novel of sensations and ideas, provoked meditation on the ancient
philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides, change and permanence. Bergson argued that
intelligence had formed by course of a temporal, “historical” procedure (change),
something Schopenhauer would reject, because the Will conditions all history and so
rules it (permanence). At the same, however, both Schopenhauer and Bergson (following
Kant) accept a limited human intellect.
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Bergson challenges Kant on the nature of time: “Kant … did not think that the
mind overflowed the intellect, and … he did not attribute to duration an absolute
existence” (206). These two points, the intellect and time, are integrally related to
Bergson. Like Schopenhauer but in a different manner, Bergson limits the intellect's role
in metaphysics. In place of Schopenhauer's Will as the unconditioned principle (“thingin-itself”), Bergson substitutes the trope of life, with associated terms evolution, creation,
flux, change, succession, unforeseeability, freedom, growth, duration, reality, the
absolute, consciousness, and even, once or twice, “spirit.”
Bergson’s “life” is not the same as the English and French aesthetes, nor the
American and Russian vitalists, nor the German idealists. The ultimate term for this
cluster in Bergson is intuition, but not merely as Kant and Schopenhauer conceived it:
There would be, in other words, a supra-intellectual intuition. If this intuition exists, a
taking possession of the spirit by itself is possible, and no longer only a knowledge
that is external and phenomenal. What is more, if we have an intuition of this kind (I
mean an ultra-intellectual intuition) then sensuous intuition is likely to be in
continuity with it through certain intermediaries, as the infra-red is continuous with
the ultra-violet. Sensuous intuition itself, therefore, is promoted. (360)
Burke's vaguish, moody “mind” reverses Kant's dichotomy between intuition and the
intellect. Bergson does the same, but adds above it the “ultra-intellectual intuition” and
thereby promotes the sensuous intuition. Whereas in Kant the intuition “restricts” the
intellect and reason, in Burke the intellect remains shrouded in the larger, less definite,
pre-intellectual (or sensuous) intuition. In this model Burke follows Bergson more than
either of the Germans. At age 20, his initial instinct was as a philosopher of change.
In a way, Bergson’s “intuition” allows Burke to sublimate, and accept, what he
had earlier rejected as Paterian “sensation.” Bergson's ultra-intellectual intuition depends
on his theory of time. His earliest intimations of this intuition in Creative Evolution
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emerge, as they should, slowly: “The feeling we have of our evolution and of the
evolution of all things in pure duration is there, forming around the intellectual concept
properly so-called an indistinct fringe that fades off into darkness.” This fringe, Bergson
continues, “enables us to affirm that the nucleus is a nucleus, that pure intellect is a
contraction, by condensation, of a more extensive power” (46). A few pages later,
Bergson hints, “And we shall probably be aided in [grasping the true nature of vital
activity] by the fringe of vague intuition that surrounds our distinct—that is—intellectual
representation” (49). I have chosen the term “fringe” to represent the first inkling of
Bergson's intuition in Creative Evolution. When properly beheld and grasped, this fringe
widens into a surge of evolutionary change.
Bergson’s method requires that first we must “complete the intellect and its
knowledge of matter by accustoming it to install itself within the moving,” and then we
learn “that if that which is being unmade endures, it can only be because it is inseparably
bound to what is making itself” (343). Embrace the flux. Bergson's book is full of dense
eloquence, manifold ways of expressing his core argument of the “ultra-intellectual
intuition.” He does not dismiss nor demote time, as Kant and Schopenhauer do. In fact he
criticizes them both for “mak[ing] out the same articulations in nature that mechanism
does” (362), remaining trapped within the intellect. Bergson affirms for duration and
temporality “absolute existence.”
At this point we can ask two related questions upon comparison of Henri Bergson
and Kenneth Burke: 1) How does Bergson's theory of time color or shadow Burke's
theory of form? And 2) To what extent did Burke go all the way over to Bergson's side,
the philosophy of change, and why?
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The first point boils down to the following question: What is Henri Bergson's
theory of form in Creative Evolution? Bergson adopts the traditional dichotomy between
“form” and “matter.” His most intimate revelation of their interaction results from his
ultra-intuitive method: “For we seize from within, we live at every instant, a creation of
form, and it is just in those cases in which the form is pure, and in which the creative
current is momentarily interrupted, that there is a creation of matter” (239). To “seize” in
this case creates form, but the pure form interrupts the creative current from within which
we seize. In this way only can we say that form “engenders” matter. Form and matter are
really simultaneous. Bergson would rather us say that matter and form together interrupt
life.
Form was invented by the Greeks, consummate artists, as “a type of suprasensible
truth” (347). Bergson seeks to return form to the medium of time. This consists in
treating form not as a truth, a thought, nor any kind of schema, nor transcendental object,
but as a living form:
The time taken up by the invention, is one with the invention itself. It is the progress
of a thought which is changing in the degree and measure that it is taking form. … the
concrete solution brings with it that unforseeable nothing which is everything in a
work of art. And it is this nothing that takes time. Nought as matter, it creates itself as
form. (340)
The mind takes snapshots of reality and seizes upon them as forms, but to the extent that
it begins only with these forms, it loses entirely the process of formation. Thus, again,
Bergson's theory of time centers his theory of aesthetic form. Bergson does not, as does
Schopenhauer, distinguish between human-artistic forms and forms of nature. For
Schopenhauer the material of artwork is already frozen and dead and can never directly
express the Will. Bergson's “evolution” provides a common term, life, inclusive of nature
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and human consciousness alike. The human artwork as a “concrete solution” does not
differ in kind from any other evolutionary solution, be it tooth, claw, seed, or flower.
As to the second question above, I argue that Burke was prevented from going
“all the way” over to Bergson in great part because of his ongoing psychical resistance to
Walter Pater. Pater, too, was a philosopher of the “flux,” and the roots of resistance to
Pater had already begun to take hold. Burke needed to preserve an anti-Paterian (later, he
might claim it to be anti-aesthetic) trope of the “intellect,” which surfaces again and again
in his short fiction (see Chapter 2). But the Columbia philosophy course had injected
Bergsonism, which Burke could not dismiss on the grounds of anti-intellectualism.
Bergson held out the lure of a “supra-intellectual” flux. Let us see how Burke's intellect
responded to this challenge.
“The Age,” Adolescence, and Crisis
Out of Bergson, rather than Schopenhauer, comes the critical concept of “the
age.” At one point, likely in the summer of 1920,1 Burke wrote a note on the work of his
friend William Carlos Williams. Burke copied down the following passage from
Williams's preface to Kora in Hell,
By the brokenness of his composition the poet makes himself master of a certain
weapon which he could possess himself of in no other way. The speed of the
emotions is sometimes such that thrashing about in a thin exaltation or despair many
matters are touched but not held, more often broken by the contact. (16)
Burke followed with his appreciation: “—Now that is been put so neatly, I suppose the
whole age can die with resignation: as a physician, Mr. Williams has diagnosed our
incurable illness with comforting accuracy.” The diagnosis fits because “the whole age”

1

Burke quoted this passage from Williams in an unpublished essay, “A Second Look at Sterility,” dated
July 21, 1920.
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is “thrashing about.” Temporal fantasy takes on apocalyptic proportions, but within time.
Burke's heading to this note reads, “Considerations of form. One of the bafflements
peculiar to the moderns. Note to Improvisation, and yet Bergson's discussion of the
impossibility of acquiring motion from points.” The statement in question from
Williams's “Improvisation” VI 1, is, “Of course history is an attempt to make the past
seem stable and of course it's all a lie” (41). The “age,” like all tropes of history and the
“environment,” merely externalizes the mind's apprehension of time.
Bergson puts it another way in a section titled “Form and Becoming,” the same
section to which Burke refers, just before Bergson’s discussion of motion and fixed
points in space:
Now, life is an evolution. We concentrate a period of this evolution in a stable view
which we call a form, and, when the change has become considerable enough to
overcome the fortunate inertia of our perception, we say that the body has changed its
form. But in reality the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no
form, since form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the
continual change of form: form is only a snapshot view of a transition. (302, italics
original)
Form in Bergson is the mental shape of transition. We can adapt this metaphysics to
history and call it a “period,” an “age,” an “epoch,” as I discussed scholarly arrangement
of Kenneth Burke's career in Chapter 2. Bergson retains the “suprasensible” aspect of
form inherited from the Greeks and Germans, but his understanding of time leads him to
label it a “transition,” what William Carlos Williams and Burke might call a
“brokenness” when applied to the modern era.
Burke mentions Bergson's name in a part of his letter announcing to Cowley that
he is quitting Columbia, on January 7, 1918:
I am in turmoil, and shall go somewhere,– perhaps up to school to fight with Matty,
perhaps down to the square to agree with Jim. My only fear in the world is that I
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won't live long enough to do all the things I want to do. Time! Didn't Bergson say that
time should be considered as a course, or did I in my eagerness read him wrong? The
only other occasion on which I felt like this was when I started to high-school. I
remember praying to God to let me live until I had one day of high-school. He made
me live through four years of it, God-damn him.
If we are looking for moments of crisis and transition that define “eras” in Burke’s life,
this may be the most significant letter since January 28, 1916. The operation of memory
is the same, as Burke divides his own life by the crisis or transition points of beginning
high school, and now leaving college for good. Burke yields to some consciousness of
“Time!” which, per Bergson, must be greater than perception. In Bergsonian terms Burke
seems to “install himself within” the suprasensual flux.
The “age,” like “genre” or any other trope of form, sublates dynamic and static
aspects, permanence and change. Bergson helped Burke to see how perception merely
created stability out of its own “fortunate” and quite “evolutionary” necessity. Burke
would eventually apply this “transitional form” to history at large: first in Auscultation,
Creation, and Revision, written in 1932 but unpublished until 1993, and later in Attitudes
Toward History. Both of these works rest on this dichotomy of static or immobile
perception and dynamic reality. Before then, Burke applied the conceptual form of the
“age” in the chapter titled “The Status of Art” which found its way into CounterStatement. Earlier than these efforts, however, Burke seized upon Bergsonian dynamism
and applied forms or “eras” to his own life in terms of biological development:
specifically, the term adolescence.
In the previous chapter, we explored how Malcolm Cowley and subsequent
canonical criticism built up a trope of Burke’s “adolescence.” Now let us look to Burke’s
own formulations of this “period” or “era” in a biological life. It is particularly germane
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to study them against the backdrop of Bergson’s theory that form interrupts the flow of
time, marking out units (forms) that can be used to rationalize time for the sake of the
intelligence. Indeed, the form of adolescence represents the crisis of transition in general.
As we shall see, the trope “adolescence” can be linked in Burke closely to revision by
classification. This makes it a suitable trope for the modern era itself.
One usage of “adolescence” relates to Burke's earlier and later relationship to
Charles Baudelaire. On March 27, 1916, Burke wrote Cowley that he thought
Baudelaire's “Petits Poèmes en Prose” “very funny, and very normal.” He accused
Baudelaire of “childish … mere youthfulness.” It appears that accusations based on
“developmental stage” mask an insecurity in one's own development. Burke wrote and
published an imitation of “Petits Poèmes en Prose” entitled “La Baudelairienne” in
January 1917. On March 21, 1918, Burke reprimanded his earlier self and more
respectfully referred to Baudelaire as “this man whom I, in my eighteen-year-old
maturity, my adolescent sagedom, had deemed worthy of a parody and a dismissal.”
Burke’s classification of his earlier self, mockingly, as “adolescent,” shows the revision
of his attitude toward French literature from 1916 to 1918.
The key “transitions” or “forms” of life typically involve crisis. In capturing
nodes of crisis in Burke's life we follow him in periodizing himself. On July 23, 1917, he
wrote to Cowley,
A few stars shining, but the man who said stars are an emblem of hope never lived in
Weehawken. Two years ago I should most certainly have written a blank verse sonnet
to Goldie on a night like this; one year ago I should have begun a little squib about a
mood of some sort, torn it up, and masturbated; tonight I simply smoked my pipe and
got a glass of beer. I saw some gin in a window, and felt a sudden impulse to go on a
lone drunk, but I thought I had better come home and write you about it instead. I am
quite sick of this sort of living; it seems so foolish that adolescence, the most poetic
part of one's life, should be so dull. I wonder what it is that I want.
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This may not seem at first glance to be a crisis, but it comes on the heels of Burke’s
abandonment of his first attempt at a novel, “Fallow Ground.” At age twenty, Burke
seems to accept and even wallow in his own adolescence as a “dullness.” The crisis may
be that for Burke at this point, dumb sensation threatens to overtake his intelligence.
In the passage above, Burke provides Cowley a criticism of poetry in general, of
“the man who said stars are an emblem of hope.” He also divides his own “adolescence”
into three characteristic and progressive reactions to a moody night sky: 1) blank verse
sonnet to Goldie, 2) torn-up squib (short humorous writing) and masturbation, and 3)
tobacco and beer. This anatomy of one period, adolescence, suggests the operation by
which it could be sub-divided further, but more significantly, it defines each period in
terms of literary genre. This anticipates Attitudes Toward History two decades later. The
final term in the sequence dissolves into an artificially stimulated wordlessness (“a lone
drunk”) where conventional poetry once stood.
The final instance of “adolescence” in the letters from Burke to Cowley through
1920 (after which the archive becomes considerably more complex) refers to another
schematic attempt at fiction, a resuscitation of the type of effort required for Burke’s first
novel “Fallow Ground,” which he had attempted three years prior in the summer of 1917.
Instead of a novel, it was to be a “trilogy” of shorter stories: “each story, while in a
fashion continuing the ones before it, would be independent of the others” (To Cowley
6/12/20). Think of Harold Bloom’s reading of Marius the Epicurean, and Bergson's
concept of form discussed above, “a snapshot view of a transition.” Burke swerves from
Bergson in his greater insistence upon the independence of the transition, a story as an
integer.
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On September 6, 1920, Burke enthused to Cowley about a literary school Burke
wanted to call “INTEGRALISM, the emphasis of the unit, the vision of art as a
succession of units, or integers.” Burke then cites William Carlos Williams’s passage of
the modern poet and “brokenness,” cited at the beginning of this section. He reveals to
Cowley in this letter that the critical insight, attached by Burke to Williams, may also
have arisen as a result of Burke’s finishing the first and third parts of his trilogy—but not
the second.
Burke began working on the first part of what he only later envisioned as a
trilogy, “The Birth of a Philosophy,” in the fall of 1918, according to a letter of October 4
of that year. A year and a half later, July 23, 1920, Burke considered it “irrevocable,” or
finished past the point of revision. It may have been his most ambitious attempt at fiction
since “The White Oxen,” which he had finished in March 1918—just after he quit
Columbia. Part III, “Thébaïde: An Anatomy of Sensation,” was nearly finished in July
1920. Part II, “The Dungeon,” (To Cowley 6/12/20), may have never been composed, but
it was to be “the great Document of Adolescence, a useless monument to immaturity, bad
taste, and triviality” (To Cowley 7/23/20). Whether Burke at this point believed he had
surmounted his own “adolescence” remains unclear from this passage, but one need not
strain to detect his disgust at this developmental transition into maturity.
Burke announces his trilogy to another literary correspondent, Matthew
Josephson, on the same day he had to Cowley: “My scheme now is to make this into a
trilogy of short stories, each complete in itself, and yet each related to the other. The
Birth of a Philosophy is his childhood; The Dungeon is his adolescence; and Thébaïde:
An Anatomy of Sensation is Alfred’s final discovery of his norm” (To Josephson
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6/12/20). He goes to connect his plans for “The Dungeon” with documents Burke
recently discovered of his own adolescence, “poems, pieces of a diary, duplicates of
letters I had written to an old sweetheart back in Pittsburgh, self-analyses, records of
dreams, all thoroughly degraded and shrieking with the spirit of self-flagellation. That,
my friend, goes into the Dungeon” (To Josephson 6/12/20). We may recognize in this
catalog of sins some of the brushes with “Russian pride” Burke experienced in the years
1915-16. Likely some of those old “marvelous documents of adolescence,” which Burke
may have associated with an indulgence of self-expression, have survived for scholars to
study today.
The chart described here begins with an “adolescent” Burke scoffing at
Baudelaire in 1916, brooding on “dullness” in the summer of 1917, revising his view of
Baudelaire in 1918, and by 1920, schematizing the transition from childhood, to
adolescence, to the “final discovery of his norm” in a projected trilogy, of which the
middle term, adolescence, to be represented in “The Dungeon,” seems never to have been
completed. I have argued that the philosophy of Henri Bergson helped Burke to think in
“stages,” and it is around 1917, just after he read Bergson, that we see Burke musing on
the progressive stages of his own adolescence.
To resume our tale of influence, after the philosophical interlude, it is best to now
continue the narrative in the summer of 1917. Despite encountering Schopenhauer and
Bergson in May 1917, Burke’s major critical terms were still “art” and “expression.” He
now began to conceive of those dialectical terms in a temporal framework of “eras” and
“ages,” biological and historical, but this development did not occur all at once.
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“Beyond Catullus” and “Fallow Ground”
Burke alludes to plans for writing fiction in the earliest letters to Cowley from
Fall 1915, but the earliest phase of his published fiction arrived in two publications:
Sansculotte, an Ohio State publication that ran for three issues in the Spring of 1917, and
Smart Set, the publication associated with H. L. Mencken and George Jean Nathan.
Spearheaded by Burke's friend Jim Light, Sansculotte printed the former's “A Parabolic
Tale, with Invocation” in January 1917. On January 9, Burke sent a bit of self-styled
“Prose Libre” (free prose) entitled “To My Old Friends,” which Smart Set eventually
published as one of several “Idylls” in November 1918.
No dated stories appear in the archive until “Beyond Catullus” in late Spring/early
Summer 1917, about the same time Burke was planning and writing his first novel,
“Fallow Ground.” The unnamed protagonist of “Beyond Catullus” likely follows Burke’s
“cerebralist” of the early story and prefigures the character George Carter from “Fallow
Ground.” He is a solitary, sullen lover of poetry who contemplates suicide, and who may
be close enough to an autobiographical representation. The more this anonymous
protagonist writes in his diary, the more he resolves upon suicide, and the less able is he
to commit the deed. At this point the manuscript is dated “Late spring or early summer
1917.” This is followed by an epilogue evidently written later than the first part, but
before Burke’s letter to Cowley of June 28, 1917.
The narrative point of view in the epilogue switches to a newspaper reporter who
encounters this strange man, who appears literary but has trouble communicating with an
easy manner. Abruptly the stranger blurts to the reporter everything he has written in his
diary, and that he has tried unsuccessfully to kill himself. The reporter plays the part of
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Dostoevsky’s bemused terrace audience in The Idiot. The would-be translator of Catullus,
released from gloom by this encounter, joyfully experiences a renewed purpose which
enables him to kill himself successfully. The story rehearses Burke’s dilemma over the
question of self-expression in writing. Writing to himself only leads the protagonist to
live, as he writes in his diary, “on one dead level.” Release from this “burden of egoism”
in the chance moment of exchange with the reporter gives the protagonist a “moment of
elation and promise” (To Cowley 6/28/17). About a year later Burke remembers this
fictional experiment fondly: “oh suicides who never kill themselves!” (To Cowley
3/21/18). The shadow of Ippolit Terentyev clearly lurks not far from “Beyond Catullus.”
The reporter also illustrates Burke’s attempt to double the perspective and avoid straight
autobiography: his “comic” side.
Burke’s philosophical adventures, while guiding him even further from Dreiser
and (so he thought) from Pater, did not exclude sensuality entirely, for Burke wrote to
Cowley on June 11, 1917, of a novel he was planning: “I know that sex will manage
somehow to color every page.” Burke initially aims at “wild freedom of self-expression,”
Yet the titular metaphor, “Fallow Ground,” offers an image of fecundity through
passivity or withdrawal. Burke’s rationale continues, “in treating my characters’
personalities as fallow ground I feel that I shall come nearer my conviction that character
is kinetic rather than potential, possibility rather than manifestation” (To Cowley
6/11/17). The puzzle of this statement is to determine what Burke means by “kinetic” and
“possibility,” and how those correspond to “fallow ground,” a field left abandoned to
restore its fecundity. I can only assume Burke would prefer to illustrate his characters
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kinetically, in motion, in such a way as to raise possibilities instead of allowing the
characters to achieve their aims. If true, this may show the influence of Bergson.
Burke writes to Cowley about the character Arthur Kinsley, whom Burke has built
up “out of” Cowley: “But the exigencies of art are not identical at all with the exigencies
of self-expression, and enough foreign matter has gone in to Arthur Kinsley to make you
doubt even that he ever originated with you as his germ” (To Cowley 6/16/17). Selfexpression in “Fallow Ground” meant faithfully rendering Burke's impression of Cowley.
Burke discovered that such an aim conflicted with his conceptual plans for the novel.
After he had given up the novel, Burke tried to explain this challenge to Cowley by
contrasting his own characterization with Dreiser's:
For instance, when Dreiser wants to make a liaison, it is the simplest thing in the
world. A man and woman meet, forthwith feel a great physical need for each other,
and if there isn't a bed handy use the bathroom. But here is my preparation for
adultery: 'It seemed to him that he simply wanted her to admire him and after she
admired him she would have faith in him, so that he could kiss her on the forehead.'
(To Cowley 6/28/17)
Expression, in this case, might demand the characters use the bathroom if a bed isn't
handy. Art, Burke finds, defers gratification. Thus arises the convention of “literary
unhappiness,” which Burke had rebelled against earlier: “great happiness is so akin to
pain that the body must take the same outlets of expression as for pain, and ecstasy is as
fatal as anguish” (To Cowley 6/28/17). Happiness and pain demand expression along the
same outlets: the “needs of autobiography.” The pressure of art converts experience into
something both painful and happy, because these are unified in the mechanism (“art”) of
expression, beginning with the sub-linguistic “cry” of Jennie Gearhardt. The
“mountainous” question of how to convert sensation into language persists.
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Expression, here, seems to be the transition of life into art, mingling happiness
and pain, that very “unattainable” which defines Burke's modern age. I suspect the source
of this anxiety for Burke lies in Oscar Wilde, who made the transition between life and
art appear so seamless as to be uncanny, even in prison. Dostoesvky had “expressed” the
young Burke to himself in the form of a character, Ippolit Terentyev. Burke had to
remove himself one degree from the expressions of both Wilde and Dostoevsky.
Call them first-degree expressions of “life,” at least in Burke’s fantasy structure:
Jennie Gearhardt, Wilde in prison, and the seething egotistical nihilist wracked with
disease. Only upon this highly stylized “expression” of life does Burke declare,
To write novels, one must be careful not to live them; for it is the ruthless denial of
action which fosters that feeling of incompleteness in us which makes us turn to art.
People who do things blunt their sense of the need for expression; people who don't
do things are invariably thrown into a state of agitation which is not healthy, but is
productive. Art, of course, increases rather than lulls this dissatisfaction, but who,
after all, would prefer satisfaction to art? (To Cowley 6/28/17)
Art and expression are still aligned. Renunciation of action diminishes the
autobiographical factor imperiling the expressions of Dreiser, Wilde, and Dostoevsky.
André Gide had assisted Burke down this path with both his monograph on Oscar Wilde
and La Porte Étroite. French art could still be called “expression.” This purifying process
interests Burke more than psychologies of this or that character—first-order expressions
of life—and forms the basis of his emerging critical theory.
Burke's antipathy to action crystallized into a well-earned bias or prejudice: “If I
can make pen-characters do all these things, I shall be happy … if I write what I think, I
shall come much nearer to doing what I wanted to do that [sic] if I live what I think.”
This remains a desire for expression, “to impose my personality upon the world” (To
Cowley 7/17/17). The “failed” novel discouraged his artistic ambitions, but he resolved
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anyway to write a make-believe criticism of the book he never wrote. Perhaps, thought
Burke, this would be the proper medium of expression for him! “You see, although I am
completely convinced that art has become the enemy of self-expression, and although I
place most emphasis on self-expression, yet I should be desolately disappointed if I
erected no work of art” (To Cowley 7/17/17). The terms have not yet settled, nor has
Burke made his peace with them.
His next chance to sharpen this distinction in his vocabulary came in a friendly
spar with Cowley over Dostoevsky and Turgenev. Cowley had suggested in a letter to
Burke that they would take different sides in the preference between the two Russian
masters (Jay 43), and Burke interpreted this to mean “you [Cowley] would have been for
Turgenev, I for Dostoevsky” (To Cowley 7/20/17). As Burke had been accustomed to
aligning Dostoevsky with “expression” and not “art,” Turgenev fell easily into the latter
column: “[I]f I condemn Turgenev, it is because he had one dominating quality … of the
artist” (To Cowley 7/20/17). Art and expression grow more diametrically opposed when
embodied or symbolized by the two rival authors.
Burke reverses Cowley's argument: while Burke would “vote” for Dostoevskian
expression, Burke identifies with Turgenev's quality of the artist, “which evidently
[Turgenev] hated in himself, and which has disgusted me in mine” (To Cowley 7/20/17).
Burke found, writing his novel, something prevented the “wild self-expression” he hoped
for. He attributed this to the conventions of art, now projected onto Turgenev: “[He] was
unable to forget himself; he lacked the magnificent capacity of striving to move the
world, the social sense. … He is in spite of himself a spectator, an ego. … [He writes]
from that horrid subdued curiosity of the ego, of the plot hunter” (To Cowley 7/20/17).
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For this moment Burke envies Dostoevsky his expression, associating it with a “social
sense”: Dostoevsky “was honestly one of the people” (To Cowley 7/20/17). Finally,
Burke grants Turgenev one final compliment and thus completes his revenge on Cowley:
“Turgenev, being an artist, has only begun the effect of his book when he writes the last
word” (To Cowley 7/20/17). This letter remains intensely ambivalent on the question of
art versus expression.
Turgenev and Dostoevsky advance Burke’s articulation of the conflict between
“art” and “expression,” although he has not yet schematized them historically, as he will
do in his Columbia English essays. “Expression” gives voice to the (modern) people and
social sense, while the lonely, plot-hunting artist stays aloof, affecting the public only
belatedly through his work. We observe a paradox that the expressive, social creature is
at the same time more personal, while the artist, perhaps more universal, has only an
“amorphous character” (To Cowley 9/13/17) as a person. Turgenev, as a productive
artist, however, was not “sterile,” as Burke on July 20, 1917, felt himself to be.
To whatever extent Burke began to reconcile himself to an identity as “artist,” he
was determined not to be sterile. Sometime later (as he declared in a damaged manuscript
letter to Cowley possibly written September 14, 1917), Burke wrote a 3,500-word story
which “although it may not be interesting, has satisfied me that it is a work of art.” I am
not sure to which story this refers, but it could either be one of a number of known stories
in the archive, or one that has not survived.
In Fall 1917 Burke had a burst of productivity before enrolling for his second
semester in Columbia. In September he wrote his earliest book review and a handful of
short stories. In October and November he wrote several brief essays for an English class

125

which survive, and meanwhile Burke experienced what I call a “rhetorical awakening,” in
response to reading letters by Cicero and Flaubert. Something in the pressure of this
awakening, I argue, led to his critical decision to leave Columbia and university
education early in 1918. To these events we now turn.
“Two Sordid Books”: Burke’s First Book Review
Burke's first book review should be placed in the context of the ongoing problem
of “art” versus “expression” outlined so far through the summer of 1917. He had talked
on June 9, 1917, just before starting “Fallow Ground,” of writing on “Huch, Mann, Gide,
Bordeaux, Coulevain, Pater, the erotica of the Greek Anthology and a comparison of
languages” (To Cowley 6/9/17), and so likely his composition of the novel sublimated
much of this fervor, for a time.
Two weeks later Burke expressed desire to “write in Latin an 'oratiuncula' [little
speech] in defense of the study of Latin” (To Cowley 6/20/17). Looking forward to the
fall, he planned “to write criticisms about French German and Latin – and also the Greek
Anthology – in the [Columbia] Monthly” (To Cowley 7/17/17). This is the same letter,
cited above, in which Burke reflected that writing “make-believe criticism” might be the
most appropriate form for his self-expression: “But an essay about a book, when that
book is my own … seems so satisfying to me, so likely to afford me a means of complete
self-expression” (To Cowley 7/17/17). For this reason, he distrusted it. By Burke’s own
admission, in his growing awareness of a rift between expression and art, “Art, of course,
increases rather than lulls dissatisfaction, but who, after all, would prefer satisfaction to
art?” (To Cowley 6/28/17). One solution, evidently, was for Burke to write criticism of
other peoples' books.
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On September 10, 1917, Burke vowed to turn his back on “sensuality” and
“refused to permit further sterility.” He had finished a critical book review, the earliest
extant of which I know. It is not clear whether Burke deliberately cultivated reviewing
books as a money-making tactic, but the letter of July 17, 1917 suggests the motive
initially had to do with self-expression. Wilde, in The Picture of Dorian Gray, argued that
criticism is the highest form of autobiography (376)—perhaps Kenneth Burke was not far
behind. We can think of Burke's reviews as if he were commenting on his own works that
someone else happened to have written, and his various statements about authors will
make more sense. His evasion of autobiography took the form of the book review. This
can be illustrated in his double-review of works by Mary McLane and Edouard Rod:
“Two Sordid Books,” completed by September 10, 1917.
Coming off the heels of a failed novel, Burke finds a new outlet, the book review.
This document contains at least three important intellectual events. For the first time, and
in the critical voice for which he became famous, Burke associates, as a critical precept,
“a stage of self-refinement” with an aesthetic problem concerning art and expression.
Second, Burke deduces national types from the different ways Rod and MacLane respond
to what the critic takes as a universal situation. Third, Burke describes his own era's
relationship to conventional “art forms.”
The first point of criticism begins in the author's person: “the attitude of negation,
the dreaded weakness for self-analysis, the crying need for expression, even when the
value of expression is questioned.” Let us interpolate and call Burke's universal “stage of
self-refinement” by the term “adolescence.” Burke's later critical application of this term
to Jules Laforgue fits well enough. From the preceding analysis of Burke's letters to
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Cowley, we know the critic here means himself as well as Edouard Rod and Mary
MacLane. At this quasi-biological stage, “one's intellect runs counter to one's organic
impulses.” Sound philosophically familiar? Rod and MacLane respond in ways
characteristic of their respective nationalities, according to Burke, and yet this difference
sheds a common light on the problems of Burke's literary epoch, “modernity.”
Burke's approach to Rod's “La Course à la Mort” mobilizes the George Meredith's
theory of comedy, along the lines developed in Burke's poetry and discussed in Chapter
3. Rod adopts the “attitude of negation,” the intellect's rebellion against sensation, in a
kind of “sustained and beautiful weeping.” These “are tears of pure tragedy, and with the
naïve whole heartedness of tragedy.” MacLane has more of the comic attitude: “baffled
tearlessness” and “cautious yearning.” This matches a French style and an American
style, respectively. The French Rod, while pure, leans toward generalities, “often more
true to art than to life.” MacLane “deals frankly with her own problems”: empirical,
specific, personal, factual.
Both types, however, share a “modern” dilemma concerning form and convention.
Returning to Burke's original thesis, both Rod and MacLane are “thrown into the
immediate problem of self-expression.” Rod's prose may tend, French-style, toward
generalities, but the purity of the tragic attitude signifies for Burke the adolescent
dilemma of brain versus heart. MacLane suffers from the opposite extreme of comedy,
the “obligation of bathos,” also to the detriment of her work as art. Her intellect
“tryannize[s]” over her talent, which dissipates as a result. Neither work rises to the
architectural solidity of conventional form. Indeed, they question its possibility.
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Negatively, Burke arrives at the convention which no longer seems to fit
modernity: “a perfect flux of plot with its introduction, development, climax, and
denouement.” Modernity uniquely “den[ies] the art forms we have mastered.” Burke
affirms the universal need for expression. To their discredit, perhaps, moderns cannot
seem to express themselves conventionally. This surely exposes “convention” as a kind
of classical nostalgia, but leaves Burke with the two questions: “Is it that we no longer
think as artists? Or is it that we are more artistic than the former artists?” His subjects,
Rod and MacLane, must reconcile themselves to “an amorphous medium.” Loss in
artistic convention proves, through its over-eager search for “expression,” to harm
expression itself. Readers can draw definite conclusions from this essay on neither art nor
expression. The terms, having differentiated in Burke's struggle to develop a theory of
fiction, merge again when he attempts to locate them in a tangible work. The
“amorphous” result, in turn, merges into a general description of Burke's own times.
With this live problem in mind, Burke soon finds his contemporary era to stretch
back to the 1830s generation in Germany: writers such as Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne,
Ludolf Wienbarg, and Karl Gutzkow “felt as passionately as we the need of perfect art
forms, and yet as heartlessly as we they were forced into the unsatisfactory compromises
of memoirs, letters, essays, and all that” (To Cowley 9/13/17). Part of the difficulty lies in
the supposed post-Romantic imperative for individualism. Individualism does not fit into
conventional form, and perhaps this has something to teach us about conventional form.
Art, as an end, overcomes or transcends the need for expression. Burke begins to see
truthfulness and expression as “adolescent” qualities, typical of the modern age.
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Those errant forms—memoirs, letters, essays—rebel against conventional art in
the name of personal expression: “The more personal our expression becomes, the more
it departs from the massive conceptions of the classical type” (To Cowley 9/21/17). For
this reason, Burke refuses to start a diary. Within days of completing the review “Two
Sordid Books,” however, Burke wrote several short stories and theorized about a
“French” versus “American” type.
Burke's Fiction of 1917: American vs. French Type
“Beyond Catullus,” discussed above and finished by June 1917, was preoccupied
with the theme of suicide carried over as a problem of expression, as Burke continued to
struggle with a repressed version of Ippolit Terentyev from Dostoevsky’s The Idiot. A
few of the stories written between September 1917 and the end of the year also deal with
suicide. Of these, “A Matter of Gratitude” has the most continuity with “Beyond
Catullus.”
Like the earlier story, “A Matter of Gratitude” features a suicidal scholar, glutted
with the need for expression and lonely. Instead of the newspaper reporter to balance the
perspective, however, Burke chooses a neighbor of the poor fellow, and makes this
benevolent neighbor the first-person narrator. This narrator represents a comic, if tough,
approach to the emotional excesses of solitude: “I had been lonely when I came to this
damned city, too, and nobody made up with me. But finally I got the New York way of
thinking. Do you know, this is the most inhuman city in the world, and I’m proud of it.
So I let the man go on by himself.” Think of Burke’s confrontation with the mountain,
and his return to the city.

130

Letting a man go by himself is a kind of sympathy, but Burke’s narrator goes
further and invites himself into the scholar’s room one day. Over time the ill-fated man
becomes so gratefully attached to the narrator that it comes to disgust the latter. Like the
protagonist from “Beyond Catullus,” the unnamed scholar expresses thoughts about
suicide. He settles upon throwing himself under a subway car, much like Anna Karenina
threw herself under a train. And the narrator is grateful for it.
I am not sure to what story Burke refers when he writes on the letter I do believe
to be dated September 14, 1917, “Only this morning I turned out thirty-five hundred
words of weary despair. And the nearest I can come to allying myself with the spirit of
Americanism is the calmness of this despair. … although it may not be interesting, [it]
has satisfied me that it is a work of art.” He may have incorporated it into something
later, or he may have cut it down. Although “A Matter of Gratitude” is slightly under
1,500 words, it certainly could fit this description otherwise. I am also tempted to identify
“A Matter of Gratitude” with the story described in this letter, because of a subsequent
letter written by Burke to Cowley on September 16, 1917, comparing American and
French short stories.
Evidently feeling a burst of creativity, Burke finished three stories in what seems
to be two days, in addition to his 3,500 words already completed. These were “When the
Gods Laugh” and “The Laying Down of Lives,” possibility written on Saturday,
September 15, 1917, and “A Man of Forethought,” finished the morning of Sunday,
September 16. When he wrote of these to Cowley, Burke distinguished the American
type as “a story which prepares for a certain solution … followed by one sharp swift
stroke which comes as a surprise, but is an integral part of the story.” The French, by
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contrast, “buries itself in you imperceptibly, and then goes quietly on eating away” (51),
much as Burke had claimed for Turgenev’s fictional art.
Burke identifies “When the Gods Laugh” as an American kind, and “The Laying
Down of Lives” as a French kind. Recall that in his book review “Two Sordid Books,”
Burke had divided French and American by a focus on generalities and empirical details,
respectively. Over the summer of 1917, he had also associated Turgenev with Art and
Dostoevsky with Expression. The alignments now buffered his earlier influences to give
Burke a prejudice toward the French kind: art over expression.
Burke had once identified with Dostoevsky’s suicidal Ippolit Terentyev, but
Burke creates distance from the suicides in “Beyond Catullus” and “A Matter of
Gratitude” through the characters of reporter and neighbor-narrator. The suicides project
out of Burke as he introjects comic forbearance (trying to replace his fantasy structure of
Dostoesvky the novelist). The suicide is the solipsistic limit of modern individualism:
both the failure of expression and a caricature of the artist.
As with Burke’s poetic procedure, in those two stories Burke effected the comedy
with a quick reversal at the end; the accomplishment of the suicide after its long delay.
The short sketch “When the Gods Laugh” also mocks a solitary, this time someone who
pines after a lost lover presumed to be traveling around the world, when really she had
been living next door. “A Man of Forethought” adapts what Burke seems to have wanted
to accomplish in “Fallow Ground” into a denser format.
“A Man of Forethought” lifts the plots of “Fallow Ground,” and even the
protagonist’s name, Carter. Carter has fallen in love with his best friend’s wife, and their
courtship is the quintessence of patience and decorum: “He was proud of the feelings he
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had had towards her then, for there had been a note of decided Christian cleanness. He
had simply wanted to kiss her on the forehead, to advise her, to smoke big cigars and tell
her things” (Here & Elsewhere 194). After agonizing and failing to profess his love at the
end of the story, Carter learns that his beloved ran off with an actor. To put a twist on a
twist, Carter is not even able to kill himself at the end of the story.
Burke realized something about these “American” stories of his, and perhaps he
realized something about his earlier poetry, too. The form of “reversal” at the end to
signify comic irony toward the “standard” poetic or narrative persona—exactly what
Burke came to call the “tangent ending” of Jules Laforgue’s poetry—depends a little too
much on that reversal. The temporality of the narrative relies on conveying information to
the reader: characteristically American and empirical. This pertains to the side of
sensation, matter, and content. Burke swerved from the American to the French short
story type just as he had turned from Dreiser to Gide.
Among his own stories, Burke claimed, “The Laying Down of Lives” was
different, closer to the French type. Instead of a surprise twist at the end, the reader and
the main character, Ed, hear the repeated statement from Ed’s mother that she “laid down
her life for you once.” Ed returns to his mother and a profitable career after leaving
temporarily to pursue a dream as an astronomer, and the reader feels a kind of smothering
loss on Ed’s behalf. But this feeling is not new; it was there from the beginning, in the
story as in Ed’s life. Whatever one feels about Burke’s theory of the “French type,” it
clearly suited him as a better model than the American, although neither was free from
modern despair.
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The other stories written during this time are “The Excursion,” marked Fall 1917
and published in The Dial (July 1920), a handwritten manuscript titled “The Courtship”
and dated Fall or early Winter 1917, and “Victories,” mentioned in a letter to Cowley as
complete on January 6, 1918, the same letter announcing Burke’s withdrawal from
Columbia.
“Victories” performs another riff on the suicide theme, here from the point of
view of a woman seeking to escape a bad relationship. When she considers the act’s
futility as a limit of expression, however, she demurs. The story’s surprise twist comes
when she returns to her partner’s nonchalance, despite his having read her suicide note.
Perhaps this bemused lover, confident that she would never leap, reflects some of
Burke’s comic attitude toward the tragic. “The Excursion” dissolves the problem of
expression into the massacre of ants, on the one hand, and the appeal to/identification
with God on the other. The gravity of youth contemplating fate echoes Burke's earlier
“Parabolic Tale, with Invocation,” and prefigured Burke's later “The Soul of Kajn
Tafha.”
If any of these, besides “The Laying Down of Lives,” has claim to the “French
type” it would be “The Courtship,” a kind of rolling inner monologue delivered by a
thirty-year-old bartender. The person was in love five years prior to the narrative and
recalls a chasteness and “smuttiness” self-consciously present in Burke at this time.
Similar to the muted and suppressed ambition of Ed in “The Laying Down of Lives,” the
bartender-narrator never acted and lost his dream of love. Burke does not tell the story
urgently or frantically, as in “A Man of Forethought,” but balances it with periodic
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repetitions; not with guilt from a mother, as in Ed’s story, but with anticipation of new
women to arrive. Of course, they never do arrive.
The most important things to take away from these very early stories are the tone
of modern despair, the equation of suicide or violence as a limit of expression, and the
resilience that Burke found in the “French” model of a short story, of which later
examples include “A Conjecture” and the somewhat later “Olympians.” Burke found
resilience, in French literature, against the degradations of the modern era when it seemed
that Americans all too readily embraced them. Burke eventually found that this resilience,
which he may have first truly detected in André Gide and then re-articulated in
September 1917, could be mapped historically. Exercises in English literature at
Columbia assisted him to formalize this possibility.
Columbia English Essays: Convention in the Renaissance
Burke’s theory of modernity allowed him to retroactively assign “historical
periods” to the relationship between “expression” and “art” during a given era. Certain
unified eras, in which expression and convention joined flawlessly, included the great
eras of Greek and English drama. Burke wrote four papers for English Professor John
Erskine at Columbia between October and December 1917: “The Renaissance: Its Ideas
of a Chivalrous Man” (“RICM”), “Beauty in the 'Faery Queene'” (“BFQ”), “Renaissance
Ideals” (“RI”) and “An Attitude towards Fate in Shakespeare?” (“ATFS”).
Burke constructs the Renaissance as the period originating when the formerly
lawless knights of Europe returned from the Crusades in the East with “ideas as to how
one should act toward others” (“RICM” para. 6). This constituted a “universal agreement
among the upper classes” and defined the basis of “Renaissance self-expression”
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(“RICM” para. 11). Having established a conventional code of conduct, people came to
“live and act in a manner fore-ordained by convention” (“RICM” para. 1). Thus Burke
lays the thematic foundation between “art and expression” upon which he will improvise.
Authors such as Sidney, Castiglione, Rabelais, Dante, Shakespeare, Spenser, Lyly, Peele,
Greene, and Marlowe illustrate various conventional or exceptional treatments of the
ideal man and the “strict distinction between man and woman” (“RI” para. 4). The
Renaissance embodies for Burke a cohesive and agreed-upon set of meanings (“art”),
whether the conventions are obeyed or not.
By contrast, the modern era tries to erect an art from the babel of self-expression:
“We are schooled – perhaps a little too zealously – to see people as they are” (“RICM”
para. 1). Wonderful echo of Oscar Wilde! Burke defined four periods or “ages,” each
defined by its particular “unattainable.” Greece sought “reason” against the democratic
mob. Roman Stoicism refuted the ideal of glory. The “Dark Ages” dreamed a City of
God, “the earth then being anything but a City of God.” The Renaissance dedicated itself
to “reconciling love with virginity,” and, in 1917, the defining modern unattainable is
“simply that which we have experienced, the need to give back in art as fully as we have
seen in life” (“RI” para. 1). Expression invariably fails art in the modern era.
Burke now had a vision of a past coherent “age” to substitute for the torture of
modern adolescence, that actual hell of permanent transition and failure of expression,
whose image in fiction is a comic, Dostoevskian suicide attempt that may or may not
succeed. This stable “age” was in the past, and called the Renaissance, but it could be
studied and there might be a hope that such an “age” could return. Following a study of
Henri Bergson, Burke gradually turned his attention to history. One of the predominant,

136

slow-burgeoning influences that came to the fore at the end of 1917 was Burke’s long
devotion to Cicero. I contend that the influence of Cicero’s letters, triggered when Burke
encountered Walter Pater’s analysis of Flaubert’s letters on December 10, 1917, forced
Burke inexorably to leave school permanently. The last of his Columbia essays, “An
Attitude Towards Fate in Shakespeare?” was turned in on the very same day.
Latin Influence and Burke’s Rhetorical Awakening
It is therefore appropriate to conclude this chapter, which began with Kant and
Burke’s philosophy reading in May 1917, after his first semester at Columbia, with the
events that led up to his departure, at the end of his second. I have chosen to call this
pressure, built up over most of 1917, but whose seeds were planted well before the
documentary evidence, Kenneth Burke’s “rhetorical awakening.” This slogan may appear
a little grandiose or facile, I grant. My sense of “awakening” may be something close to
Burke’s version of “maturity,” the “final discovery of his norm.”
Wilbur Samuel Howell has disputed Burke’s right to theorize on behalf of
“rhetoric,” calling him a “maverick.” As a school teacher, Howell presents us with a new
problem of canonical versus antithetical criticism. Like Rueckert wants for Burke,
Howell desires an “established rhetorical tradition” (91) alongside of dialectic (i.e.
science and philosophy) and poetics (i.e. literature). Howell credits the development of
this tradition to Plato and Aristotle with “brilliant expansions … produced by Cicero,
Quintilian, and St. Augustine” (96). Howell rightly accuses Burke of “bring[ing] all
works expressed in an evaluative, moral, and emotional vocabulary within the scope of
rhetoric” (101). In Burke’s attempted merger of the old distinction between poetics and
rhetoric, Howell argues, Burke neglects that rhetoric performs its task with “statement
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and proof,” while poetics uses “incidents, plots, imagined events” (102). Howell
confesses, “Why Burke did not perceive the need for incorporating this same distinctive
characteristic [between “statement and proof” for rhetoric, and “incidents, plots,
imagined event” for poetics] into his otherwise excellent system is indeed a mystery”
(102). I do not wish to (nor could I) dispute Howell’s understanding of the “established
rhetorical tradition,” nor question his claim that Burke sought to merge poetics and
rhetoric. What I can offer is to help explain the mystery.
As I have already established, Burke did not originate from within the
“established rhetorical tradition,” but from within something more like an aesthetic
culture of the early twentieth century, rooted mostly in England and France, with a dash
of American, Russian, and German writers thrown in. Poems and novels concerned
Burke the most at first, but he does brag about Cicero to Louis Wilkinson’s wife as early
as November 6, 1915. If at first Burke regarded Ciceronian oratory as a species of
literature comparable, say, to an Horatian ode, a piece of music by Chopin, or Walter
Pater’s intricate novel of “sensations and ideas,” eventually Cicero contaminated Burkethe-aesthete to the point that the latter, as ephebe, could no longer evade the term
“rhetoric.”
Some could argue that Burke did not really grapple with the “established
rhetorical tradition” until he published A Rhetoric of Motives in 1950, but at least we can
certainly say that this process was only barely underway by 1920. But it was underway,
and antithetical criticism, assisted by the archive, can show us this minute, particular
journey. We can think of Howell’s conflict with Burke in terms of an image. Howell may
very well define canonical criticism of rhetoric in the twentieth century. Burke, so
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Howell thinks, is trying to storm the citadel. I would say no, Burke’s canonical disciples,
those who casually and flippantly called him “Mr. Rhetoric” in the 1970s (Howell 93),
are trying to storm Howell’s citadel of rhetoric, guarded by none other than Plato and
Aristotle.
Antithetical criticism battles against both pretenses: the citadel itself, but more
likely the pretenders and usurpers of the citadel in Burke’s name. Those canonical
disciples of Burke who seek to place Burke in the center of a new canon, a new theory,
distort and maim Burke far more than Howell, who judges Burke more or less accurately
from Howell’s own point of view. Yet Howell is still “mystified” as to the motives of
Burke’s actions, a blindness I hope to correct.
In my understanding, and the point of view of this document, Burke was an
exceptional and lonely teenager, within whom something demanded public attention, to
impose itself on the world. Burke’s educational milieu was English/French Romantic, on
one hand, and American/Russian journalistic, on the other. Burke tasted philosophy but
always had a relish for Latin. In that cauldron-like summer and fall of 1917, Burke read
Henri Bergson and developed an attitude toward history. The pressure from Cicero
became unbearable. Burke could now place the Latins historically and metaphysically, as
he had located the Renaissance in his English papers, and Burke found in ancient Rome a
new synthesis, only obliquely, by association, connected to the idea of “rhetoric.”
I am specifically interested in how Burke read Cicero from 1915-17. Therefore, in
what follows I spend more time on Cicero’s text than Burke’s text, owing to the import of
the precursor and the sparse yet significant registers by Burke the ephebe. Before we get
into details, however, why is the Cicero/Burke ratio significant for the history of rhetoric?
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We must ask this question antithetically, not canonically, and therefore we must
suspend, without discarding, the “established rhetorical tradition.” That tradition as such
meant very little to Burke at the time of this story, yet Burke needed Cicero anyway, for
some reason. To discover this reason, to discover Burke’s clinamen from Cicero, will be
to show something about Cicero in a “Burkean way,” perhaps not visible within the
canonical tradition. We discover a Cicero not limited to the “established rhetorical
tradition,” but primarily a letter-writer, like the young Burke himself.
It will also, no less significantly, say something about Pater, Wilde, Dostoevsky,
and the other English and French aesthetes with whom the young Burke struggled during
his “adolescence.” Burke fled, in a way, from the modern aesthetes into the arms of
Cicero. He did not begin by storming the gates of the citadel, but by begging alms. It
would behoove the “established rhetorical tradition” to understand why so many poor
Romantics come greedily begging at their door.
Michael Leff initiates the antithetical reading of Cicero in terms of Burke. He
recognizes the canonical Aristotelian bias, but also wisely reminds his readers that “[t]he
categories of intellectual history ordinarily depend on studies of influence” (116). Leff
was the editor for the Quarterly Journal of Speech when James Arnt Aune published his
book review on Harold Bloom, and thus began the true antithetical criticism of Burke via
Bloom, so Leff is at least aware of Bloom’s theories. Leff also points out Burke’s “noncanonical” reading of Aristotle, focusing more on the Metaphysics and Poetics than on
Aristotle’s Rhetoric (116). Just so, Burke responded ardently to Cicero’s letters and
Cicero’s philosophical dialogue De Senectute in 1917, with nary a mention of the
Roman’s oratorical treatises.
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Leff calls the influence of Cicero on Burke “minimal, if nonexistent” (116), but in
1989 Leff did not have access to the Burke-3 archive. Regardless, we find Leff reading
Cicero in a delightfully “Burkean” way, coining the term “oratorism” for Cicero as a
counterpart to Burke’s “dramatism” (118). This could not match more precisely Bloom’s
definition of strong misreading and antithetical criticism, whereby one reads the
precursor in terms of the ephebe. Each system, Leff argues, oratory for Cicero and ritual
drama for Burke, becomes “a microcosm by which we can understand the nature of
human relations, which in turn becomes a microcosm for understanding the nature of the
world itself” (126n4). Leff regards Cicero’s De oratore as “a synthetic masterpiece that
merged form and content to embody a rhetorical perspective on civic life” (115). If that is
true, and Cicero truly embodies this rhetorical perspective, it should be visible in all his
works. I begin my reading of Cicero with this assumption. I implicitly extend this
“rhetorical perspective”—as I believe Burke did—to the Roman period, roughly the first
century BCE, when the Republic transitioned into the Empire.
Burke underwent Latin influence beginning with some of the earliest letters from
1915. I have so far discussed English, Irish, American, Russian, French, and German
influence during this earliest phase, but Burke paraded his Cicero as early as his visit to
Dreiser (To Cowley 11/6/15). Burke quotes to Cowley from Cicero’s second invective
against Catiline (To Cowley 11/29/15), and, starting in 1917, refers to Horace, Catullus,
Lucretius, Ovid, and Pliny.
Burke had received an “A” in his Columbia Latin class, which gave him
confidence to find that “Horace is a great solace to people who have found that they can’t
become impassioned without becoming rhetorical” (To Cowley 6/5/17). This comment,
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which I believe to be Burke’s earliest dated usage of “rhetoric,” does not give a precise or
technical meaning to the term, but it suggests that Burke suspected a resolution to the
art/expression problem in Latin literature.
We now, for the first time tracking Burke’s archive, encounter the problematic
definition of “rhetoric.” In searching for an approximate meaning of “rhetoric” in Burke’s
reference to Horace in June 1917, I turn to Arthur Symons’s Studies in Prose and Verse
(1904), which Burke most likely read cover to cover in early 1916. Burke refers to
several essays in this book in letters to Cowley between January 18 and 31, 1916, right
around the period of his “mountainous” crisis, as Burke tested himself against various
figures in Symons’s book. Although I have no direct evidence of Burke’s response to the
term “rhetoric” in Symons, I think it is reasonable to say that the work deeply impressed
Burke, and I doubt that Burke would have had any quarrel with Symons’s usage when he
first read it in 1916.
Symons, in an essay on De Quincey, associates “rhetoric” with “color making up
for absence of form” (48); “to write prose loudly, as if it were to be delivered from a
pulpit … qualities which fit it to impress a multitude when spoken aloud, in a voice
artificially heightened in order to be heard by that multitude” (49-50). This does not in
any way conflict with Burke’s comment that Horace “can’t become impassioned without
becoming rhetorical,” especially given Burke’s additional explanation: “for [Horace], to
use his own mildly academic jest, is known even where Latin is spoken” (To Cowley
6/5/17). Spoken, as opposed to merely read. The irony of the joke, of course, is Horace’s
boast to be known internationally also by a Latin-reading public. Two factors—
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popularity and spoken language—distinguish “rhetoric” for Symons and, apparently, for
the early Burke.
Burke’s use of “impassioned” as a state which may or may not “become
rhetorical,” links it to the problem of art and expression which so concerned him. It must
be possible, then, for passion to hesitate at the threshold of popularity and the spoken
word, to conserve itself from the charge of rhetoric; to decline public expression for the
privacy of art. Horace, as Burke celebrates, yields to that rhetorical threshold. Yet the
Latin poet cannot be denied his artistry. While Burke’s bias may originate more or less in
Symons, the cosmos of Burke’s “rhetoric,” in its swerve from Symons to Horace, already
contains both expression and art.
Symons prefers the epistemological categories of empricism, such as facts, ideas,
thoughts, and impressions. To measure Burke’s clinamen from Symons would begin with
the notation that Burke, as ephebe, swerves from the British aesthete simultaneously to
Latin publicity and to German abstraction. Where Symons accuses rhetoric of an
“absence of form,” Burke is on his way to identifying form with nothing other than
rhetoric, or appeal to an audience. Burke’s commitment to Latin oratory and German
philosophy, however, had not yet formulated.
By June 20, 1917, Burke claims, “I have a satisfactory hold on the modern
languages … and I can go back to Latin.” Above all, “I am in the thick of Cicero, his
orations, his letters to Atticus, his ‘De Senectute’” (To Cowley 6/20/17). These three
forms—oration, epistle, and philosophical dialogue—have all the makings of rhetorical
consciousness. All dichotomies of art and expression completely vanish. The oration is
the traditional figure of practical rhetoric, and no doubt what Symons has in mind when
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he identifies “a voice artificially heightened in order to be heard by [the] multitude.”
These were the keys to Cicero’s fame and identity, in his time and ours.
To a young man fresh from Henri Bergson, the dialogue De Senectute provided an
attractive schema of the “ages of man.” It consists mostly of long monologues, each by a
single character, which might as well be orations. The character Elder Cato, Cicero’s
mouthpiece, structures his defense of old age as a refutation of four progressive
arguments announced at the beginning: old age removes one from life, diminishes vigor,
deprives one of pleasure, and approaches death (10). The first three points amount to
roughly the same thing, a conflict between sensation and the intellect. Cicero as an old
man, like Burke as a young man, chooses intellect, and the transition from physical
activity to the intellect takes a precisely “rhetorical” turn:
It is not by the strong back or the nimble foot or the muscular physique that important
questions are settled, but by consultation, by personal influence, by expression of
opinion … [I]t is among the old that thought, reason, and deliberation are to be found;
if there had never been any old men, there would never have been any civilization at
all. (11, 34)
This attitude seems to have impressed Burke deeply about Cicero and Latin culture in
general: “Latin satisfies my thirst for dignity. Like Greek, it is dominated by a respect for
old men, an unwavering belief in fame, and a high regard for politics,- all of which gives
to it a ceremonious bigness which is not in the more personal vulgar tongues that grew
out of it” (To Cowley 6/20/17). Cicero believed in hypostatic ages of life: youth, early
manhood, middle age, and old age, “senectute” in Latin (37). Cicero’s ideal old age
surrounded itself with young people, influence in politics, friendly conversation, and the
natural pleasures of farming.
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A student of Burke may raise an eyebrow to determine how closely this image fits
with Burke, the “agro-bohemian” rhetorician of Andover, NJ. Two summers later, in July
1919, Burke wrote the following poem:
De Senectute
Oh pshaw!
Just twenty summers and another winter;
That is my age. Then what is old about me!
I am not aged like a deserted cabin,
For that has something, say, Virginia Ivy,
Which blossoms in the autumn,-- or fat spiders,
Or black loam on the [fl?]oor with worms for fishing.
Nor then could I be likened to an oak tree,
However dead; the tree may fall from lightening [sic],
Crash to the earth with quite artistic [splendor?]
Nor am I old like old Grandfather Patten.
Patten will die and leave his children money,
And loves to try us with his set opinions.
Perhaps my age is like -- oh, what’s the difference.
This may be one more phase of adolescence.
But to my books.
At one point, Cicero claims that young people derive as much enjoyment out of the old,
as old people do from the young (15). Burke first read De Senectute barely past the age of
twenty, as he sought to theorize and make judgments about his own passage through the
“seasons” of life. Clearly also, something in Burke’s youth gazed longingly to the
prospect of old age, and perhaps even absorbed this grave ideal “prematurely.”
The Letters to Atticus, however, reveal Cicero a living rhetorical man. He
discusses politics with his friend, arranges family and business matters, boasts about his
rhetorical style, and criticizes that of others. Cicero shows a keen awareness of the
political import of his letters, whether establishing precautions should they fall into the
wrong hands, or openly desiring that Atticus share some item with another. Cicero gave
Atticus permission to write letters in his name for routine business while he was away,
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and in one early extant letter instructs him, “When I write to you praising any of your
friends, I wish you would let them know I have done so” (II. XXV). Another, slightly
earlier letter, asks his interlocutor to gather information on Pompey’s attitude toward
Cicero, “and … deliver to me a kind of Whole Duty by which to regulate my conduct”
(II. XVII). Communication was just as much about pruning one’s good name, or
gathering another’s opinion, as it was the transmission of a private message.
Cicero descends to actual criticism of particular letters he receives from Atticus.
He praises one as more politically valuable than casual gossip: “What a lot of nonsense is
talked about “viva vox” [living voice, zoses phones, original in Greek]? Why, I learned a
dozen times as much about affairs from your letter as from his talk” (II. XII). Signifying
that he regards composition of an epistle as analogous to framing an oration, Cicero
responds in kind as to the “form” and “arrangement” of one letter: “[N]or will I start an
arrangement [oikonomian, original in Greek] of my own, but will keep to your order.”
Later he refers to the same arrangement, which he has copied, as “what a medley of
topics! but that was the delightful feature of your letter, to my mind” (VI. I). Topics
[pragmaton, original in Greek] here straddle the line between the traditional rhetorical
canons of invention and arrangement.
The pragmatic topics help Cicero deliberate whether to leave or stay in Italy as
Civil War mounted between Pompey and Caesar: “To help you [Atticus] to a decision
[over what I, Cicero should do], I will briefly recount what occurs to me on both sides of
the question” (VIII. III). Even more deliberate and explicit a rhetorical exercise, Cicero
takes up a host of Greek theses, stock rhetorical questions so that he “may practice the
subject.” He writes these in Greek, nine total, including such as dispute ethical questions
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concerning tyranny and duty to one’s country. Cicero resolves to write out arguments in
both Greek and Latin (IX. IV). Rhetorical exercise thus shades into political analysis.
The letters also display Cicero’s skill at what we might call “audience analysis” in
a political sense. Evaluating the factions comprising his contemporary situation, Cicero
argues, “in political splits it is classes and parties we want.” He identifies the Senate, taxcollectors, financiers, and farmers as distinct blocs with discernible interests (VII. VII).
Cicero despairs of all parties, and laments the advent of Caesar. The sad result is a kind
of epochal “death of rhetoric”: “For at one time declamation was more or less a necessity;
now, however things turn out, it is not” (XIV. XII). And it was from reading the Letters
to Atticus I learned the etymology of “epoch.” Cicero quibbles about how to render the
term epochē, “suspension of judgment,” into Latin (XIII. XXI). Caesar, through Cicero’s
letters, marks an “epoch” in the history of rhetoric, a “suspension” of the efficacy of
certain practices.
To repeat an argument made above, the “modern” dichotomy of expression versus
art does not exist in Cicero’s cosmos. There may be a range of candor between total
frankness and the most guarded dissimulation, but at no moment does Cicero lose sight of
his public identity. Indeed, the public persona or “good name” typically ranks higher than
any private concern, although “private failure is even more disgraceful than public
failure” (XVI. XV). At any rate, to move from the “paradox” of solitude and the
“psychological state” to the dynamic, above all active, political, social world of Cicero is
to make a passage analogous to what Kant calls that from “speculative” to “practical”
reason.
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To Kant, the “unconditioned”—for Burke, the wordless—can only be posed
“problematically” in speculative reason, as simply not perceivable in the world of
appearance or phenomena (Critique of Practical Reason 5: 3). The subject encounters the
unconditioned, or the principle of freedom, directly in practical reason. A practical rule of
any kind, a priori (formal) or empirical, “prescribes action as a means to an effect” (5:
20). Given this imperative to act, “the mere form of a practical rule without presupposing
any feeling” (5: 24) puts the subject in direct exercise of freedom. Cicero’s letters exhibit
an empirical kind of practical reasoning always at work.
The Roman Ex-Consul certainly did not possess Kant’s transcendental logic, but
we see him wringing his hands and asking for his friend’s advice over duty (“offices”),
the right action for its own sake, and which direction to determine his will. Cicero’s
empirical ingredient ties to the structure of the Roman state. When this material support
for Cicero’s rhetorical identity disappears, so do the (political) grounds for determining
his will. Cicero made a heroic last stand in his Phillipics against Mark Antony, but he
essentially died with the Republic.
I do not argue that Burke absorbed all of this at once, but the seeds are there in the
fallow ground of Summer 1917. Burke’s philosophy class motivated an interest to read
“German ethics, because the Germans all accept determinism to start with and try to build
up a system of moral responsibility in spite of it,- which is next to impossible and is the
only courageous way to go about it” (To Cowley 5/31/17). Burke has Schopenhauer in
mind, but Kant is not far away. Both German philosophers acknowledge fixed “laws of
nature” in phenomena—determinism in general—even if they differ on the particular
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grounds of determination of the will. Kant focuses on moral law, while Schopenhauer
stresses the simple ethical functions of acceptance and rejection.
Practical reason, or ethics, conforms nicely with Latin rhetorical culture, and the
young Burke cannot have missed that connection on some level. That September Burke
discussed writing an essay “to show that the ethical purpose is not inimical to art” (To
Cowley 9/10/17). On December 10, 1917, about two months before he quit Columbia—
the “anticipation” of a crisis, as it were—Burke revisited the theoretical importance of
letters:
I have begun a study of Pliny's letters. The remarkable contrast between them and
Cicero's, coupled with the fact that I recently ran across in Pater some letters of
Flaubert, has given me the idea of a writing a book on letter-writers. The
introductory, of course, will advance my usual thesis that art, fictional art, is inimical
to self-expression, and that the epistolary form is the best of all mediums. Where it
defeats the diary is in the fact that the writer of the letter is making some concession
to an audience, a thing which is necessary in the creation of a medium.
This passage contains all the major terms of Burke's critical vocabulary up to that point:
art, expression, form, and medium. Burke's new enthusiasm, which launched him from
Columbia into Greenwich Village, originated in reading criticism of Walter Pater (on the
letters of Flaubert), whereas Burke’s enthusiasm toward fiction away from poetry was in
large part prompted and guided by his cathexis to Pater's Marius the Epicurean (see
previous chapter).
Burke's own stance in 1918 differs from his position towards himself in 1916 by
the same ratio. Burke quit Columbia in early 1918. Curiously, his crises of both 1916 and
1918 are associated with images returned from the past, depriving the present of
language. In '16 and '18 the “wordless” crisis surrounded letters. Then, Burke had
suffered as a letter-writer precisely the crisis of audience. None of his words were to be
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taken seriously, which also represents a loss (if temporary, still necessary) of faith in his
reader, Malcolm Cowley, the dumb rolling mountain. Now Burke, in 1918, takes up the
critique of the letter-writer. This transition, as Burke scholars know, is a typical Burke
defense, from concrete to abstract, always one further step removed. After much
pondering, I tend to think of this letter of December 10, 1917, as a “rhetorical
awakening” in Burke’s thinking.
At this point, “rhetoric” in Burke can be taken as “epistolary,” and it contains the
same dialectic between art and expression we observed in Burke’s “mountainous” letter
of January 28, 1916. I don’t mean to suggest “rhetoric” as such was an important term for
Burke during this time. He rarely uses it, and never with any more specificity than I
indicated above in relation to Horace. I draw attention to Burke’s “epistolary” revelation
because it begins to articulate a specifically social form expression, in direct terms or
“concession” to an audience. Critics who want to point to a “social turn” in Kenneth
Burke should look at these progressive crises in 1916 and 1918. In the latter, when he
quit Columbia, Burke threw himself onto Greenwich Village with what I take to be a
deliberate experiment in “publicity,” or rhetoric. The danger of the school professor
would be in the discovery that one has nothing, and no ability, to express.
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Chapter 5 – City, Country, and Catholicism (January 1918 – Summer 1920)
Overview of this Chapter
We resume with Kenneth Burke at the beginning of 1918, after he dropped out of
Columbia. In the following two years, there are fewer letters to Cowley, but several
works of fiction dated in the archive between 1918-19. Burke was married in 1919, and
began writing serious essays for publication around 1920, in earnest. The scope of this
chapter, then, has three components: some fiction, a few essays, and Burke’s
comprehensive study of Remy de Gourmont.
A review of Burke’s fiction from 1918 to mid-1920 culminates with the Joris-Karl
Huysmans-influenced “Thébaïde: An Anatomy of Sensation.” The differences in this
fiction from that written by Burke in later 1917 are first, less of an emphasis on suicide,
and more on sexual crime; and second, a growing dichotomy of the country and city. The
presence of Dostoevsky diminishes, and that of Walter Pater increases. Burke’s drift
toward the “French type” of short story continues as he begins to internalize the French,
neo-Catholic historiography of Huysmans and Gourmont.
A few undated essays likely written in late 1919 or 1920 illustrate synthetic
developments of the metaphysical strategies in the 1917 essays. I discuss four: “Carrie A.
Nation,” “The Basis of the American Attitude,” “Gastronomic Art” (a review of
Huysmans), and “Axiomatics,” Burke’s first published book review on a novel by John
Cournos.
To conclude this chapter and dissertation, I approach Burke’s misreading of Remy
de Gourmont. I place special emphasis on Gourmont’s La Culture des Idées [The Culture
of Ideas] and Le Chemin de Velours [The Velvet Path], the most frequently quoted books
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in Burke’s essay “Approaches to Remy de Gourmont.” Large sections of both books have
never been translated into English, so at times I rely on my own translations. Our lessons,
and Burke’s, from Gourmont, are on the metaphysics of sensation and the historical
relation between ancient Rome and medieval Catholicism. For that reason, parallel to my
section in the last chapter on Cicero and Burke’s “rhetorical awakening,” I have named
this final section “Gourmont and Burke’s Catholic awakening.” This awakening, in turn,
informs our reading of Burke’s “Thébaïde: An Anatomy of Sensation,” a swerve from
Walter Pater into French Catholicism. Burke is Rhetorical and Catholic in equal
proportions, and their continuity is essential to his historiography.
Overview of Burke’s Short Fiction, 1918 to mid-1920
Burke began writing longer stories in early 1918, and continued this activity with
diligence for the next few years. The major stories of 1918 are “The White Oxen” and
“Buried Titan,” abandoned at first but revised two years later, for which Burke left
extensive notes. Letters to Cowley in 1918 increasingly mention Thomas Mann and
Gustave Flaubert, two writers often associated with the young Burke. In late 1918, Burke
first mentions Des Esseintes, the hero of J.-K. Huysmans’s Against Nature [À Rebours], a
work Burke may have encountered through S. Foster Damon, whom Burke met in May
1918. A letter of October 4, 1918, links Huysmans to the early stages of “The Birth of a
Philosophy.”
In 1919 Burke finished the first draft of that story, in addition to “The Soul of
Kajn Tafha,” “Scandal” (two versions), “The Suicide at 214,” “The Black Sheep,”
“Berenice and ‘Florio,’” “Mrs. Maecenas,” “The Miracle,” and “The Storm.” That would
make at least nine stories in 1919—only two eventually published—his most prolific year
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as a fiction writer. “Symptoms,” and “Pop Rebels” were possibly written in 1919 or ‘20.
On June 21, 1919, reporting from Candor, NY, Burke mentions Remy de Gourmont for
the first time, on whom by early 1920 Burke was taking avid notes. In 1920 Burke wrote
“David Wassermann,” “Portrait of an Arrived Critic,” “Olympians,” and “Thébaïde: An
Anatomy of Sensation,” and revised “The Buried Titan” and “The Birth of a Philosophy.”
“The White Oxen” through “The Buried Titan” (Early 1918)
Burke retains examples of both the “American” type and the “French” type of
short story, the first with a surprise ending, and the second with a muted repetition of
some generality. “The White Oxen,” more of the French type with its repetitive image of
the white oxen, was belatedly published with Burke's volume of short stories in 1924, and
gave the volume its title: The White Oxen. Like “The Laying Down of Lives,” “The
White Oxen” follows the equivocal career of a sensitive child of the bourgeois Middle
West. Where Ed, in “The Laying Down of Lives,” returns to his mother and a profitable
career, Matthew Carr, in “The White Oxen,” ends up in a mystical transport, merging his
identity with docile, placid, and yet morally pure bovine creatures.
“The White Oxen” in particular resembles Marius the Epicurean in its narrative
form. Like Marius, Matthew's education takes place via progressive stages through
friendships or acquaintances. Matthew learns first from a negative or antithetical
encounter with Lowell Waldemar Jones, Burke's deliberate parody of the British
aesthete—one might say also a defensive trope towards Pater and Wilde. Burke,
especially as a young man, held a particular grudge against Wilde even though he
denounces his villain with an Oscarian ring.
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The Catholic boy Edward Carroll, who might represent Burke's deliberate attempt
at self-revision, next attracts Matthew through his piety. Yet Edward disappoints
Matthew by showing too callous an attitude toward sex after going off to college. His
other two companions, an unnamed prostitute and a co-worker turned roommate who
steals from him, betray Matthew in turn, with each transgression bearing the mark of
profane or forbidden sexuality. In a near-parody of the Paterian aesthete, of a different
order from Lowell Valdemar Jones, Burke's hero Matthew Carr longs for the “blissful
sloth of semi-sensation” (Here & Elsewhere 184). Marius's relationships with Flavian
and Cornelius both involve loss, but Marius sustains that loss with considerable dignity.
One doubts Matthew's ability to withstand pain and disappointment as he dumbly longs
for his white oxen.
The second story Burke wrote that spring, “The Black Sheep,” after his liberation
into Greenwich Village, is more of an “American” type set in the country. Burke
structures the story around an attempted adultery, as in “Fallow Ground” and “A Man of
Forethought.” Perhaps adultery, over time, received some of Burke’s fictional
associations previously relegated to suicide. Rather than a surprise twist, however, “The
Black Sheep” builds slowly to its final reversal. We go from white oxen to black sheep as
Bert Hamilton, a country boy spoiled by the city, tries to seduce the country lass Alice
Hempstead, née Gridley. Everything is going fine until “she shifted her eyes towards him.
He was smiling. On seeing him smile, a panic of distrust came over her, she was on her
guard again in an instant, and turned her eyes coldly back to the valley” (21). Everything
goes downhill from there.

154

Michael Leff points out that many “contemporary writers who, like Burke, seek to
revive rhetorical studies … normally approach rhetoric via literary rather than civic
discourse” (126n4). True enough, and this applies to Burke here, but the drama hinges
upon an exchange, and its fictional image depends on the aesthetic apprehension of the
exchange. This is how Walter Pater adds to Cicero in Burke’s literary culture. We call
“rhetorical” the actions of smiling and turning away: they are grounded in an interest in
the audience, the other. “Communication” is the more general term.
Written two years after Burke protested to write a novel with “no woman and pig”
(To Cowley 1/31/16), “The Black Sheep” has a woman and a few pigs. Bert Hamilton
returns to his boyhood hometown in the country after disillusionment as an artist in the
city. The country gives Burke ample room to invoke sensations: the visual landscape, the
sound of animals, the smells of manure and the kitchen. Bert's ironic detachment yields to
a homey, nostalgic indulgence of the country vernacular even as he falls for his old
nemesis Alice Gridley.
If we accept the date of April 26, 1919, on one of the manuscripts, “The Black
Sheep” also contains one of Burke's earliest uses of the term “rhetoric,” while Bert is
talking to Alice: “He felt that he had been sincere enough, yet he was conscious of a
certain rhetoric in his statements, as though he were trying rather to make an impression
than merely to express himself” (19). This entangles “rhetoric,” as dialogue between the
sexes, with the problematic impression/expression dialectic. A self-directed discourse can
be innocent of “rhetoric,” in this view, if sincere. The desire to make an impression
smacks of disingenuous sexual self-interest. One cannot take the city out of the country
boy. Burke had discussed this city/country dialectic in letters to Cowley of January 1916.
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Bert's flirtation with Alice begins with sensation. He speaks of the valley
landscape as would a Paterian aesthete, but feels guilty about the “rhetorical” part, “the
thoroughly masculine and thoroughly detestable purpose of impressing a woman” (20). It
backfires on Bert, as with so many of Burke's protagonists, and though his courtship
winds up in disaster, Bert winds up the aesthete again, visually admiring the landscape
when the fog lifts.
“The Crooked Old Lady and the Man Without Imagination”1 relies upon a final
reversal of a milder sort for its effect. Like “A Matter of Gratitude,” it features two
strangers in a city apartment building, the two characters named in the title. The man
without imagination, the protagonist, notices his neighbor, the crooked old lady, stooping
one day to pick up a piece of tin-foil. Because this unnamed protagonist had already
begun to notice and brood upon her, he, the man without imagination, infers a utilitarian
purpose to her collection of tin-foil. She must be poor, and this must be her source of
income. So, philanthropist without imagination that he is, he goes around collecting tinfoil and dropping it in the gutter for her to pick up. To his horror, the man without
imagination discovers the crooked old lady one day in a filthy apartment building, tearing
up the tin-foil in little pieces and letting them float down from the window.
A grotesque picture of city-life without being morose, this story mocks the
possibilities of empathy or “altruism” in the urban, capital-driven environment. About the
same time as Burke wrote this story, in April or May 1918, he wrote a sketch of country

1

There are two copies of this story in the Burke-3 archive (Box 1, Folder No. 13). The earlier (I assume)
version has the date “April or May 1918,” which I have used in dating the story, but I quote from the
later, undated version, nearly identical in wording.
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life with almost no action at all. Titled “A Conjecture,”2 it may be Burke’s most Gidean
story up to that point. Its only rival in that category is the similarly brooding monologue
“The Courtship,” discussed in the previous chapter.
“A Conjecture” begins with detailed qualifications of the narrator's authority, in a
mode that anticipates Burke's novel Towards a Better Life, and which Burke had already
found in Gide’s “The Straight Gate.” The first-person narrator, like Bert Hamilton, a
stranger in a small country town, analyzes the life of women in the town into major
stages of “marriage, child-birth, and death” (2). The narrator not only witnesses these
three events in the life of Alice, the subject of his narrative, but in fact divides his
narrative based on these “eras” or “stages” in a “typical” woman’s life. The narrator’s
point of view is aesthetic and detached, of course, but we finally see that his attention is
really focused on Alice’s husband.
The latter has done nothing remarkable at all in the story; always very composed.
Here is the very oblique irony by which Burke’s narrator allows himself to betray
emotion: “But perhaps if [Alice] had fallen into the creek when the last flood was here
and the water, you remember, even reached to Fenwick Lane, [her husband] would have
gone after her, and lost his life” (5). We can only really tell the narrator’s love for Alice
because he has considered her life so tactfully, and yet so thoroughly. I would say of all
Burke’s stories through 1918, this one achieves, most nearly, a “French style” of
suggestion through near-sterility.

2

See previous note. The dated (I assume earlier) manuscript of “A Conjecture” is May 2, 1918, but I
quote from the later, undated copy.
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Sensation in Burke's fiction is not so much eliminated as alienated, sometimes
with happy effect. Consider the following passage in “The Buried Titan,” begun by May
1918 (To Cowley 5/11/18), concerning a man walking through the streets of New York:
His brain contemplated the general idea of the scheme, while his eyes went on
registering the minutiae of his walk: a street-car is coming; look out, an auto is
coming the other way; there is a fire plug with three spouts. Allowed to roam
unmolested, they leapt gleefully, now on the very crack of the pavement at his feet,
now stretching themselves off to crawl up and down the distant elevtaed [sic] station.
(9)
Rereading the first sentence one perceives Burke's trick. The “eyes” detach themselves,
without our knowledge, to cascade in a water-ballet of vision as they drop, speed, hurry,
scratch, rest, puzzle, fling, crash, and soar: “And all the while their master followed his
own thoughts” (9-10). Radical separation of sensation from the intellect (the “eye” from
the “brain”) moves further away from England than France, though short of Russia, to
Germany: the lesson of detachment Burke learned from Schopenhauer.
Burke's fiction leans to the extremity of objectifying form, as when he begins the
story “Victories” with a vertigo in perspective of a large cliff: “From down in the valley,
where the river flowed, the rocks shot straight up like a ladder from heaven; but from up
above, the rocks dropped straight down and made you dizzy” (1). Characteristically for
Burke, this dizzying perspective sets up a theme of intellectual reversal regarding motive,
justification, and interpretation. The young woman decides not to leap and conceives it a
victory over her lover; when she returns to him, the lover brands it a victory for himself.
Both characters are modern individualists.
In “The Buried Titan” the harried protagonist writes a poem on the “physical
effects of love.” Burke attempts a post-Joycean Euphuism by conjuring images from the
mere sounds of words, the “unconscious choice of vowel quantities … The writing of the
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poem closed and dismissed all that he had experienced up to the present moment” (25-6).
Something in Euphuism banishes, quenches, or quells “experience” in “the writing of the
poem.” Burke would write much later, in 1941,
[I]f we try to discover what the poem is doing for the poet, we may discover a set of
generalizations as to what poems do for everybody. With these in mind, we have cues
for analyzing the sort of eventfulness that the poem contains. And in analyzing this
eventfulness, we shall make basic discoveries about the structure of the work itself.
(PLF 73)
A line obtains from the sensation or “eventfulness” of the poet, nervously scribbling on
the park bench, to the enclosure of experience in “structure” or form of the poem. In
literature, form is wrapped up with language, but form exceeds language as a concept.
Forms do things for poets and readers, as they do for plants.
Burke sums up the entire tendency in a letter of June 21, 1919, to Cowley: “Being
at present in a virulent form-over-substance phase, I was irritated by de Gourmont's
continual excursions; he has all the time in the world.” On June 25, 1921, Burke wrote to
Cowley that the painter Carl Sprinchorn, like Robert McAlmon and William Carlos
Williams, “feels things; but my joy does not really begin until I formulate them.” This
distinction had been previously gendered for Burke. In an undated version of the story
“Scandal” (another version, probably written earlier, is dated March 1919), Burke wrote,
“Meredith says women think in 's': He probably meant that they just feel their thoughts,
and not, like men, have them subjected to the baldness of words” (9).3 I have not located
the reference of this allusion in the writings of George Meredith, but Burke's equation of
women with sensation or emotion against the masculine intellect is clear enough.
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À Rebours and Burke’s Fiction of 1919-20
Burke first mentions meeting S. Foster Damon in a letter to Cowley of May 11,
1918, so it may be around this time that Burke and Cowley first made their acquaintance
with the French poet Jules Laforgue (see Chapter 3). Cowley, who introduced Damon to
Burke, writes of discussing Joris-Karl Huysmans while hanging with Damon in Boston in
a latter of May 25, 1918 (Jay 65-6). On October 4, 1918, Burke asks Cowley to “bring
that essay of Damon’s. It is vitally necessary, as I was immensely engrossed in A
Rebours and am ready to follow it up.” In the same paragraph, Burke states that À
Rebours gave him a good idea for a story he was working on, “Birth of a Philosophy.”
Burke praises Huysmans’s novel because it showed him “there are so many
outlets for the sensually inclined” other than sex (To Cowley 10/4/18). Where Marius the
Epicurean keeps any potential sexual tension between the male characters submerged,
and La Porte Étroite continually suspends and frustrates a sexual tension that never
comes to fruition, À Rebours begins with the scenario of sexual exhaustion. Burke
seemed to welcome this “escape,” it seems, from a real-life love affair with Berenice
Abbott which may have occurred over the summer of 1918.
The relationship was never consummated, and Burke voices relief at Husymans’s
implication that “a crucifix properly placed [aesthetically] is substitute enough for
Berny’s virginity,” which Burke apparently had failed to claim (To Cowley 10/4/18).
Whatever Burke had accomplished in the drafting of “Birth of a Philosophy” is unclear,
but it does seem decisively linked to Burke’s encounter with Huysmans in 1918.
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Surviving archival notes suggest that Burke planned the story around a somewhat
autobiographical character named Alfred, with a history of sexual encounters somewhat
like Burke’s.4 At one point Burke writes of the following tentative outline:
Possible division.
1. Sensations from revery (only religious experiences)
2. Sensations from contact with life (love experiences)
3. Reasoning and attempt at application (loveless marriage)
“Prepared to be a modern Faust, he soon found that he had no place to sell his soul,
and no soul to sell.” But perhaps that is a modern Faust?
We have some evidence that these pages of notes were composed in late 1918 or early
1919. The manuscript of Burke’s story “The Soul of Kajn Tafha,” eventually published in
1920, is dated late February/early March 1919. That story presents an austere
mythological tale of renunciation: Kajn Tafha, the modern day Faust, would sell his soul,
but “‘maybe we can’t sell our souls, and maybe we don’t even have souls to sell’” (Here
& Elsewhere 215). The link between this note and the published story helps orient us as
to Burke’s thinking about sensation and intellect at the time. It also suggests that his early
fiction of 1919 in part sublimated, in small pieces, a more comprehensive architecture
that Burke contemplated in 1918, but never carried through until 1919-20.
The three (or four) stories definitively dated by March 1919 are “The Soul of Kajn
Tafha,” and two (or three) attributed to Burke's pseudonym Michael Duvac: “Scandal”
(two versions) and “The Suicide at 214.” Based on what became of “The Birth of a
Philosophy,” and Burke’s letters about volatile love affairs in late 1918, we can assume
the primary “subject-matter” for Burke in early 1919 was the relation between sexes. We
also know Burke was courting Lily Batterham at this time, marrying her on May 19, 1919
(Selzer 188). The two versions of “Scandal” focus on seduction through trickery against
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the backdrop of yellow journalism and society gossip. They contrast the seduction of a
married woman to getting a journalistic “scoop.”
“Symptoms” and “Pop Rebels,” under the Michael Duvac pseudonym, may have
been written in early 1919 as well. “Symptoms” dramatizes the supposed conflict
between Christian morality (or prudery) and the corrupting sensuality of French novels as
a quarrel between ex-lovers. In “The Suicide at 214” and “Pop Rebels” the male-female
interaction is further displaced, with both stories focused on solitary males with only a
peripheral suggestion of eros. Harry van Bourne of “The Suicide at 214” takes to
anonymously observing and speculating on the life of a young woman who lives across
from an abandoned warehouse window he's rented. And Pop Yardsley of “Pop Rebels”
forsakes any chance at love during his self-centered youth, waging battle as an adult only
against the routine of a Wall Street bank.
Like “Symptoms,” “Berenice and 'Florio'” centers on the rhetorical exchange of a
man and woman, ex-lovers. Berenice had preferred Florio before “he had decided that he
was in love with her” or exposed his sentiment to the baldness of words. Her musings
describe this declaration as “fallen” (6). She too is fallen, having read a book “of a
woman who dressed as a knight and went in search of beauty” (12) and moved to become
a model in New York. Burke denotes the “unfallen” Florio (in Berenice's eyes), the one
who at first pleases Berenice, by quotation marks, “Florio.” Without quotation marks,
Florio fell moodily in love. But “Florio” was a charming best friend. Berenice rejects
Florio, and yet “Florio” returns with another woman, calculating for himself an “AngloSaxon revenge” (20). This tactic drives Berenice to despair and death, and “Florio”
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completes his revenge by bringing Olga to the cabin where he had formerly intended to
take Berenice.
Although the manuscript of “Berenice and 'Florio'” dates June 9, 1919, Burke
dated the following hand-written note, May 5, 1919:
Form is not an end, but a means. Powys was at least on the right track when he said to
me that he wanted to write a novel chaotic from the artistic standpoint to give a
presentation of chaotic life. In my Berenice and “Florio” I can see no advantage in
what I might term the orchestration of The Black Sheep. If it is right that one
demands a greater tension towards the end of the story, this tension is not necessarily
the raising of hairs. In The Black Sheep it is true, I felt that it was fitting to write a
crescendo, with the actual tempo of words much faster. But in Berenice and “Florio”,
if there is to be an increased tension, this tension should be nothing other than
realizing the style more characteristic of itself. That is to say, the last page is the first
page, only more of it. To give a subtly beginning story form, one would end largely;
but one could just as easily end more subtly. A story may grow into itself as well as
out of itself. I shall ambush Matty with this consideration, for he is sure to attack
Berenice and “Florio” on the grounds of formlessness.
Sensations of chaotic life, greater tension, and “the raising of hairs” all signify the
operations of literary form and can be thus viewed as deliberate or rhetorical effects. The
difference between stories lies in different patterns and manipulations of these forms
which result in the effect of the reader's sensation or experience. The prevalence of
courtship and sexual relations as subject-matter for literature suggests the sensual and
“sensational” power of these matters in both literature and life.
The dynamics of courtship in Kenneth Burke's early fiction often point to the
difference between the country or province as a land of sensation buckled by morality,
and the city as a debauched aesthetic theater of the mind. “The Black Sheep” narrates the
stability of the country female against the urban male, building to the “crescendo” of a
failed masculine ejaculation. “Berenice and 'Florio'” illustrates the slow dissipation of
country female sexuality in the city, as lack of fulfillment dwindles into disease. The
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latter story begins with the “calculating eye” of male revenge, and ends with its
amplification in “Florio's” triumph.
“The Storm” begins as far removed as possible from subjective human
experience. The voice of the story floats over the odors, vistas, and conditions of the
plants and atmosphere in the heat of the sun “naturalistically.” Two aesthetes roaming the
countryside take shelter in a cabin as the storm breaks. They argue the storm’s merits as a
work of art, and laughingly judge that the academy might rate it “fair in places,” before
they return to the city. In other stories, marriage synthesizes the sexual and social aspects
of form. The urban couple Croggs and Nelly in the apparently unfinished “The Miracle”
grind each other down as “the miracle,” the impending birth of a child, threatens to make
their life more difficult. Burke's great widow, Mrs. Maecenas, wields sexual power over
her protégé Siegfried only to mock him.
In the city, as in the country, the problem of expression remains. The title
character in “David Wassermann” confronts his friend Lambert Wright on the limitations
of silence as a rhetorical strategy: “[I]t blunts a man, since it gets him into making a
broad division of his sensations: this thing I recognize, this thing I am silent about. With
the final result that you become inarticulate. You forget how to carve neat slices off a big
steaming idea” (Here & Elsewhere 231). Refusal to speak reduces one to amoeba-like
capacity. Burke distinguishes the city-dwellers Wassermann and Wright further by the
cultural mark of Jew and Gentile.
Wassermann, Burke’s caricature of a Jew, has a self-declared “egocentric attitude
to life, with nothing but you and God, and God making the world to plague you,” while
Wright enjoys “Roman therms, resignation, either no God or a laissez-faire policy on the
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part of God; ah, how Walter Pater, how Parian marble, how off in the mountains to
meditate.” Wassermann drips scorn on his Gentile friend, for he knows “there is a God,
with a swagger, and an ugly leer, and a quid of tobacco in his cheek” (232). Wright does
not exactly represent “sensation” as directly as many of Burke's women characters, but
his muteness and association with Pater place him closer to that end of the spectrum than
the hyper-intellectual Wassermann.
Soon Wassermann inveighs against clarity: “Intelligence is a parasitic growth”
(235). He gives a speech at a saloon prophesying the rise of commercial fascism in
America. He proposes marriage to his Jewish girlfriend Cynthia, who accepts. Before the
wedding, however, Cynthia spends the night at Lambert Wright's apartment, with the
suggestion that it will not be for the last time. “David Wassermann” shows an early
version of what can be termed Burke's anti-Semitism, or at best his ambivalent stance
toward Jews. The story implies that Cynthia finds something appealing and restful in
Wright's placidity, although she will find a respectable social place with Wassermann,
who joins his father's growing clothing firm at last.
Lambert Wright, although Paterian in David Wassermann's eyes, still behaves
intellectually with regard to Cynthia: “Do women suspect the calculating eye of the
male?” (240). Burke apparently constructs a continuum with Cynthia, the woman, at the
far end of sensation; Wright, the Roman-Gentile, in the middle; and David Wassermann,
the Jewish intellectual-turned-businessman as the extreme of intellect, fit to marry
Cynthia but not to comfort her.
Infidelity (and its mere possibility), childbirth, and widowhood, as variations on
the theme of marriage, appear as vital social-sexual forms. They make for good literature,
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or at least, they manifested as the results of Burke's experimental fiction. Whether, and to
what extent, these fictions may allow us to draw conclusions or point “beyond” fiction is
a question that must be suspended. In fact, one of the most troublesome questions raised
by the total work of Kenneth Burke may be as to the status of fiction.
However one begins to approach that question, the key element or transition from
fiction to reality must lie in the concept of “form,” universally recognized by critics as the
key term of Burke's early career. Form, as stated above, transcends both the domain of
literature and the larger genus of art. But owing to its position in the origin or genealogy
of consciousness, the non-aesthetic, as fiction never tires of demonstrating, can be viewed
as a “fall.” This “fallen state” of the mere fact never escapes the purview of literature.
Schopenhauer's On the Will in Nature provides an organic instance of form in the
direction of plant growth, but Burke's early fiction prophesies a mode of reading which
would subject Schopenhauer to the criteria of fiction. Burke, like his predecessor Oscar
Wilde, believes that life imitates art.
Writing November 26, 1921, to Cowley, Burke discovers, “Art, then, is the only
certainty, since it is the only outlet which can utilize these byproducts [of metaphysics]
legitimately. Metaphysics becomes one branch of fiction. Oh shit! …” This stance
absolutely commiserates with Pater's vision, and we have reason to believe Burke never
abandoned it, despite his complaints. Matthew Carr in “The White Oxen,” passionate
lover of dull sensation, on through the aesthetic characters in nearly all of Burke's stories,
wrestle with the Paterian legacy and represent Burke's various attempts to formalize or
formulate his admiration of, and resistance to, Walter Pater.
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Burke's later work does not so much abandon or replace literature so much as
augment it. As early evidence, Burke read Schopenhauer's On the Will in Nature and
Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution and on May 27, 1917, claimed that “reading
philosophy is a much better preparation for writing novels than reading novels is.” The
tensions raised in these philosophic works between Kantian and Darwinian (evolutionary)
worldviews, in particular, would fuel Burke's attachment to the more abstract side of
Marius the Epicurean and drive the form of his career through the late 1930s.
The development of Burke's criticism transformed the potentials he saw in literary
texts. But one should not assume, ever, that Kenneth Burke lost or discarded the lessons
he learned while writing fiction. His first attempts at criticism analyzed his own fiction
more than they attempted generally to characterize literature; Burke’s writing on other
writers, à la Wilde, passes through his own preoccupations and vocabularies as a kind of
displaced autobiography. A major consequence of this genealogy is the insistence upon a
literary foundation to any and all notions of “rhetoric.”
The professional disciplines of literature and rhetoric should, by the nature of their
subjects, work to coordinate research, criticism, and education more closely. Kenneth
Burke as an intellectual icon may help facilitate this coordination. The worst case
scenarios would be if they viewed themselves as hostile to each other or isolated,
unrelated, autonomous subject-matters. To hold fast to Burke-the-aesthete increases the
mystery and depth of his output. His stories from 1920 on show increasing aesthetic
appropriation of the “non-literary.”
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The Saga of Alfred
Once planned as a trilogy, only two works of Alfred's saga now exist in the
archive: “The Birth of a Philosophy” and “Thébaïde: An Anatomy of Sensation.”
Together they re-write Marius the Epicurean, which could easily be subtitled “The Birth
of a Philosophy” and/or “An Anatomy of Sensation.” At one point in Pater's tale, Marius
and his youthful poetic friend Flavian read together from Apuleius and enjoy “the
adventure … the exploits of the robbers, their charming caves” (53). We first meet
Burke's Alfred on his ninth birthday, of which day the single moment Alfred finds
successful consists in a scene illumined by candle-light on the birthday cake: “He felt a
sudden kinship with his relatives; he and they were all robbers dining sumptuously in a
deep cavern” (“Birth” 2-3). The character Alfred follows Matthew Carr from “The White
Oxen” in thinking without perceiving himself think. And he shares with the narrator of
Gide’s “The Straight Gate” the dissociated manner of recollection and description.
Alfred becomes moodily religious, vaguely afraid of other boys, and vaguely
attracted to girls, but he experiences three forms of disillusion. First, Alfred learns
painfully that the candles surrounding his family home's crucifix are not part of the
crucifix, but the “crucifix, then, was an agony” (“Birth” 27). Second, he witnesses the
Catholic bishop trip over his robes during a solemn procession. And third, Alfred gets a
pair of eyeglasses, sharpening his vision to the ugliness of the world, a new David
Wassermann. Burke seems to delight in methodically removing the ritual dignity and
love of sensation which Pater establishes so minutely in Marius the Epicurean.
In the sequel, “Thébaïde: An Anatomy of Sensation,” Alfred is a city boy in New
York who slips into a late night party. Burke takes another dig at women, as kinds of
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surrogate for sensation. No one can be quite sure of Burke's irony: “Groves' intelligence
according to Milvaney was just low enough to charm any woman, a state which most
men are in only when they are drunk” (“Thébaïde” 8). After the naked women and piano
music in the dark, each guest “drown[s] himself in his individual flood of pure emotion.”
Alfred rebels against this wash, however, and upon returning to his room writes
furiously: “I MUST BE MY OWN MOTION, incorporate my own flux” (10). Such an
effort at self-re-possession against yielding to sensation constitutes Burke's rebellious
swerve against Walter Pater, who famously championed the Epicurean flux. This critical
swerve enters materially into Burke's origin as a critic.
The act of writing purges the alcohol, and Alfred vomits after his spat at the
typewriter. This physiological counterpart, similar to the act of writing poetry in “The
Buried Titan,” reinforces the problem of writing—and what Burke calls “formulation” in
general—which Burke would pursue in his long essay on Coleridge's “Rime of the
Ancient Mariner,” published in The Philosophy of Literary Form in 1941. A shadow of
Alfred's Catholic youth haunts him, as Burke alternates between images of filth and
cleanliness. Like Coleridge's water-snakes, the people of New York provide only “the
squirmings of a quotidian humanity” (“Thébaïde” 17). Burke had used the adjective
“squirming” associated with sensation in a letter to Cowley on January 28, 1916 (quoted
in Chapter 3), and by implication the “subject-matter” component to art.
The spatial configuration appropriate to Alfred's recoil is a “secular monastery,” a
retreat or “modern Thébaïde” (“Thébaïde” 17), the same term used for the protagonist's
sanctuary in Huysmans's À Rebours (Against Nature). Unlike Bert Hamilton in “The
Black Sheep,” Alfred moves to the country free of social obligations and local memories.
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Burke narrates the range of Alfred's country occupations, which mostly surround
preparing food, smoking tobacco, reading magazines and Church Latin, and writing.
Content with this life, he re-imagines all he previously found ugly—including women,
appetites, vulgarity, and mean places of all kinds—as capable of aesthetic redemption.
This entertainment runs out of charm for him, though, and he resolves at the end of the
story to marry into a state of mediocrity.
Pater's Marius begins with the pagan Roman ancestral religion and ends up
something like a Christian martyr. Burke's Alfred begins as an obedient if obsessive
Catholic, passes through urbane skepticism and an ascetic fascination with smut, and
finally longs for the stability, routine, comfort, and habit of marriage. In a typed, undated
note Burke explained that he wanted Alfred in “The Birth of a Philosophy” to “'feel' (not
think) the questioning attitude.”
And Burke gives to the final section of “Thébaïde” the subtitle, “Loss of pigment
or Halcyonism and the prodigious genius of the oyster.” Marius the Epicurean includes
part of an ancient dialogue “The Halcyon,” on the mythic bird who brings about
“serenity … See how transparent is the sky above us, and how motionless the sea!—like
a smooth mirror” (Marius 207). Burke concludes “The Birth of a Philosophy” stating that
by about the age of twelve, Alfred was ready to “stumble through the dungeon of his
Middle Ages, adolescence” (“Birth” 29). At the end of “Thébaïde” Alfred admires the
oyster who simply protects itself, “buffering the exterior elements to filter in and out of
him sluggishly, indifferently as they happened to come” (“Thébaïde” 34). To the
adolescent, then, marriage seems the placid threshold beyond which he cannot glimpse.
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Clearly, Burke's fiction holds an ambiguous stance toward the matter of sensation.
Artistic ambition would seem to require grappling with the world and experience. A drive
away from matter into form abstracts from this “content,” but the white oxen and oysters
represent also a regressive instinct in Burke to a pre-adolescent, normal innocence, as
though the mind, wresting from matter into form, could find no other object than its
origin and negation. Burke cannot so easily overcome Pater's aestheticism, and Burke's
persistent use of such terms as “dull” and “blunt” to describe sensation suggest the
opposite of what Burke had, at first in 1915, considered to be Pater's strength: acuity.
Much of Burke's ambiguity towards aesthetic sensation lies in his treatment of a
Paterian staple: visual landscape. Alfred, Bert Hamilton from “The Black Sheep,”
Dowers and Murdock from “The Storm,” and even Matthew Carr at the end of “The
White Oxen,” not only exult in the landscape but draw from it an intimation of
transcendental meaning.
Four Essays from 1920: American and French
One of the undated essays from this period may go back to Burke’s Columbia
days of 1917. In “Degeneracy of the Gloss,” Burke complains about the dull marginal
comments in books at the Columbia library. Two essays, “Carrie A. Nation” and “Basis
of the American Attitude,” cannot be dated precisely, but were likely written in the period
1918-1920. The latter mentions “the glory [for the English] of the purification which is
supposed to have come with the war” (1), so may have been after the war ended in 1918.
The former, while it does not mention the Prohibition of 1920 directly, may have been
inspired by those measures in preparation or implementation.
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“The Basis of the American Attitude” finds the primary features of the American
scene to be self-absorption, vulgarity, and chaos. Commercial rivalry with England and a
decadent local Puritanism force a pivot of American intellectuals toward France, but the
lack of any social institutions in the U.S. on par with the “European café [leaves] a
surprisingly large proportion of the population who are left to develop in loneliness” (4).
This leads to a certain “morbidity” (4) in the American character, against which the
morality of “prudence” (3) is helpless to contend. Just as the New York subway itself
“discount[s] … the mere individual” (4),
[T]he new generation in America, filled with the brutal awareness of political
corruption, sex perversion, imperialistic oppression, industrial exploitation -- filled in
short with the acute consciousness of numberless violences, and backed by enough
non-English blood to get into the glut of these things, has already done much to
disintegrate our hang-over official mentality. (5)
For Burke, the tide of historical change was toward disintegration of the old EnglishPuritanical social code, which he left to die its own death. (With the assistance of
Thorstein Veblen, Burke would later call this process a “cultural lag”). In its place,
however, would be “frankness,” the “hog psychology” of Ragtime (4), vulgarity, chaos,
and morbidity, natural responses to violence and loneliness.
Burke linked this change demographically to “non-English blood” and the influx
of “plebian” immigrants (4). Another response to the cultural dislocation of America lay
in simplification—one of the earliest uses I have seen of a hugely important Burkean
term. One kind of American simplification lay in nationalism, the “vigorous” kind Burke
might have expected from Theodore Dreiser (as opposed to the “complexity” of the
Russians). Burke evidently represented another kind of American simplification in the
form of evangelist and anti-alcohol crusader Carrie A. Nation. Burke’s essay on her

172

autobiography, entitled “Carrie A. Nation,” is undated but was likely written in 1919-20.
It seems clearly, in part, motivated by the advent of Prohibition, which took effect
January 1, 1920. Burke links the mental phenomena of “simplification” to crisis points in
the “age” of both persons and cultures.
Burke begins “Carrie A. Nation” by describing four “periods” of life in a person:
puberty; adolescence; an unnamed “heated summer between the ages of twenty-eight and
thirty” which, for Church initiates, had involved “the last decisive struggle for their
faith”; and “a fourth phase” above the age of forty, when a person proves less and less
able to adapt in a situation which may demand adaptation (1). Given this psychological
schema, he maps it onto the life of Carrie Nation. Second, Burke describes “the ‘freak’
era in American psychology, an age when, so insistent was the popular demand for
standardization, for total conformity to type, that every deviation was immediately
singled out and put under the glass” (12). Carrie Nation was put under the glass and made
into a “freak,” a clown of her own prophesy, in a typically modern (and urban) revision
by classification.
To be sure, Burke valorizes Carrie Nation in his way. Burke gives her credit for
“light, and the manna of spontaneous speech - these, I submit, constitute the major
equipment of prophecy [sic]” (6). And he concludes his essay with a hopeful quotation
about the possibilities of America. But I submit, the most important aspect of the essay is
the way Burke chronicles what he calls Carrie Nation’s “matter of method … the
perfection of a technique” in her prophesy (5). This is most likely a concealed proxy for
Burke himself, as he works out his own method and technique of prophesy: “light, and
the manna of spontaneous speech.”

173

A person who has reached the “fourth stage” around age forty must adapt to a new
situation precisely having adjusted more or less satisfactorily to a previous one. Now
Burke divides the possibilities for this adaption according to two types of person, based
on the concepts of internal and external. The “external” creature is the hero or genius—
aggressive—and the prophet or maniac, recessive. The latter attempts to socialize by only
adjusting her or his inner world to external conditions, whereas a genius or hero like
Napoleon or Shakespeare “forge[s] himself some external equivalent” to match his “inner
certainty” (6). Then again, Burke concedes, some people are a “mixture” of these types,
including Carrie Nation.
The “mixture” types include “[t]he evangelist, the reformer, the crank” (7). The
equation is simple enough: first develop your inner conviction of God, and then begin
smashng saloons. In Carrie Nation’s case, she “found a set of social conditions suitable to
her state of mind: and her militant career as prohibitionist and ‘joint-smasher’ began” (7).
I treat Burke’s flight into Greenwich Village in 1918 as a paradigmatic case of Burke
trying to find a set of social conditions suitable to his state of mind.
Burke’s antithetical mind counters Carrie Nation with the story of another
“conversion,” that by J.-K. Huysmans, precursor of Oscar Wilde and Remy de Gourmont.
Burke’s review of Huysmans’s En Route, undated and titled “Gastronomic Art,” is
marked with the address of 143 Waverly Place, Burke’s address between February and
May 1920, so he likely wrote the review during that time. Huysmans’s professional arc,
according to Burke, develops from a “low-visioned drudgery” of Zolaesque naturalism,
to the perversions and erudition of Medieval Latin, to outright conversion to Catholicism.
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Just as Carrie Nation looks forward to a better future, Huysmans burrows
backward in time: “The passion and strenuousness of the Dark Ages held a peculiar
fascination for Huysmans, until he became one of the most eloquent apologists of the
period” (2). Commenting on this movement, Burke surmises that “his conversion was an
artistic necessity, that he chose the foot of the cross rather than face complete literary
suicide” (3). In a handwritten note which was probably written after Burke had finished
“Gastronomic Art,” he writes, “The phenomenon of Huysmans is the phenomenon of the
artistic shaping the non-artistic. … No doubt a good Catholic, but first of all a writer, and
a Catholic because he was poisoned enough to determine on continuing as a writer.” Yet
Huysmans after all achieved “a type of writing peculiar to himself … a lover of exact
expression, and an expert in the manufacture of Ciceronian thunder” (3-4). Huysmans, to
Burke, seemed to have worked his way backwards in time to a novel synthesis of
expression and art.
Burke’s first published book review, of John Cournos’s The Mask, appeared in the
April 1920 issue of The Dial. From the manuscript we know this essay was finished by
February 25, 1920. It combines many of the themes he had already developed in letters to
Cowley. In a way, it rehearses Burke’s entire journey since 1915. Burke sets up Dreiser,
English novels, and “Russian epilepticism” as examples of “magnitude” in fiction (55).
These are the “immersed-in-lifers” (56), for which the French — “Huysmans, Gide, de
Gourmont”—make an obvious contrast. His conclusion? “The novel is too rigid a form to
express an age like the present” (57). Burke converts a critical judgment, French
literature over English/American/Russian, into an epochal claim. Burke votes for the
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regressive, withdrawn French over the progressive, vigorous Americans. Like Huysmans
and Gourmont, Burke finds an affinity of his own time with a new Dark Ages.
Remy de Gourmont and Burke’s Catholic Awakening
The first major test of Burke’s new stance was a lengthy review of Remy de
Gourmont for The Dial, completed by June 12, 1920 (To Josephson 6/12/20). The archive
contains hand-written notes, many on note cards, on no fewer than eighteen works by
Gourmont written over a thirty-year span. Burke cites many of these sources, along with
others, in his survey of Gourmont which The Dial published in February 1921. I have
chosen to end with Gourmont not because the summer of 1920 is an end point, but
because Gourmont was another one of those overwhelming influences that came along
for Burke every few years, on par with Walter Pater and Henri Bergson.
Pater ignited Burke’s agon of the intellect against sensation; Bergson alerted him
to the component of time; Gourmont implausibly combines Pater and Bergson, one part
aesthete and one part natural scientist. Gourmont’s main difference from Bergson is that
the former’s historical view is regressive, looking back to the Jesuit order and eternal
Paganism, while the latter is a Darwinian progressive, going so far as to nearly equate
“creation” with the passage of time itself. Reading Gourmont, it does seem as if Walter
Pater had read Huysmans and Bergson.
The following attempts an antithetical reading of Gourmont via Burke. I
acknowledge a Master’s thesis recently written by Alexander Joseph Hayden entitled
“Dissociation and Identification: The Influence of Remy de Gourmont on Kenneth
Burke.” Hayden’s project surrounds the two writers’ theoretical projects at large, while I
want to just focus on this moment of misprision during the first half of 1920. I will first
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analyze Burke’s swerve from Gourmont, and then focus on two elements of Gourmont I
deem significant to Burke henceforward: Gourmont’s metaphysics of sensation and his
Catholic historiography. Out of the eighteen works of Gourmont that Burke cites in
“Approaches to Remy de Gourmont,” published in The Dial in February 1921, Burke
devotes by far the most attention to La Culture des Idées and Le Chemin de Velours, with
seven citations apiece. The first of these books, near-sequels published in 1900 and 1902,
includes Gourmont’s famous essay “Dissociation of Ideas,” but much of both texts has
never been translated into English.
Let us first examine the crucial moment of Burke’s published essay, when he
renders a judgment on Gourmont at one stroke, employing all the metaphysics the young
Burke could muster against such a formidable foe:
[D]e Gourmont was now cast against life for the first time. The war had startled him
out of his theory, deprived him of the purity of his Epicureanism. The vigour of his
intelligence, it seems, had delayed as far as old age the struggle with vital forces that
most of us have experienced before twenty. Until now, he had succeeded in saddling
his emotions with ideas; but the war, which was hardly more than an irritation to so
many, became an overwhelming flood to him. For the most part, his war books are
the magnificent ruins of a great intelligence. (136-7)
Just barely aged twenty-three when writing this in 1920 (Burke was born May 5, 1897),
Burke attacks in Gourmont everything Burke himself had been resisting for at least five
years, the scope of this dissertation. Vigor and Epicureanism are harbingers of Dreiser
and Pater, respectively, but Burke transforms these into the intellect, even the “pure”
intellect, when projecting onto Gourmont. As Burke had projected his “adolescence” onto
Edouard Rod and Mary MacLane, so he does onto Gourmont.
Curious reversals tend to be a sign of misreading. Where Burke had always
aligned himself with the intellect against sensation and emotion, now he criticizes
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Gourmont for having inadequately experienced sensation and emotions throughout his
long life. “I may have detested it,” Burke seems to say, “but I put up with beastly
sensuality more than you did.” It is an upwelling of Burke’s American pride (perhaps
tinged with Russian?) against the over-intellectual Frenchman who could not withstand
the flood of sensuality (“the war”) which flooded upon him.
So, Burke grants himself some superiority in his American toughness, and wins a
victory, it would seem, over the Frenchman, when he had so long clamored for French
asceticism in both art and expression. But let us, as antithetical critics, see where
Gourmont takes his revenge for Burke’s purposive misreading. Let us follow the entire
argument of La Culture des Idées and Le Chemin de Velours and not just “Dissociation of
Ideas,” just as we read diverse works of Cicero and not just the oratorical treatises.
The first chapter of the first book is titled “On Style or Writing,”5 where
Gourmont writes, “A criticism of style must begin with a criticism of the inner vision, by
an essay on the formation of images” (95). The second chapter, “Subconscious Creation,”
continues the pursuit: “How does a sensation become an image, the image an idea?”
(152). The transformation of sensation into image is a subconscious procedure, but we
can have a better grasp on the transformation from image to idea. “Dissociation of Ideas”
only follows this hierarchy of the sensation climbing to the idea: “a notion, to be entitled
to the name of idea, must be innocent of all compromise with the contingent” (21). This
sounds a lot more like Schopenhauer than it does Bergson, and indeed Gourmont
frequently alludes to Schopenhauer, whom he had read well.

5

When possible, I use Glenn S. Burne’s translation of Gourmont. When not available, the reader must
suffer my translation of Gourmont’s French.
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Gourmont differs from the Germans in his return to the senses. Sensation is not
bad; ideas should work in service of the senses. Only when popular and/or contingent
sensation is taken for an idea are ideas and sensation travestied. For this reason,
Gourmont’s historiography praises popular religion but damns popular prejudice.
Gourmont’s historical models, the Jesuits, cultivate an elite intellect in service of the
people. It is hard to believe Burke read through La Culture des Idées and Le Chemin de
Velours without absorbing this, at least subconsciously. More and more, it seems a basic
feature of Burke’s rhetoric. To establish the relationship between religion and art,
Gourmont introduces religion through the double schema of sensation and intelligence:
Le catholicisme est le christianisme paganisé. Religion à la fois mystique et sensuelle,
il peut satisfaire, et il a satisfait uniquement, pendant longtemps, les deux tendances
primordiales et contradictoires de l'humanité, qui sont de vivre à la fois dans le fini et
dans l'infini, ou, en termes plus acceptables, dans la sensation et dans l'intelligence.
(140)
[Catholicism is paganized Christianity. A religion at once mystical and sensual, it can
satisfy, and it uniquely satisfied, for a long time, the two primordial tendencies and
contradictions of humanity, which are to live at the same time in the finite and in the
infinite, or, in more acceptable terms, in sensation and in intelligence.]
It was not a matter, for Gourmont, of “saddling his emotions with ideas” as the young
Burke accused. Rather, Gourmont would say, the Protestants and their ilk gradually (and
sometimes suddenly) destroyed the sensual artistry of the Church: “elle n’a plus
d’influence sur l’esprit secret des races, qui est avide de beauté corporelle et de
magnificence [it no longer has influence on the secret spirit of races, which is avid for
corporal beauty and for magnificence]” (146). Burke interpreted Gourmont’s
susceptibility to war-feelings as a weakness of an intellect overpowered by sensation, but
perhaps Gourmont’s rage at Germany during World War I had its grounding in the
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explicit defense of sensation. Burke, an American free to choose sides or reserve his
sympathy for a high-minded neutrality, perhaps was unable to appreciate this.
Gourmont’s historiographical finesse, and its relationship to his theoretical
“dissociation of ideas” becomes more clear in Le Chemin de Velour [The Velvet Path]. It
turns out that after the Greeks, the Jesuits have been some of the best at dissociating
ideas, using their intellects, namely, in service of popular (and especially female)
sensuality. Gourmont laments the Protestant influence which led to French Jansenism,
captor of the scientific genius Pascal, who condemned the mostly Italian and Spanish
Jesuits as too permissive. Gourmont is full of admiration for the Jesuits: “Le Jésuite est
un être optimiste de sa nature. Son but est le bonheur. Il y croit et le veut, non pas
seulement après la mort, mais aujourd'hui même [The Jesuit is an optimistic being by
nature. His goal is happiness. He believes in it and wants it, not only after death, but
today as well]” (135). Like the Catholic Church itself, the Jesuits for Gourmont form a
bridge between the current day and ancient pleasures, “the secret spirit of races.” With
the subtlety of theological nuance, they tried to assure the people in their old ways.
Furthermore, Gourmont compares the Jesuits with modern day scientific
psychologists: “Ce Jésuite,” he writes of one Alphonse Antonio de Sarasa, “s'intéressait
aujourd'hui à la psychophysiologie [This Jesuit would interest himself today in psychophysiology]” (132). And the old theologian would do it for the same reason as the
modern day physician:
Pourquoi les casuistes ont-ils étudié les cas de conscience de l'amour? Mais pourquoi
y a-t-il en vente, à cette heure, trente ou quarante ouvrages de médecine vulgarisatrice
où les rapports sexuels sont examinés avec beaucoup moins de décence que dans
Sanchez ou dans Liguori? Cest qu'autrefois les hommes songeaient à leur salut et
qu'aujourd'hui ils songent à leur santé. Et ils voulaient conquérir leur salut comme
aujourd'hui conserver leur santé, sans se priver d'aucuns de leurs plaisirs. Les
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casuistes les rassuraient; les médecins les réconfortent. C'est en ces matières surtout
que l'humanité entend rester immuable car elle sent bien que, guérie de ses vices, elle
se trouverait du coup guérie de la vie, c'est-à-dire du plaisir de vivre. (168-9)
[Why did the casuists study cases of conscience of love? But why are there for sale, at
this hour, thirty or forty works of vulgar medicine where sexual rapports are
examined with much less decency than in {Jesuits} Sanchez or in Liguori? It is that in
older times men thought of their salvation and that today they think of their health.
And they wanted to conquer their salvation as today to conserve their health, without
depriving themselves of any of their pleasures. The casuists reassured them; the
doctors comfort them. It is in these matters above all that humanity learns to rest
immutable; because it well feels that, cleansed of its vices, it would find itself
cleansed of life, that is to say of the pleasure of life.]
On the one hand, Gourmont invalidates the antagonism between sensation and intellect
that Burke found so convenient against Pater. On the other, Gourmont employs an
historiographical parallel worthy of Bergson and Huysmans when he compares Jesuit
casuists with modern-day sex doctors. Permanence is achieved not in an aloof and
rigorous Protestantism (Gourmont would include Kant in this category), but in the
constant accommodation to temporal needs. I believe Gourmont’s metaphysics were
simply too large and complex for Burke to absorb completely when he studied Gourmont
early in 1920, and Burke’s misprision reflects his weaker part in the struggle.
Gourmont’s “subconscious” performs the same function as Bergson’s
suprasensible intuition or Burke’s “mood,” and Gourmont’s epistemology of the “pure
idea” shows the influence of Schopenhauer. Burke could not place his own intellectual
rigor above Gourmont’s, as Burke had attempted, with Marius the Epicurean, to place his
above Pater’s. The best Burke could do was reverse the charge and claim that
Gourmont’s intake of sensuality was insufficient for him to resist the emotional
patriotism of the herd during World War I. Burke judged him from an American point of
view, and his nearly opposite reactions to Pater and to Gourmont should sufficiently
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illustrate Burke’s ambivalence on the question of sensation and the intellect; the
importance of this question to Burke as well.
Burke’s spirit of accommodation and universalism, as well as his newfound
cathexis to the body (see Moving Bodies by Hawhee), may come in great part from
Gourmont, and Burke would continue to see the Catholic Middle Ages as an era of
unified meanings. Burke was no great friend to Protestantism, as Attitudes Toward
History makes clear. Aligned attitudes such as progress, technology, and finance
capitalism, did not gain much favor with Burke either. Much of this seems to me a relic
of Burke’s encounter with Gourmont. Gourmont, in turn, should be viewed as both a
theorist of writing and a complex historiographer of the 17th century, when, according to
Gourmont, the Jesuit order made a heroic last stand in favor of eternal paganism.
Conclusion: Aesthetics and Sensation in Rhetoric
At the end of 1918, after a few bruising love affairs, Burke started writing notes
for a story called “The Birth of a Philosophy,” under the influence of J.-K. Huysmans’s À
Rebours, whose main character Des Esseintes retreats into “a refined Thebaid, a desert
hermitage equipped with all modern conveniences, a snugly heated ark on dry land in
which he might take refuge from the incessant deluge of human stupidity” (22). Burke
wanted something a little different for his hero Alfred, in a swerve from Huysmans: “His
philosophy, then, is the renunciation of nothing, but the moderate incorporation of
everything where this is possible. Where this is not possible, renunciation is the next best
course. But still, we should not renounce before taking.” I have tried to follow this advice
in my treatment of Burke’s archive, and Burke followed it in his intellectual project.
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This makes Burke a Ciceronian figure in the non-canonical sense. Both Cicero
and Burke are intellectual dabblers who somehow found in “rhetoric” (“oratorio” in
Latin) a unifying term for discourse and society. It would be absurd, in studying either of
them, to separate aesthetics from rhetoric, even if Burke attempted this separation
himself, and Cicero observed a difference between the active and contemplative life.
Informed by the techniques of Gourmont, Burke learns to dissociate the idea of “rhetoric”
from its concrete setting, while retaining the abstract placeholders “situation” and
“scene.”
The striving for “purification” is Gourmont’s before it is Burke’s, and Gourmont
has an antecedent in Schopenhauer: “A notion that has achieved the status of an idea has
become indisputable: it is a cipher, a sign, one of the letters of the alphabet of thought. …
There exists a pure art which is solely concerned with its own self-realization” (Burne 21,
27). Whatever Burke came to say or think about Gourmont’s defense of “art-for-art’s
sake,” mingled as it was with Burke’s concerns about his own adolescence, Gourmont’s
drive for metaphysical purity contaminated Burke as a quest for ultimate principles in
communication.
The preceding dissertation has charted Kenneth Burke in careful documentary
detail from his origin as a “Slavian Junior and Oscarian Senior” in high school (1913-15)
through the summer of 1920. The story does not end there, of course. Burke wrote more
essays and stories in 1920 that I did not include in this study. He earned money as a book
reviewer and translator, and eventually as an editor for The Dial. Nevertheless, I hope to
have captured something vital and complex about Burke even in these earliest years.
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The method of influence studies not only clarifies Burke’s debts, anxieties, and
equivocal triumphs, but also highlights his particular revision of the British and French
aesthetic tradition. For example, we open to the first pages of Arthur Symons’s Studies in
Prose and Verse, which the young Burke read avidly around 1915-16, and we find the
following passage: “Literature, in making its beautiful piece of work, has to use words
and facts; these words, these facts, are the common property of all the world, to whom
they mean no more than what each individually says, before it has come to take on
beautiful form through its adjustment in the pattern” (2). This is by no means a Marxist
criticism, but we can see in the words, “the common property of all the world,”
intimations of an unexplored metaphysic.
Perhaps we only sense this possibility in Symons because Burke exploited it so
thoroughly. One of Burke’s most enduring legacies to communication theory may
ironically be his revitalization of the 19th century aesthetics of sensation. Remy de
Gourmont writes the most directly, of all the authors considered above, on the physiology
of language, and this topic haunted Burke throughout his life. Gregory Clark has oriented
Burke in terms of art, through his work on jazz and other aesthetic experiences, but the
aesthetic writers themselves—Pater, Wilde, Gourmont, even Henri Bergson, if we
consider him as a philosopher of art—are not considered part of rhetorical history as
such.
What can the aesthetic writers teach us about rhetoric? The material charted in the
preceding dissertation is marked most strongly by the presence of Walter Pater’s Marius
the Epicurean, a presence that scarcely diminishes throughout these years. Burke read
Marius in October 1915, had it on his table in March 1918 (To Cowley 3/21/18) and re-
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read it August 1920 (To Josephson 8/29/20). In Marius, Pater gives us the “rhetorical
situation” of ancient Rome from a metaphysical point of view essentially British
empiricist. The book’s subtitle, “A Novel of Sensations and Ideas,” could be taken
straight from John Locke or David Hume.
No matter how you configure “rhetoric” in the English-speaking world in the 20th
century and after, you must confront British power as historically antagonistic to the
Roman Empire. Gourmont understood this when he lamented the rise of Protestantism
and the decline of Jesuit casuistry. “Rhetoric” as we know it, including St. Augustine, is a
Roman phenomenon, even as the Romans absorbed and transmitted the Greeks. Once it
becomes too Aristotelian, it verges on logic alone, governed by impersonal philosophical
norms.
British rhetoric, from Locke until today, rests on a naïve empiricism that
maintains what I mean by a word must be identical to what you mean by a word. Words
and their referents, thoughts and ideas, must in this view be at least commensurate, if not
identical. The poets and their legatees teach otherwise. Perhaps Oscar Wilde will never
be considered a rhetorical theorist in the canonical anthologies, but he should be. After
British power, certainly by the 20th century, you have two choices: science and the
imagination. Modern dualism is represented by the split between objective and subjective
orders of rationality. It has been fashionable in the second half of the 20th century to point
to Friedrich Nietzsche as the eminent modern theorist of the lie, but Wilde is just as
profound on the topic.
When a writer such as Arthur Symons sneers at the term “rhetoric,” he merely
lodges a protest against Roman culture. Rhetorical theorists should not be quick to
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dismiss those who ridicule their profession, and assume the jeerers have nothing to teach
them about their art. Simply put, British and French aestheticism is an elitist culture of
letters, which came to prize subjectivity and originality. The institutional polemics
involved in creating and holding a disciplinary identity have demanded that we not ask
certain “rhetorical questions” of the aesthetes.
Kenneth Burke, however, allows us to, in part by Romanizing them. Burke is
Ciceronian in his word-consciousness, but whereas Cicero’s philosophy was Greek, ours
and Burke’s is British and German. If there is to be any aristocracy, something in Burke
implies, it is to be an aristocracy of style. You cannot really imitate style, nor falsify it,
nor mass produce it. Going one step further in the chain, this is why Harold Bloom is
such a keen guide to Burke: Bloom shows us Burke the original and inimitable stylist, an
aristocrat of discourse even while proclaiming himself, Whitman-like, of the people.
Let us return to identification as an aesthetic concept. As we have seen, Burke’s
drive for identification, from author to author, follows the path of the intellect dogged by
sensation. The aesthetic ideal is to capture, portray, or evoke the sensation in words, but
how can words, “common property of all,” convey an elite, individual sensibility? The
game of language takes on the dimension of social power in the lop-sidedness or
inequality of interpretive power. Confronted by the sensual richness of his aesthetic
precursors, Burke continually abstracted, German-style, until his “logology” seems to
fairly twinkle in its rarified, mystical atmosphere.
Just as the aesthetic writers—Wilde most explicitly—wanted to transform “life”
and “nature” into something better, Burke remained forever occupied with the difference
between life and art, not always sure which was better. This is a strong misreading of the
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aesthetic tradition, and what Burke may have lost in sensuous beauty, he made up for (to
what degree may be uncertain) in a conceptual architecture which should be called
mystical. Whether or not you consider Burke a “central” communication theorist depends
on your purpose in scholarship and criticism.
If the goal is to create a reliable and reproducible method for regularizing
knowledge about some empirical object, whether it be a speech, media document, or
more complex construction, Burke will probably yield dissatisfying results. But if you
want to orient yourself in a world bifurcated between art and science, where sensation is
alienated from words about that sensation, Burke can provide a model way of thinking.
Burke’s drive for “purity” goes well beyond the point at which most of us are likely or
willing to follow him. He is likely to have already schematized a problem before we
know what questions to ask, beyond the extent to which we want or need it schematized.
As an exercise in reading, there are few challenges as difficult and rewarding as
Kenneth Burke. I cannot prophesy his fate in the academy any better than I can predict
his impact on any given reader who might come across his work or this dissertation. But I
do hope this study can assist initiation, both into Burke and into the aesthetic writers who
influenced him.
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